Doxa by unknown
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
Budapest

DOXA
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
3
Institute o f Philosophy 
Hungarian Academy o f Sciences
Budapest
DOXA 3 
I 984
aeriee editor 
János Kelemen
PREPRINT 
ISSN 0236-6932
©  Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences
József Lukács director, publisher 
At the Printing Office of the Institute for Culture,Gábor 
Fazekas printer
CONTENTS
V. Békés: Towards the Reconstruction of a "Missing
Paradigm* 7
B. Dajka: Social Life and Social Semantics 25
M. Fehér: Some Remarks on the Kripke-Putnam Theory of
Reference 35
I. Hronszky: Measurement Data which Played a Trick on
Theory 53
J. Lukács - J. Kelemen: Some Issues in Social Science
Methodology - A Hungarian Perspective 69
A. Müller: Determinacy of Physical Events 79
K. Redl: On the First European Theory of Money 95
J. Sipos: On the Materialistic Approach to the Psyche
and Problems of Psychophysiology 117
T.J. Szécsényi: The Structuralist View on Equilibrium
Thermodynamics 131

DOXA 3 is the second volume of a selection of Hun­
garian studies in the philosophy, logic and history 
of science, published in English on the occasion 
of the 5th Joint International Conference on History 
and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS). For more details, 
see the introduction to OOXA 2. Let us, however, 
repeatedly express our thanks to the authors for 
the generous contribution of their articles, many 
of which have been specially written for this pub­
lication. We were greatly helped by the Committee 
for the History, Logic and Philosophy of Science at 
the Postgraduate Training and Information Centre for 
Philosophy, Lor&nd Eötvös University.
The Reader is invited to send reflections and other 
contributions to the editor, or address himself 
directly to the authors in case further material 
or permission to reprint their articles is needed. 
Please send all mail to the Institute of Philosophy, 
Budapest:
MTA Filozófiai Intézete - DOXA
1054 Budapest, Szemere u. 10
Hungary
5

VERA BÉKÉS
TOWARDS THE RECONSTRUCTION OF A "MISSING PARADIGM
"Has sich aufhebt, wird dadurch nicht 
zu Nichts."
Hegel
"How could history of science fail to be 
a source of phenomena to which theories 
about knowledge may legitimately be 
asked to apply?"
T.S. Kuhn
According to his influential conception of paradigm, 
Thomas Kuhn asserts that the approach of a scientific revolu­
tion is signalled by an Increasing number of anomalies (irre­
ducible paradox) inside normal science. The scientific com­
munity is not easily persuaded that a problem can be such an 
anomaly: there are always some who are eager to refute the 
•scandalous" theorem, and others who try to develop alter­
native theories to avoid the emergence of paradox. The problem 
leads to crisis when these "extraordinary" endeavours, as it 
seems to normal research,do not succed. However, researchers 
who have, from the very beginning, regarded the problematic 
theorem as an anomaly Insolvable within the prevailing para­
digm, now more or less find themselves rooted in a différant 
paradigm, and pass their judgements from that new standpoint.
In the philosophy of science, the theorem of incommen­
surability, and the meaning variance theorem connected to it, 
seem to be precisely such and anomaly. As is well-known, these 
theorems assert that, in the absence of an absolute, neutral 
and Independent "measuring rod", the consecutive paradigms are 
categorically, methodologically and epistemologically, etc., 
inconmensurable. What is more, the terms used in these theo­
ries undergo a radical change of meaning. Thus, the theorem
7
which was originally used to explain the radicality of shifts 
in the paradigms of the special sciences, and to render many 
paradoxes in the history of science Interpretable, has itself 
created a new, meta-level paradox, emerging as an anomaly 
vithin the philoeophioal ay et eme themselves which explore the 
history of the development of the sciences.*
Logical positivists have tried to refute this theorem, 
which they consider to necessarily Involve both irrationality 
and relativity. But their arguments have either turned out to 
be irrelevant, or, if acknowledged as relevant, their only 
effect was to push the radicals towards a more consistent 
formulation in order to uphold the theorem of incommensura­
bility and meaning variance. (It is worth mentioning that 
opponents of P. Feyerabend could attack his, in some cases, 
ambivalent, pre-“Against Method" views, but never the prin­
ciple of incommensurability itselfi2
The “moderate" philosophers have tried to eliminate the 
incommensurability problem by developing alternative models. 
Their aim is, in direct opposition to Kuhn, to develop an 
evolutionary model wherein this paradox does not emerge at 
all.3 Only a small group (first of all Kuhn, Feyerabend, Han­
son and Toulmin) consider the incommensurability theorem to 
be a revolutionary, that is, “fatal“ anomaly. For this reason, 
they are regarded as radicals. They seak a solution within 
the classical categorisation of rationality, which has been 
traditionally accepted since Descartes (but not before).4
In this paper, I will try to outline a conception which 
involves incommensurability, but does not view it as a dis­
astrous catastrophy. On the contrary, I will use it as a 
etarting point, a preeuppoeition. All the paradoxes which have 
been formulated to refute this theorem will not only seem 
theoretical, and not at all following from the theorem as its 
consequences but, fuet to the contrary, the theorem providee 
a formulation of real hietorieal phenomena, which occur when 
there is a radical transformation of scientific knowledge be­
tween two consequtive paradigms. (As long as we consider only
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two paradigms, the paradox will remain insolvable.)5
My starting point is a logical consequence of applying 
the principle of discontinuity to the history of science. The 
mere idea of historical continuity and cumulativity being a 
myth (without accepting the more radical incommensurability 
theorem) opens new perspectives for research in the history 
of science. In the same way, using historical facts, and 
without discarding any radical conclusions, the results nay 
even modify the theory of shifting paradigms. Moreover, a 
conscious application of this theorem as a presupposition may 
reveal why its advocates had to stop short (that is to say, 
why the problem of incommensurability actually remained an 
anomaly). We may also get a glimpse of that new model which 
will be based on facts of the history of science, and in 
which the anomaly of incommensurability "can be made law- 
like".6
2. We can draw some interesting conclusions from the in­
commensurability theorem on the nature of anomalies in gener­
al.
What is the origin of these "fatal" anomalies? Kuhn 
answers this question - although not in an entirely resolute 
way -, saying that it is the paradigms themselves which prod­
uce the anomalies.7 He believes this to be the case in the 
problem of incommensurability as well, and he thinks it is 
these very circumstances which make him stop short. All at­
tempts at eliminating this problem must be hopeless, but, 
"...in the absence of a developed alternative", he finds it 
Impossible to entirely relinquish the epistemological view­
point that has largely guided Western philosophy for three 
centuries, although he feels it no longer functions effee-
Qtively. Kuhn also refers to "... what might, in another phi- 
solophlcal climate,have been taken for granted" (my italics, 
UBJ, precisely in the context of the equality of meaninggvariance to an altered world. Feyerabend puts it in a similar 
way: "Incommensurable theories, then, can be refuted by ref-
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erence to their own respective kinds of experience (in the 
absence of commensurable alternatives these refutations are 
quite weak, however).*10 To put it in another way, the fol­
lowers of the incommensurability theory claim that it is pre­
cisely the abeenoe of commensurable alternatives which effects 
its paradoxical conclusions. However, it is to be noted that 
Kuhn formulated this theorem and the whole paradigm conception 
in general, as if from outside, on the basis of anothtr para­
digm.11 As far as Kuhn's sources are concerned, it would seem 
that the majority lie beyond the atomist, lnductlvist, sen­
sualist, etc., paradigm, and the same can also be said for 
Feyerabend. One could say that these elements are already 
conceptions belonging to a new paradigm. (Kuhn also says that
■often a new paradigm emerges, at least in embryo, before a
12crisis has developed far or been explicitly recognized.")
The constitutive role played by these "other* (for the time 
being let us suppose new) embryo paradigms in formulating the 
theorem makes it questionable whether the anomaly has indeed 
come into being within the prevailing paradigm. If we set out 
to investigate the sources within their historical context, 
the whole problem might receive a new and unexpected perspec­
tive.
3. The application of the principle of discontinuity in 
the history of science has already changed, to a great extent, 
the overall attitude of the historigaphy of sciences the 
methods, and also the subject matter, have undergone modifi­
cation. The aim has ceased to be the search for forerunners 
and doing them justice under the aegis of the cumulativity 
myth. Now research is aimed at a discontinuous historical 
reconstruction of competitive scientific paradigms. As the 
paradigm theory showed that, in the absence of a means of 
neutral measurement, the border between conceptions regarded 
as scientific, or pseudo-scientific, is relative and often 
arbitrary, Kuhnian historiography extends into territories 
barred by positivism. (Of course, this type of historicity 
does not go back to Kuhn himself, and it is significant that
10
one of Kunh's basic sources is the work of the non-positivlst- 
ic Duhemian, Alexandre Koyré. This is again characteristic of 
the anomaly-generating capacity of the ‘other* paradigm.)
The research done by the new generation has, understan­
dably enough, turned towards epochs and topics which have, 
until new, counted as ‘terra Incognita*. This throws light 
on two imbalaneea which are even characteristic of non-tele- 
ologistic reconstructions. On the one hand, the overwhelming 
majority of research has been directed towards the origin and 
development of natural «eianea». Research directed towards 
social sciences, itself on a much smaller scale, has shown 
little interest in the concept of paradigm. Nevertheless, the 
majority of sources contributing to the elaboration of the 
paradigm theory and the incommensurability problem art not 
from natural sciences, but from social science. On the other 
hand, there is a similar imbalance in that the reconstructions 
in the history of science (which, in the literature, mostly 
means natural science) usually come to an end at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. They then skip over a dim apoah of 
several decades, resuming the reconstruction somewhere around 
the 1880's, thus concentrating on the direct precedessors of 
the 20th century. These imbalances seem to be significant, 
and can only partly be explained by the survival of the cu- 
mulativity myth. This odd situation is highlighted in the 
fact that the sources in social sciences which influenced Kuhn 
are theories which are not integrated into tho pooitiviat 
paradigm. They are, metaphorically speaking, "inolutione", or 
"ielande", and they have their origin in the pra-poaitiviat 
period, that is, preoiaely in that dim epoch which falls 
beyond the above-mentioned, historical investigations.
We have store and more reasons to assume that this epoch, 
which remained outside the scope of historical research, and, 
what is store, of our hiatorieal ooneeioueneea, seems to be an 
independent, oui generie, but loot or "mieeing paradigm".
Contrary to the generally held belief that, since 
Descartes, the sciences have been based on a homogeneous tra­ il
il
ditlon with regard to their epistemological, logical, method­
ological, ethical, etc., aspects, we must now acknowledge 
emother, forgotten paradigm which constituted a different, 
non-Carteeian alternative. In addition, this alternative not 
only existed as a philosophical (epistemological, antropol- 
ogical, etc.) conception, (it was recognised as such in the 
great dialectical period of classical German philosophy) but, 
at its height, the “missing paradigm“ had, in all probability, 
full control over the scientific theory and praxis of the era. 
This paradigm had its origins in the conflict with Enlightened 
Rationalism and perished in the fight against Positivism.
The fact that this paradigm is lost to our present 
range of historical knowledge may substantiate the theorem of 
incommensurability and radical meaning variance: as long as 
there are two paradigms and they are Incommensurable, there is 
no possibility of translation between them, and the conquered 
paradigm will vanish. Examining the history of the “missing 
paradigm“ may throw light upon the real function of the prin­
ciple of incommensurability.13
4. But, adhering to the presupposition that elimination 
in the sense of “Aufhebung* does not mean entire liquidation 
(this kind of dialectics is again part of the “missing para­
digm*), we can conclude that the vanished paradigm has, in 
fact, partly survived. Theories on the development of science 
do not give due importance to this phenomenon, for they only 
know the alternatives of either accepting the victorious para­
digm or facing excommunication from science. However, it is 
also possible that, after the disintegration of the old para­
digm, fragments of it survive as “inclusion» "*iiich the conquering 
paradigm cannot either liquidate or integrate. We can come to 
some understanding of the nature of an unintegrated conception 
by drawing the following comparison, using the original mean­
ing of 'paradigm': an unintegrated and unintegrateable theory 
behaves like the irregular conjugation of a verb in grammar 
(a verb which does not follow the usual pattern). Every natu­
ral language is known to have such irregular conjugations.
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which are, In fact, fragmented remnant« of loet, arehaio 
paradigme.
A caramon feature of such enclosed conceptions is that 
their structure and attitude are incommensurable with the 
prevailing logic. Owing to radical meaning variance, their 
subject matter is so different, and their means of discus­
sion (methodological incommensurability) so deviant, that the 
conquering paradigm will never be willing and able to in­
corporate them. However, due to various factors, their exist­
ence must be tolerated.
So the vanished paradigm continues to exist in the 
form of ‘inclusions* (tendencies outside the mainstream of 
science, separate schools, isolated chairs at universities, 
or single researchers), and its latent existence has extra­
ordinary significance in the elaboration of new, emergent 
paradigms. The fact that a conception is an Inclusion in­
volves a specific relation which always expresses
the mutual positioning of three paradigms (the eliminated 
(A), the prevailing (B) and the forthcoming (A') paradigms). 
The consecutive paradigms are incommensurable, although there 
is a historical genetic continuity between the ceased para­
digm (A) and that which is forthcoming (A'), regardless of 
whether those in an ‘inclusion" position are aware of it 
(traditionists) or not (pioneers). If we examine the history 
of science from this angle, we find that, in most cases, 
those who champion the new paradigm (A') conflict with the 
prevailing one (B) because of their affinity with the logic 
of the missing paradigm (A). That is why they eventually 
develop their incommensurable, ‘new" alternative, which is 
at the same time ‘old“, corresponding to the paradigm before 
last. However, since they are mostly unaware of the missing 
paradigm as their actual frame of reference, they consider 
their sources, identified as inclusions, to be the first, 
embryo appearances of the forthcoming victorious paradigm 
(A'). I could indeed state the most Important point in my 
paper as follows: the new paradigm overcoming the actual one
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(B) is incommensurable with (B) but, nevertheless, it is com­
mensurable with (A) (the missing one, whose existence is to 
be historically acknowledged), therefore it uill be (A* ), not
(C) .
According to their general affinity with the logic in­
commensurable with the prevailing paradigm, inclusions can be 
assigned to four etagee.
(i) During the normal period of the prevailing para­
digm (B):
First stage: (which could also be called "zeroth stage“): 
entirely isolated conceptions superseded and crowded out of 
science. (Usually we are not aware of them at all, or they 
are accounted for as curiosities or negative examples.)
Second stage: surviving schools and tendencies. The normal 
scientific community holds the opinion of their presupposi­
tions that “though this be madness, yet there is method in't" 
Generally, questions posed by these schools do not in fact 
cause problems because (and this is one of their main charac­
teristics ) they are not even worth arguing about, they are 
simply avoided by the prevailing paradigm. Their existence at 
all is seen as an anomaly, especially when the prevailing 
paradigm holds methodological monopoly to be an eminent value 
Inclusions of this type consciously preserve continuity and 
their channels of transmission are known to them. They do not 
contest the theories of the victorious paradigm, as they pre­
serve and reproduce, in relatively clear contours, the char­
acteristics of the normal period of the missing paradigm.
Third stage: Theories in opposition to normal science (B), 
where the dimensions of controvery are unclear to normal 
science. At first these theories exert an all round effect in 
which, however, the original intentions are misunderstood. 
Thus they are present in the collective consciousness and, 
after the first “refusing" generation (contemporaries), the 
“interpreting“ generation (the disciples) follows. In this
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epoch, certain elements of the theory may penetrate normal 
science, contributing to Its growing sate of crisis. If the 
disciples are not "well-versed” enough, and the conception 
itself is rather important, the role of the penetrating ideas, 
even though their original import cannot be substantially 
Integrated, may become decisive in
(ii) the critical period of the prevailing paradigm
(B).
At this point, the third generation appears and this genera­
tion is always very responsive to the original conceptions. 
They do not interpret; instead, they intériorisé the counter- 
prevailing view-points and attitudes characteristic of the 
inclusion.
The authors concerned with inclusion theories at this stage 
are not usually conscious of their connection to the missing 
paradigm. The channels are hidden. Their itentlons are iden­
tical to the prçgram of the «xtraordinary phase of the missing 
paradigm, although there is no point of reference and no 
feeling of community. They start their fight "under the nose" 
of a prevalent paradigm. This temporarily very disadvantageous 
fight demands the most devoted intellectual courage and cre­
ativity, yielding an independence which may prompt new, orig­
inal thoughts.
Fourth stage: Theories formulating the "fatal" anomalies of 
paradigm (B), itself in crisis, belong here. At this point, 
they are no longer inclusions, but are rather theories belong­
ing to the new paradigm (A'). Its representatives are partly 
the disciples of the second stage in the formation of enclo­
sures and partly the third generation followers of the third 
stage, who can, with their "new" theories, successfully in­
tegrate conceptions which had hitherto been indlgestable. In 
their revolutionary offensive, they take their selectional 
aspects mainly from the results of the third stage. I believe, 
for exasq>le, that the Wittgensteinian distinction between 
private language and non-private language conceptions can
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prove very fruitful far beyond the philosophy of language, in 
discovering paradigmatically different viewpoints. tihis distinc­
tion is no less operational than the widely accepted helio­
centric, non-hellocentric,division of modern astrophysics.)
The second stage mainly offers a pattern by which the new 
paradigm (A’) can be made more coherent. This stage and the 
first stage also involve curiosities for later historiography, 
because they will be the main target of the “rehabilitating" 
or precursor vindicating manoeuvres of the history of science. 
This ideological, self-asserting component of “doing justice* 
to predecessors can hardly be eliminated from historiography. 
However, it will contribute to the actualizing of the poten­
tials of the missing paradigm, which is preserved in inclu­
sions .
5. In the ensuing example, I will illustrate my case. 
Kuhn mentions, in the Preface to his Structures, the impor­
tance he placed on his discovery of B. L. Whorf's theory re­
garding the effect languages exert on worldview. Kuhn's ar­
guments for the incommensurability theorem nearly always seem 
to be Whorfian and if they aren’t, then this deviation produces 
severe consequences. It is worth mentioning that neo-Hum- 
boldtian linguistics, principally associated with F. Boas,
E. Sapir and Whorf, forms no organic part of linguistics as 
such. It is an unintegrated conception, an inclusion. Hum- 
boldt himself cannot be accounted for in the traditional his­
toriography of linguistics.The explanation for this is that 
contemporary linguistics did not come about from nothing, from 
the sphere of "unscience". It emerged from a fight against 
“philosophical linguistics“ linked with German Sprachphilo­
sophie and directed by the now missing paradigm.Humboldt was 
the most outstanding figure of this school holding a non­
private conception of language, which was eventually over­
thrown by positivism. The American neo-Humboldtian school of 
linguistics is only an inclusion belonging to the second stage 
of a missing paradigm. Their fundamental theorem, drawn from
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Humboldt, has played a decisive role in the formulation of 
the incommensurability problem: the native language influ­
ences decisively and a priori our way of perceiving and inter­
preting reality. Non-privatistic epistemological presupposi­
tions have paradigmatic ally demarcated this theory from nor­
mal linguistics, which now stands on a positivist, privatis- 
tic base, and which has been homogeneous since the appearence 
of the “Young Grammarians“. When Kuhn thus argues about the 
conversion, he is ‘conjugating according to the missing para­
digm“, albeit unconsciously because he sees the difference 
between our relationship with our native language and with 
foreign languages to be paramount.(we find the same distinc­
tion in Wittgenstein's conception: when ashing for meaning, 
we should look at how children start to use language. When 
learning to speak, we also learn to experience, and so our 
experience is determined and regulated by the native language 
of our community. This process is unreflected.)
It is now more understandable that in the discussion on 
incommensurability and meaning variance, the different part­
ners were not talking about the same thing: they gavt dif- 
ftrtnt mtamngt to the tame terme. Logical positivism, and 
private language conceptions in general, find no philosophical 
difference between the learning process of the native language 
and that of a later-acquired language. According to this view, 
people acquire both by translating their direct, neutral 
sense-data and thoughts into a common language, which,as a 
mechanical tool for communication, is only secondary to pri­
vate thinking. We can conclude that the problem of radical 
meaning variance is eeeentially incomprehensible on the baeie 
of private (positivist) theories. The origin of Kuhn's prob­
lem lies with an inclusion with a non-private basis and, for 
this reason, he is able to conclude the following :
‘To translate a theory or worldview into one's own language is 
not to make it one's own. For that one must go native, discov­
er that one is thinking and working in, not simply translating 
out of, a language that was previously f o r e i g n . H e  is con-
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sequently arguing that the shift, the conversion which com­
prises the very heart of revolutionary process is not a mat­
ter of individual deliberation and choice. In many cases, a 
scientist who has made this choice intellectually has per­
ceived that "... the conversion required if it is to be ef­
fective eludes him. He may use the new theory nonetheless, 
but he will do so as a foreigner in a foreign environment, an 
alternative available to him only beeause there are natives 
already there. His work is parasitic on theirs, for he lacks
the constellation of mental sets whioh future members of the
1 7community will acquire through education." (My italics,
V.B. )
Kuhn, however, does not seem to be aware that the distinc­
tion between the native language and a foreign language - 
together with its philosophical presuppositions - belongs to 
the missing paradigm. Thus, his arguments “in the absence of 
a developed alternative" are now becoming uncertain and 
controversial: "...In the absence of a neutral language, the 
choice of a new theory is a decision to adopt a different 
native language and to deploy it in a correspondingly dif­
ferent world." (My italics, V.B.) Then he just adds "... That 
sort of transition is, however, not one which the terms
'choice' and 'decision' quite fit, though the reasons for
18wanting to apply them after the event are clear". However, 
he has conceded on Important issues to his critics from the 
standpoint of logical positivism. According to the original 
non-private notion, such choice or conversions are incompre­
hensible . The idea of 'another, new native language' is ab­
surd, or, to put it another way, the grammar of the notion of 
a 'native language’ excludes the possibility of its connection 
with the words 'new', and 'another'. If such a conversion 
still exists, his critics have every right to challenge Kuhn 
by asserting that, in this comparison, "just the processes 
before and after the acquirement of a new language remain un­
noticed. He learn a new language with the help of the old, 
and we do not generally forget the old after having acquired
18
the new."*9.
It is not by chance that Kuhn falls to notice the linguis­
tic process of acquiring. According to the original paradigm, 
the native language is the first language, not aoquirsd by 
translation. The native language is therefore without any 
lingual precedessor. Obviously, Kuhn is forced into this para­
dox by his presupposition that "new paradigms are born from 
old ones".^0 By contrast, if we consider the effects of a 
third, latent paradigm, this assumption is modified: new para­
digms are not born from the prevailing old ones, but from 
inclusions in which a third (missing) paradigm survives with­
in the prevailing paradigm. All paradigms produce insolvable 
problems, but their perception (their definition as fatal a- 
nomalies) originates from outside, from the inclusions. Inclu­
sions increase the number of anomalies by ’smuggling* in­
commensurable problems into the paradigm. Consequently, those 
speaking the native language of the new paradigm must already 
have been “native speakers* of this old-new language before 
the revolution and, owing to the inclusions, they have learnt 
a responsiveness which is incommensurable with the prevailing 
logic. Occasional moments of failure can be explained by the 
fact that the adherents of the new paradigm have not attained 
an adequate knowledge of their own operating frame of refer­
ence. The same holds true for the incommensurability problem: 
it will not be a "law-like phenomenon* but an anomaly as long 
as it is not reflected in its own commensurable basis. Until 
this occurs, they use the terms, even while posing the ques­
tions, in a sense which is interpreted, namely distorted, by 
paradigm (B). When there is a radical shift in paradigms, a 
radical conversion or translation is only possible in the 
debate if the party to be converted already has some sort of 
latent "inclusion experience". In order to have a real dialogue 
and not to talk through each other, the participants must re­
sort to such experience as a "common language". Communication 
breakdown can only be eliminated in this way, by having two 
commensurable languages communicating. If no latent inclusion
19
experience c m  be found to use as a basis of reference, no 
conversion or persuasion will follow, only Incommensurability.
6. What I have called "missing paradigms" are missing 
because we are not aware of their existence and because there 
are no alternative suggestions given to ease the crisis. The 
missing paradigms are not exceptional or specific, 19th cen­
tury phenomena. For those who accept the Kuhnian model, the 
relationship between discontinuous incommensurable paradigms 
is characterized by a specific kind of asymmetry: the over­
thrown paradigm's memory is only annihilated in those types 
of paradigm-shifts (although the shifts are always radical 
and the consecutive paradigms incommensurable) where the 
victorious paradigm is atomist, inductivist, and sensualist, 
that is, private-based. This tradition is strongly charac­
terized by an aspiration for methodological monopoly. In the 
other type of paradigm-shift, where non-privately based para­
digms are victorious, the situation is different. As Hegel 
put it, scientific activity is not regarded here as a con­
versation of Objective Reason with Itself.2  ^So it is pos­
sible that the presence of methodological plurality and the 
high number of rival theories, which Kuhn considers to be 
characteristic of an unripe, pre-opulent period preceding 
each paradigm occurs much more frequently them was thought, 
and this in Itself is sufficient evidence of a missing para­
digm.
Adding the conception of the "missing paradigm and its 
inclusions (in the next paradigm)" to Kuhn's paradigm theory, 
we receive a new model. In this model, we may preserve all 
notions of seienoe, even that of the development of science 
without posing an impossible demand for a neutral, absolute 
rule of thumb. The criteria of development will necessarily be 
relative , but relativity is not identical to an absence of 
measurement criteria. Here I only repeat an argument which
has been formulated during the past hundred years mostly by
22occupants of an inclusion position. This acceptance of rel-
20
ativity is a result of the insight that oar actual scale and 
criteria of measurement coordinating our activity is not the 
one and only possible rule of thumb. In the absence of know­
ledge about other scales, we maintain an unconscious rela­
tionship (that isrwe cannot speak of any relationship at all) 
with our criteria, or frame of reference. What must be un­
conditional in the end is not the absoluteness of the scale, 
but the fact of the actual existence of such a scale.
Loránd Eötvös University,
Budapest
NOTES
1. The present discussion of the incommensurability theorem, 
the crisis it has caused and the debate it gave rise to 
owes a great deal to the work of Márta Fehér. Cf. M. Fe­
hér, A tudományfejlődés kérdőjelei. A tudományos elméle- 
tek inkommensurábilitásának problémája (Questions of 
Scientific Development. The Problem of the Incommen­
surability of Scientific Theories) Akadémiai Kiadó, Buda­
pest, 1983.
2. Cf. M. Fehér, op.eit., p. 60
3. Cf. M. Fehér, ’Thomas Kuhn tudományfilozófiai paradigmá­
ja". (Thomas Kuhn's Paradigm in/of the Philosophy of 
Science) Postcript to the Hungarian edition of T.S. Kuhn, 
The Structure of Seientifio Revolutions (A tudományos 
forradalmak szerkezete) Gondolat Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 
1984, p. 317
4. T.S. Kuhn, The Struoture of Seientifio Revolutions. 2nd 
edn., enlarged. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1970, p. 195
5. The term "paradigm" is here used with the intention of 
retaining Kuhn's original conception, in all the "not 
less than twenty-one different senses* Identified by Mar-
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garet Masterman. (M. Masterman, “The Nature of a Paradigm", 
in: I. Lakatos - A. Musgrave, (eds.) Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge, 1970, p. 61.)
6. T.S. Kuhn, op. oit., p.
7. Cf. Ibid., p. 52
8. Ibid., p. 126
9. Ibid., p. 102
10. P.K. Feyerabend, "Consolations for the Specialist", in:
I. Lakatos - A. Musgrave (eds.), op. cit., p. 227
11. An observation made by M. Fehér, A tudomány fejlődés kér­
dőjelei..., p. 39
12. T.S. Kuhn, op. oit., p. 86
13. By a "missing paradigm", I mean M. Masterman's "metaphys­
ical paradigm" or "meta-paradigm", (op. eit., p. 65).
In an unpublished doctoral thesis (V. Békés, 
Tudományelméleti és nyelvfilozófiai elképzelések a magyar 
nyelvújítási mozgalomban 1818 és 1874 kOzOtt, 1982; - 
Conceptions of the Theory of Science and Linguistic Phi­
losophy in the Hungarian Linguistic Reform Movement, 1818 
to 1874), I tried to demonstrate the way this paradigm 
had controlled the scientific activity of the day, under 
the aegis of the Hungarian Scientific Society. There I 
identified the paradigm through its features as that of 
Romantic Liberalism. However, both liberalism and roman­
ticism seem to arouse, at least to my judgement, misguided 
and misleading sentiments, for which reason I would now 
prefer to call this the Göttingen Paradigm. Perhaps this 
choice is warranted by the fact that, as it has emerged 
from various historical studies, the central place of the 
development of this paradigm, radically different from 
those of both the Enlightenment and Positivism, was at 
Georg-August Universität, Göttingen, at any rate a school 
more famous for its students than its teachers.
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14 . Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, for example, 
details the meaning of "inclusion" as "something that is 
included", like "a passive product of cell activity (as 
a starch grain) within the protoplasm" or "a gaseous, 
liquid, or solid foreign body enclosed in a mass (as of 
a mineral)".
15. I owe thanks to Professor Zsigmond Telegdi for a thorough 
introduction to Humboldtlan and Neo-Humboldtian linguis­
tics .
16. T.S. Kuhn, op. ait., p. 204
17. Ibid., p. 269
18. T.S. Kuhn, "Reflections on My Critics", in: I. Lakatos - 
A. Musgrave (eds.), op.eit., p. 277
19. M. Fehér, op.oit., p. 52
20. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. p.149
21. Cf. Hegel, Lectures on the Bietory of Philosophy. II.I.3
22. For this problem, see. e.g. Karl Mannheim's explication: 
"Relationism, as we use it, states that every assertion 
can only be relationally formulated. It becomes relativism 
only when it is linked with the older static ideal of 
eternal, unperspectivic truth independent of the sub­
jective experience of the observer, and when it is judged 
by this alien ideal of absolute truth." K. Mannheim, Ideo­
logy and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Know­
ledge. Routledge t Kegan Paul, London, 1954, p. 270. M. 
Fehér has shown that Mannheim's approach to epistemology 
has been generally misunderstood and that "... the concept 
of 'ideology' in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge as well 
as his interpretation of the ideological nature of know­
ledge was so much at variance with both the sensualist, 
Baconian epistemology of early positivist philosophy of 
science and the Cartesian epistemology of later philosophy 
of science and internalist history of science that there
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were hardly any grounds for even a debate between them." 
(my italics V.B.) M. Fehér, A tudományfejlffdée-elméletek 
története (A History of Theories of Scientific Develop­
ment). A Filozófia Időszerű Kérdései, 38. Budapest,
1980, p. 61.
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BALÁZS DAJKA
SOCIAL LIFE AND SOCIAL SEMANTICS
The term 'social life' had had a long history: it was 
UBed with more or less rigour by various trends of social 
thought and inquiry to stand for different concepts which 
appear to be of central interest to the philosophy of social 
science. These concepts were always closely connected to the 
assumptions underlying the particular theories of the differ­
ent traditions of social research, therefore their analysis 
must also begin at a general level. Another methodological 
imperative is to approach the different concepts according to 
their distinctive contexts, for they often appeared in con­
flicting theories. 'Post-Kuhnian' social science methodology 
has made attempts at carrying out this seemingly impossible 
task, one of which, the programme of the semantic interpreta­
tion of social scientific problems will receive especial 
attention in this essay. The semantic approach has been based 
on the work of Donald Davidson and employed by G. MacDonald 
and P. Pettit (1981) to analyse a wide range of concepts 
which, outside the meta-level of analysis, remain unrelated 
as parts of diverse theoretical constructions. Some aspects 
of the use and applicability of,as well as certain limita­
tions to, the semantic pursuit are also expected to be borne 
out by the present paper.
Social science, taken in some conveniently wide sense, 
has often been criticised for failing to fulfil one or anoth­
er of its numerous tasks, or to live up to a wide range of 
possible, philosophical or methodological, standards. It has 
also been made responsible for the welfare of man in society 
in general, similarly to natural science which, on the other 
hand, is accused of the detrimental effects of its discov­
eries. Is this only related to the problems known as those
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of applied science, or does even this apparently extraneous 
aspect of role and value ascription concern 'pure', basic 
research?1 Let us take as an example Karl Mannheim's condem­
nation of the psychology and sociology of his day for having 
lost sight of man's goals with science: "The mechanistic and 
functionalistic theory [...] is of assistance only as long as 
the goal or the value is given from another source and the 
'means' alone are to be treated. The most Important role of 
thought in life consists, however, in providing guidance for 
conduct when decisions must be made. Every real decision 
(such as one's evaluation of other persons or how society 
should be organized) implies a judgment concerning good and 
evil, concerning the meaning of life and mind.[...] Men strove 
to know the world so that they could mould it to conform to 
this ultimate goal; society was analysed so as to arrive at a 
form of social life more just or otherwise more pleasing to 
God; men were concerned with the soul in order to control the 
path to salvation. But the further men advanced in analysis, 
the more the goal disappeared from their field of vision, 
so that to-day a research worker might say with Nietzsche 'I 
have forgotten why I ever began' (Ich habe meine Gründe ver­
gessen) ." (K. Mannheim, 1954 (1936), pp. 17-18.)
If we decide, with Mannheim, that such a concern with 
goals should characterize both applied and pure science, we 
can still distinguish between at least three degrees of value- 
ladenness, which the semantic approach correlates with three 
degrees of value-realism. (Cf. G. MacDonald - P. Pettit, 1981, 
Ch. 4: Truth and Value) The latter approach also considers 
that “the social sciences are enmeshed in evaluative issues 
to the extent that their methods raise ethical problems about 
experimenting with human beings and to the extent that their 
results are used in the formation of social policies." How­
ever, within the semantic framework, the importance of these 
issues is minimized, for the authors say that "value commit­
ments raise a problem when they are likely to lead different 
inquirers to different results. The commitment to truth and
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honesty is not liable to have this effect since it is assumed 
to be universal. And neither are commitments about the import­
ance of certain topics, or about the propriety of certain 
methods or policies. Such commitments may vary as between 
people but they determine the inquiries made by researchers, 
not - or at least not necessarily - the results reached in 
those inquiries." (G. MacDonald - P. Pettit, 1981, p. 153)
This is remarkably in line with Mary Hesse's distinction. 
"Value judgments related to science may be broadly of two 
kinds. They may be evaluations of the uses to which scientific 
results are put, such as the value of cancer research, or the 
disvalue of the nuclear bomb. But they may also be evaluations 
that enter more intimately into theory-construction as asser­
tion« that it is desirable that the universe be of such and 
such a kind and that it is or is not broadly as it is desired 
to be." (M. Hesse, 1978, p. 2) According to this and the 
preceding statement quoted, one kind of value judgment can be 
excluded from the analysis even though it is not shown to be 
irrelevant to the scientific enterprise. This is precisely 
"the value ... given from another source", as Mannheim put it, 
and it is in virtue of its externality that it is often neg­
lected by philosophers of science. The other kind of values 
which, as Hesse claims, "enter more intimately into theory- 
construction" seem to serve as grounds of value judgments 
which "issue in assertions rather than imperatives, and hence 
involve a transition from ought judgments to is judgments." 
(.Ibid. , p. 2) Since logical inference is thus inappropriate 
here, she can elaborate her version of the pragmatic criterion 
of truth as a "modification of the traditional empirical 
criteria of confirmation and falsifiabllity." (Ibid., p. 4) It 
must be noted, however, that the pragmatic criterion is not 
only applicable to the second but to the first kind of value 
judgments as well. To the extent that most imperatives may in­
volve a transition to 'is' judgments, they allow of reformula­
tion so that even the first kind of value judgments enter 
inextricably into theory-construction.
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We have seen that, for Mannheim, the ascription of 
values was closely related to the ascription of meaning. For 
the semantic approach based on the description theory of 
reference, the meaning of an Indicative sentence is closely 
related to its truth conditions. We cannot consider here all 
the major traditions of social thought which have expressed 
themselves on the problem of that threefold relationship in 
social life, but we must at least mention the Marxian, the 
phenomenological and the 'verstehende' approach, which made 
extensive use of the organic metaphor of the 'life' process 
of society.
The choice of a term like 'social life' has important 
implications. In terms of the above value distinctions, there 
is a difference between one research project in which the 
events taking place in society are seen as constituting a 
'life' process and another project which envisages those 
series of events to belong to a 'lifeless' process. It would 
be a crude typology to list theories in the individualistic 
tradition under the former, and collectivistic ones under the 
latter category. In many respects, the contrary classification 
would also be warranted. A recent interpreter of Marx's work 
has argued convincingly, in a dialectival vein, that there a 
synthesis of the two approaches can be discerned. She “treats 
Marx's analysis of capitalism as exemplifying a phenomenolog­
ical mode of theorizing, one that is characterized by Inquiry 
into grounds or presuppositions of our knowledge of social 
life. Marxes version of phenomenology differs from others in 
certain specifiable ways." (R.W. Bologh, 1979, pp. 1-2) 
Following Wittgenstein, the author uses “the term, 'form of 
life', to refer to the productive relation of subject to ob­
ject, the incorporation of an object into the life of a sub­
ject. The term, 'form of life', avoids the narrow economic 
meaning that the term, 'production', tends to have. Dialec­
tical phenomenology inquires into the form of life in which 
an object of knowledge is embedded, its active relation to a 
subject.* (I b i d p. 2)
'Form of life', then, ie closely related to the concept 
of production, very much like in Marx's famous summary of his 
basic ideas: "In the social production of their life, men 
enter into definite relations that are indispensable and in­
dependent of their will, relations of production which corres­
pond to a definite stage of development of their material 
productive forces. ... The mode of production of material 
life conditions the social, political and intellectual life 
process in general." (K. Marx, 1969, Vol.l, p. 503) It is 
very interesting that, for Marx, the term 'social life 
process' does not designate as general a concept as for many 
later theorists. Beside the social and apart from the materi­
al, we also find the political and intellectual spheres. The 
main distinction is identified by G.A. Cohen as the one be­
tween the material and the social properties of society.
"Marx is frequently concerned to distinguish sharply between 
what is and what is not an economic or social characteristic.
J,..] These rulings rest on a distinction between the content 
and the form of a society. People and productive forces 
comprise its material content, a content endowed by produc­
tion relations with eoeial form." (G.A. Cohen, 1978, pp.
88-89) Cohen traces back a similar distinction to Max Weber, 
where we come back to the problem of meaningfulness or inten- 
tionallty.^
At this point, beside the concept of social life, we 
must see what other concepts the semantic approach to social 
science makes use of in analysing meaning and intention. It 
is to be understood that this approach is not primarily based 
on the hermeneutic tradition, and in certain respects it 
elaborates a moderate reductionism. It makes fine distinctions 
between social events under different descriptions, and anal­
yses the causal powers of institutions and of individuals' 
attitudes in the frame of Davidson's description theory of 
reference. In the chapter on "The Anatomy of Social Life", 
though the authors give no precise definition of the concept, 
they handle the problem of different social regularities
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within a coherent framework. Their standpoint is "that while 
society consists of individual people, and nothing is a social 
event except insofar as it connects with people, there are 
also important institutional entities on the social scene: 
specifically, groups and practices. If society is composed of 
people, these individuals are organised in such a way that 
groups apd practices are equally part of the social world."
(G. MacDonald - P. Pettit, 1981, p. 113) However, the use of 
the terms, ' social life' and 'social world' more or less 
interchangeably reveals the authors' indifference towards the 
concepts designated by them. The concepts of 'life' and 
'world' are particularly inappropriate in one Important 
respect: that of the autonomy of institutions as 'entities'. 
These in fact can only be 'entities' in a vague sense within 
the framework of the semantic approach, for they are charac­
terized by their persistence in spite of changes in their 
components. That is to say, the 'lower level' of component 
individuals does not essentially belong to the higher organi­
zation of institutions and, consequently, the 'life' of an 
institution does not depend on the 'lives' of its components 
except for extreme cases. 'Social life' then seems to be 
stratified in a way which threatens its homogeneity. The 
'social world' is similarly decomposed into micro- and macro- 
worlds, not only methodologically but also ontologically.
Warns the philosopher of science criticising reification in 
sociology in general: "The very data that we employ, the 
'described phenomena' that are so central to any sense of 
empirical reference, depend upon our interpretative theories. 
If those theories continue of reify either structure or ac­
tion, then our data will continue to reflect that reification, 
and sociology will remain fragmented in the most fundamental 
sense." (A. Tudor, 1982, p. 182)
The semantic approach also differs from the 'verstehen­
de' tradition in its way of dealing with causal explanations. 
Let us quote a very useful summary of the latter's charac­
teristics at some length: "It is extremely difficult to de-
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termine whether and to what extent a writer uses a veretehen- 
de approach. One can perhaps distinguish three elements of 
such an approach, though often they will go together and re­
inforce one another.
1. A general hostility to positivism, stressing the 
distinctiveness of the human sciences or, more generally, of 
'the social'. There will tend to be associated with this a 
particular epistemological and methodological position on the 
way in which one can obtain access to data in this realm, 
e.g. by empathy, re-experiencing (Saoherleben) or imaginative 
reconstruction.
2. A stress on the usefulness of teleological explana­
tions of human behaviour, as opposed to explanations cast 
purely in terms of efficient causes. This can be expressed in 
terms of the Marxist notion of 'praxis' and, in Sartre's 
terminology, 'project'.
3. The concept of 'form' or 'structure'. This element is 
perhaps rather less central, though it is emphasised by
L. Goldmann, who derived it from Lukács and, he claims, from 
Hegel and Marx as well." (W. Outhwaite, 1975, pp. 63-64)
We should even need a more detailed characterization 
than the above in order to bring out the contrast of the 
semantic approach. Interestingly enough, the latter also 
professes "to vindicate the Verstehen point of view" but, as 
it appears, rather defending it from the outside than practis­
ing it from the inside. This must be due, in accordance with 
criterion 1 above, to the decline of neo-positivism which 
urges social philosophers, too, to develop a new paradigm on 
the basis of one of the old ones. If we grant the vindication 
of the Verstehen point of view by the semantic approach ac­
cording to criterion 1, we have to deny it that appellation 
as regards criterion 3. Without demonstrating the lesser 
significance of the Hegelian and Marxian tradition to social 
semantics, it may suffice to note here that the latter takes 
a modified methodological individualist stance, admitting what
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it calls the expressive autonomy of institutions but rejecting 
the supposition of their explanatory autonomy.
Now, coming to criterion 2 it emerges that social seman­
tics does not wish to rely exclusively on causal patterns of 
explanation in dealing with actions, but is not attracted by 
teleological explanations, either. After a careful analysis 
of views on the non-causal character of action explanations 
it appears to stay with a kind of causal model which, however, 
is based on a different conception of law. The idea is “that 
intentional explanation is not nomothetic, and that in this 
respect it contrasts with the general run of explanations of 
natural events.” The non-nomothetic model requires that the 
postulates be “only indubitable explanatory principles and in 
the exercise there can never be a possibility of revising the 
principles and recasting the explanations.“ (G. MacDonald - 
P. Pettit, 1981, p. 99)
The substitution of “explanatory principles* for révisa­
ble “laws“ seems to be an after-effect of the once crucial 
principle of falsifiability. Social semantics is a brave at­
tempt to save social science in the face of an old challenge. 
It seeks to assign explanatory status to hypotheses which fail 
to be falsifiable, by changing their relation to laws. This 
"middle-of-the-road“ approach characterizes the proposals for 
other solutions within this framework too, among them the 
treatment of values, the conception of agents, the issue of 
individualism vs. collectivism, and various processes of so­
cial life. Like many other efforts to draw on a great variety 
of sources and to appropriate the best of '-.heir outputs, this 
brand of semantic approach to the subject matter of social 
science remains an elaborate excercise in methodology without 
the appeal, at its height, of any of the old paradigms re­
visited.
Institute of Philosophy 
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NOTES
1. This is just one way of formulating the question, which 
otherwise does not depend on any distinction between pure 
and applied science.
2. In an article dealing with realism vs. anti-realism, we 
find the following understatement: 'Philosophers have found 
attractions in the idea that a theory of meaning for a 
language might include a component capable of specifying, 
for any indicative sentence of the language, a condition 
under which it is true." (J. McDowell, 1978, p. 127)
3. Though Weber's distinction at first sight seems to be 
merely methodological, it is well known that, in this 
way, he demarcates the social from the non-social: "There 
are statistics of processes devoid of meaning such as death 
rates, phenomena of fatique, the production rates of 
machines, the amount of rainfall, in exactly the same sense 
as there are statistics of meaningful phenomena. But only 
when the phenomena are meaningful is it convenient to 
speak of sociological statistics." (M. Weber, 1947, p. 100)
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MARTA FEHÉR
SOME REMARKS ON THE KR IPKE-PUTNAM THEORY OF REFERENCE
During the debates going on now for almost two decades 
on the meaning variance of scientific terms there emerged the 
need for a new theory of meaning. In the eyes of some philos­
ophers of science, the Kripke-Putnam causal theory of refer­
ence seemed to offer an escape route from the serious prob­
lems related to the so-called incommensurability of scientific 
theories. (This incommensurability, as was mainly argued for 
by Feyerabend, is a consequence of meaning variance.>
My aim in this paper is to point out some of the inher­
ent difficulties in this new theory of meaning, put forward 
independently but convergently by Krlpke and Putnam. [Kripke 
1972, Putnam 1973, 1975]. Their theory offered a new alterna­
tive to the traditional conceptualization of the reference-re­
lation and indicated a way of identifying the reference of a 
term independently of its sense. It was later called the 
"causal* (or "historical") theory of reference. It is well 
known that the starting point for Kripke was a critical as­
sessment of the Frege-Russell theory of descriptions and prop­
er names. However, he regards his results as valid even in the 
case of natural kind (or physical magnitude) terms. The cutt­
ing edge of Putnam's and Krlpke's criticism was directed a- 
gainst those assumptions of the Frege-Russell theory that (1) 
senses are cognitive, i.e. they exist in the minds of the re- 
ferers, and (2) that senses give those descriptions which the 
referents must satisfy in order for them to be the referents 
of the terms. In Kripke's opinion, it is simply false that, in 
cases of successful reference, the referent satisfies all or 
(as the cluster concept theory holds) most of the descriptions 
given in the sense. The referent may not satisfy any of the
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descriptions and still be the referent of a name or of a nat­
ural kind word. These latter are namely rigid designators, 
which, by definition, refer in every possible world to the 
same object, independently of the descriptions this object 
actually satisfies. According to Kripke, sense is not the 
chief (or only) means by which we pick out or fix the referent 
of a term.
For species as for proper names - says Kripke -
... the way the reference of a term is fixed should not 
be regarded as a synonym for the term. In the case of 
proper names, the reference can be fixed in various ways. 
In an initial baptism it is typically fixed by an osten- 
sion or a description. Otherwise the reference is usually 
determined by a chain, passing the name from link to 
link. The same observation holds for such a general term 
as 'gold'. If we imagine a hypothetical (admittedly some­
what artificial) baptism of the substance, we must imag­
ine it picked out as by some such 'definition' as 'Gold 
is the substance instantiated by the items over there, or 
at any rate, by almost all of them'. (...) I believe that 
in general, terms for natural kinds (e.g. animal, vege­
table, and chemical kinds) get their reference fixed in 
this way; the substance is defined as the kind instan­
tiated by (almost all of) a given sample. LKripke, 1972, 
p. 322]
In Kripke's opinion the references, not only of the natu­
ral kind terms, but also of such theoretical terms as 'heat', 
are fixed by oatenaion or by some contingent deaoription 
(which may not be satisfied by the referent) and then contin- 
uated by a causal (historical) ohain linking the users of the 
term. The reference-fixing descriptions (or identities) - as, 
for example, that gold is a yellow, malleable metal - are a 
priori, but not neoaaaary, since gold, for example, may turn 
out not to be yellow, but the term 'gold' may nevertheless 
refer to the same natural kind, gold. In this view, however, 
there are so-called thaoratioal identities, which
are generally identities involving two rigid designators 
and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori 
LKripke, 1972, p. 331].
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Examples of such identifies are: 'heat is molecular mo­
tion ' or 'gold is an element with atomic number 79'. These 
identities hold in every possible world, so nothing counts as 
heat or gold which is not molecular motion or has not a- 
tomic number 79.
Quite similar views were put forward by Hilary Putnam in 
his [1973, 1975] , under the title of the 'causal theory of 
meaning', for natural kind and physical magnitude terms. Ac­
cording to his theory the fixing and continuating of the ref­
erences of these terms proceeds through a twofold causal chain. 
The first kind of causal relation connects the referent of the 
theoretical term, as a cause, to an observable phenomenon, as 
its effect. The second kind of causal relationship subsists 
between the referers i.e. the later users of the term, and the 
introducing event, or relates to earlier uses of the term.
Thus referers using the term - say - 'electricity' are
connected by a certain kind of causal chain to a situ­
ation in which a description of electricity is given, 
and generally a causal description - that is, one which 
singles out electricity as the physical magnitude respon­
sible for certain effects in a certain way. [Putnam,
1973, p.203j
The first occasion for giving a causal description such 
as that above, one which may only be approximately true of the 
referent, is called the introduoing event, and each of the lat­
er uses is causally connected with this event. Thus, every 
user of the term in question can successfully refer to the 
same intended referent, even if the initial causal description 
failed to describe the referent correctly (or is altogether 
wrong). As Putnam later [1975] added, the individual referer 
may succeed in referring even if he does not know the intro­
ducing causal description (or cannot give any description) of 
the referent, but Is causally linked to other individuals who 
were in a position to pick out the referent correctly, and who 
are able to give the required description (for example, ex­
perts). So, in reference, there is a 'division of linguistic 
labor' because the use of natural kind and physical magnitude
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terms, as well as proper names, is oolleetiva.
The extension of natural kind (and physical magnitude) 
terms can be given, according to Putnam, [1970, 1973, 1975J 
in two stages: 1) the word must be associated with an arche­
type (or stereotype, which resembles the Kripkean 'original 
sample'); and 2) everything which belongs to the extension 
of the term must bear the relation 'same kind' to the arche­
type. He assumes that this relation will specify the shared 
microstructure of the kind.(He construes the relation Itself 
as an equivalence relation throughout possible worlds.) So, 
for instance, the referent of 'water' (or the extension of 'is 
water*) is given by pointing out a standardized sample, an 
archetype or specimen of the kind (in this world) and though 
not all the features characterizing the archetype must be 
shared by samples of the kind in other possible worlds, ac­
cording to Putnam, there are some of them which must be shared 
so that the sample will belong to the extension of the term in 
question. As he writes:
Once we have discovered that water (in the actual world) 
is HjO, nothing counts as a possible world in which water 
is not H2O. In particular, if a logically possible state­
ment is one that holds in some logically possible world, 
it is not logically possible that water is not H.O. [Put­
nam, 1975, p. 151J
Notice how strongly Putnam states his case (for the so-called 
strong stereotypes, such as that of 'water'): he does not 
merely say that 'nothing counts as water in some possible 
world, which is not HjO', but that 'nothing counts as a possi­
ble world in which water is not H20' and that 'it is not logi­
cally possible that water is not H20'. This means that he re­
gards such theoretical identities as 'water is H20', not only 
as metaphysically or merely epistemologically necessary, as 
Kripke does, but also as logically necessary. That is to say, 
he takes some (fundamental) assumptions of our present scien­
tific theories to be logical truths, i.e. valid in every pos­
sible world. Or in other words, they are, for Putnam, the se-
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lective criteria for 'possible worlds' regarding their pos­
sibility.
To sum up: according to Putnam, linguistic competence is 
not just knowledge, as was held by Frege and Carnap, but it
is a matter of knowledge plus causal connection to intro­
ducing events (and ultimately to members of the natural
kind itself). T.Putnam, 1973, p.209.]
The Kripke-Putnam causal theory of reference has been exten­
sively criticised mainly for its essentialism [e.g. by Zemach, 
1976, Mellor, 1977, Kleiner, 1977, Papineau, 1979] as well as 
modified or corrected by Nola, 1980]. I do not intend,
however, to recapitulate this criticism here, not even the 
main objections brought up so far. Instead I would like to put 
forward my own assessment of the Frege-Carnap versus Kripke- 
Putnam controversy and give my own account of the efficacy of 
the causal theory of reference.
1. First, I think, it is beyond doubt that the Kripke- 
Putnam theory has the great merit that it opens up a seman­
tical-epistemological way to a referentially stable world, 
which differs rather sharply from the referentially fluid 
world of the Frege-Carnap theory of meaning. In this latter 
theory the sense or intension of the term serves as a selector 
function for referents, thus to use a technical term intro­
duced by E. Fales,L1976] the reference of a term is 'floating: 
it is not anchored to one and the same object but always picks 
out that which satisfies the sense. That is why this theory of 
meaning is haunted by the problem of the so-called 'transworld 
identity', that is, the problem of re-identifying one and the 
same entity in different possible worlds, in which it can be 
referred to by the same term but with different, changed 
sense, i.e. satisfying different descriptions given in the 
sense. On accepting this latter conception of meaning, the 
central part of Feyerabend'» incommensurability thesis follows, 
according to which the different theories talk about different 
worlds, since we have no means outside and above the theories
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In question to determine the referents of their terms. If lln- 
gustlc competence Is a matter of knowledge, and it Is the the­
ory which gives this knowledge, then each theory has Its own 
ontology or, in Feyerabend's words, its own cosmology. This is 
closed to other cosmologies, and there is no means by which 
entities belonging to such different worlds can be reidenti­
fied.
Now a great advantage of the Kripke-Putnam theory of 
meaning is that it can account for the re-identification of 
referents independently of sense, that is, it works even in 
cases of extensive descriptive changes. So it can explain re­
ferential stability even in spite of radical changes in senses 
or severe revision in intensions. I think, however, that the 
biggest difficulty With regard to the theory lies here: its 
world is too stable, and entities once introduced by initial 
baptisms or introducing events remain for ever in existence as 
referents. In one word, this theory cannot account for refer­
ential change, shifts in reference, reference to non-existing 
entities nor reference to entities whose existence is dubious 
at the very moment of, and for some time after, their intro­
duction (as was the case with quarks or positrons and, former­
ly, with impetus). It cannot account for either reference to 
entities which are supposed to be non-existent at the moment 
of Introduction (such was the point-charge electron), or for 
reference to entities disclosed as non-existing during the de­
velopment of knowledge (such as phlogiston, or unicorns). There 
were, and are, theories in the history of science which ex­
plicitly postulate entities which are not taken to exist (e.g. 
idealizations) and, in addition, there were, and are, theories 
which suppose entities or natural kinds to exist which are lat­
er discovered to be not really existing.
Thus, the Kripke-Putnam theory of reference accounts for only 
those cases of reference where the intended referent exists 
(or, at least, is supposed to exist), and where itself or its 
effect is experimentally accessible, that is, where we are 
somehow acquainted with it. It cannot account, however, for
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reference to entities postulated for theoretical, explanatory 
purposes and whose existence is at least dubious.
Moreover, as Mellor [1977] has pointed out,
'Neutrino' is for Kripke a non-Fregean rigid desig­
nator since its referent in other possible worlds is not 
constrained to satisfy these theoretical descriptions 
which must be supposed to provide its Fregean sense. For 
this work, of course, there must actually be neutrinos 
near enough as specified. They need not be in the observ­
able past to serve as archetypes, but they do need to be 
somewhere in this world (past, present or future). Other­
wise the requisite uniqueness of reference would not be 
secured. Many different kinds of particle will satisfy 
our theoretical descriptions of neutrinos in various pos­
sible worlds, and nothing but the reality of one of these 
will single it out as the unique referent of 'neutrino'. 
Were there in fact no neutrinos, the term could for Krip­
ke no more designate a natural kind than 'unicorn' can. 
[Mellor, 1977, p. 307.3
Thus my first objection against the Kripke-Putnam theory 
of reference is that it cannot account for referential change. 
It only provides a referential mechanism by which cases of re­
ferential stability are rendered understandable and theoreti­
cally, as well as pragmatically, possible.
So, it may be said that the causal theory of reference 
surpasses the Frege-Russell-Carnap theory in that it takes in­
to account the important difference [first pointed out by 
Donnellan, 1966] between "failing to refer" and "falsely re­
ferring", while nevertheless referring to something existent. 
The causal theory does not, however, allow for systematic con­
siderations regarding cases of genuine reference failure or 
reference to non-existents. Kripke and Putnam asstime, I think, 
an a priori difference between terms (now known as) having 
really existent referents and those whose referent is not-ex- 
isting, or whose extension is empty. They construe their the­
ory of reference so as to account for the stability of refer­
ence of only the former kind of terms. The tacit presuppoltion 
of the Kripke-Putnam theory is that reference can be made to 
what really exists, and, thus, for them, the ontological sta­
bility of the referent (and, finally, of the world) seems to
41
involve the stability of reference, in spite of radical 
changes in our knowledge regarding the referent. As we shall 
see below, Putnam incorporates into the meaning of a term the fact that 
its referent exists, taking it as given in the linguistic 
character of the term:
It may seem counterintuitive that a natural kind word 
such as 'horse' is sharply distinguished from a term for 
a fictitious or non-existent natural kind such as 'uni­
corn' , and that a physical magnitude term such as 'elec­
tricity' is sharply distinguished from a term for a fic­
titious or non-existent physical magnitude or substance 
such as 'phlogiston'. [Putnam, 1973, p. 210.1
As to the background of this sharp distinction, neither Putnam 
nor Kripke is very explicit. But let us consider Kripke's own 
words :
It is a common claim in contemporary philosophy that 
there are certain predicates which, though they are in 
fact empty - have null extension - have it as a matter of 
contingent fact and not as a matter of any sort of ne­
cessity. Well that I do not dispute; but an example which 
is usually given is the example of unicorn. So it is said 
that though we have all found out that there are no uni­
corns, of course there might have been unicorns. Under 
certain circumstances there would have been unicorns. 
And this is an example of something I think is not the 
case. Perhaps according to me the truth should not be put 
in terms of saying that it is necessary that there be no 
unicorns, but just that we can't say under what circum­
stances there would have been unicorns. Further, I think, 
that even if archeologists or geologists were to discover 
tomorrow some fossils conclusively showing the existence 
of animals in the past, satisfying everything we know 
about the unicorns from the myth of the unicorn, that 
would not show that there were unicorns. [.Kripke, 1972, 
pp. 253-54.]
Putnam is, however, more permissive in the unicorn-affair:
Indeed, I myself believe that if unicorns were found to 
exist and people began to discover facts about them, give 
non-obvlous definite descriptions or approximately cor­
rect descriptions of the class of unicorns, etc. then the 
linguistic character of the word unicorn would change; 
and similarly with 'phlogiston'; but this is certain to 
be controversial. [Putnam, ibid., italics added.1
All this, however, is concerned only with how we can (or
cannot) discover that a term thought to refer to something
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non-existent Is, In fact, referring to something really exist­
ing. These authors do not deal with the question of how we can 
discover If a term does not refer, or better, refers to some­
thing non-existent. (All the counterfactual situations con­
sidered by Kripke and Putnam concern those cases In which a 
term retains its referent, although its characteristic fea­
tures have changed; think of Putnam's Twin-Earth, or Kripke's 
example of gold turning out to be blue instead of yellow.) 
Thus, the causal theory of reference has been very effective 
In pointing out means by which we can stick to the referent of 
a term, In spite of extensive revisions in its sense, that is, 
in the descriptions which the referent is believed to satisfy. 
This theory, however, gives no criteria for the limits to this 
adherence to one and the same referent, nor has it pointed out 
under what conditions we should give up our assumptions re­
garding the sxistenos of the referent. I believe, therefore, 
that the scope or generality of this theory of reference 
should be regarded as more restricted than was thought by its 
authors. It must not be regarded as a general theory of re­
ference for theoretical (among them mainly natural kind and 
physical magnitude as well as substance) terms, but only as a 
theory of reference for those scientific (and everyday) terms 
which proved to be genuinely referring to existants over the 
course of extensive historical changes in their senses.
2. My second objection is thus that the immunity this 
causal theory seems to enjoy against even radical ontological 
revisions rests on a fallacy: namely, it mistakes the stabili­
ty and identity of reference for that of the stability and 
identity of the referent as an existent in the real world. I 
mean that once a term is regarded as having a referent, it 
seems to retain it, no matter what descriptions that referent 
fits in different possible worlds. Thus, the ontological sets 
of the different scientific theories are always the same, only 
the descriptions given, or the beliefs held about the entities 
belonging to these sets, differ. New entities may be added to
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this original, common set, but none of them may be deleted. At 
this point, the reader may perhaps charge me with a crude mis­
interpretation of Kripke's or Putnam's views. In fact, Kripke 
explicitly states that,
When I say that a designator is rigid and designates the 
same thing in all possible worlds, I mean that, as used 
in our language, it stands for that thing, when we talk 
about counterfactual situations. (...) I ... do not mean 
to imply that the thing exists in all possible worlds, 
just that the name refers rigidly to that thing. [Kripke, 
1972, pp. 289-900
Now, it seems clear that Kripke does not commit himself re­
garding the existence of the referents of rigid designators in 
all possible worlds. It is one thing, however, to declare 
one's non-committance and quite another to designate under 
what conditions we should regard the supposed referent to be 
non-existent, l.e. under what circumstances we should delete 
an entity from our ontological set. In the Frege-Russell the­
ory of meaning the criterion for taking the referent of a term 
as existent was that it should satisfy all or most of the 
properties given in the sense of the term in question. If 
there is no such thing, then the referent does not exist. And 
thus, Kripke writes,
A supposed statement about the existence of an object 
really is, so it is argued, a statement about whether a 
certain description or property is satisfied. As I have 
already said, I disagree. Anyway, I can't really go into 
the problems of existence here. [[Kripke, 1972, p. 311.3
And I think, herein lies the weakest point in the causal the­
ory of reference: it has no theory of existence, and, thus, it 
gives no criteria for abandoning beliefs on the existence and 
ontological status of a referent. And, furthermore, if the 
referent has none of the properties given in the sense by 
which it may be identified [see Kripke, 1972, p. 3183, and if 
reference is continuated by a causal chain which only connects 
with former uses of the term and not with the referent itself, 
then nothing prevents us from believing in the existence of 
the referent and infinitum. Thus, according to the causal the-
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ory, causal chains must perpetuate existential beliefs as well 
as ways of identifying the referents independently of senses.
If we admit that the meaning and use of terms change, 
then one can either say that this change entails a new on­
tology, or claim that one is using new or the same terms with 
changed senses to redescribe the same entities, i.e. to pre­
suppose the same ontology. The first position follows from the 
Frege-Carnap theory of meaning and was embraced by Feyerabend 
as the corner-stone of incommensurability. The second stand­
point is that of Kripke and Putnam, whose theory of reference 
thus entails a complete ontological invariance between suc­
cessive scientific theories. And this is what I find objec­
tionable, for it seems to me that an adequate realist theory 
of reference must account for ontological stability as well as 
changes in ontological presuppositions. So, this theory ought, 
at least, include additional assumptions regarding the dis­
ruption of these causal chains under certain epistemological 
circumstances, so that it can account for real, historical 
changes in the ontological sets presupposed by different sci­
entific theories.
The causal theory of reference cannot account for the most 
important scientific operations, among them the introduction 
of referring terms for hypothetical theoretical entities 
(such as positron or phlogiston) as candidates for existence 
(or, eventually, for non-existence); historical changes in the 
ontological status of a referent (for example, the fact that 
heat was once considered as a substance and, later, as a state 
of motion of particles constituting substances); or, again, 
the deletion of entities from our ontological sets.
The Kripke-Putnam ontology is insensitive towards changes 
in the theory, or, to use Quine's term, in the ideology.
You may perhaps ask, at this point, in what sense of the 
word do Z speak about the 'sameness' of the ontological sets 
for different theories if, according to the Kripke-Putnam the­
ory of reference, the descriptions which the referents fit may
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change. But this question rests on a Camapian assumption of 
reference relation. According to this latter assumption by 
choosing a language, and, thus, a conceptual framework, a sys­
tem of terms with given intensions or senses, we have already 
chosen an ontology (and so our ontologies vary with the 
senses or intensions of our terms). Thus, I would answer the 
above question somewhat loosely, speaking about the 'same 
ontological sets for different theories' in the same sense as 
Kripke and Putnam speak about the referents of rigid desig­
nators being the same in different possible worlds. And I would 
add that, therefore, in the Krlpke-Putnam theory of meaning 
there seems to prevail a principle of conservation of exist­
ence, so to say, implied by the principle of conservation of 
reference through causal chains. For in this theory, 'to re­
fer' means 'to have an existent referent'.
Thus the price paid for evading meaning relativism, and 
the disconnectedness of the ontologies of historically differ­
ent scientific theories, is that reference becomes a static, 
unchangeable relation.
In order to avoid this danger, it was, I think, necessary for 
Kripke and Putnam to embrace a certain kind of essentialism 
regarding fundamental scientific terms, such as natural kind 
and physical magnitude or substance terms. But this much-dis­
puted standpoint Usee Mellor, 1977; Zemach, 1976] is beset by 
a historiographical provincialism or parochialism.
3. In this way - and this leads us to our third object 
tion - they merely arrive at an especially rigid form of 
cluster concept theory which was otherwise so vehemently crit­
icised by Kripke. By making theoretical identities such as 
"heat is molecular motion’ metaphysically necessary (as Krip­
ke does), or by postulating (as Putnam does) that ’nothing is 
a possible world in which water is not HjO", they are making 
unwarranted ontological assumptions and are committed to an 
ontology which is as susceptible to revision due to new sci­
entific developments as any ontology which rests on the as-
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sumptions of the Frege-Caraap theory of meaning.
In my opinion, there are no absolute and unchangeable es­
sences which are given once and for all through scientific 
discoveries and which serve in the identification of samples 
of a natural kind in this and other possible worlds. However,
I do not deny that, in different theories or in different 
stages of the same theory, we always think that certain (clus­
ters of) properties of kinds or substances are more fundamen­
tal than others and, furthermore, that the former (called the 
real essence) are responsible for the manifestation of the 
latter (called the nominal essence).
It is true that in the Aristotelian theory, as well as in 
more modern scientific theories, there have always been as­
sumptions regarding the essential underlying structures of 
things and kinds which are more important in fixing something 
as the referent of a term than those properties of them which, 
although manifest, stay change without the object ceasing to be 
identifiable as such. But, as historical examples testify, 
nothing has ever prevented scientists from altering their ideas 
either about nominal essences (the manifest properties) given 
a priori and constituting the Kripkean meaning of the term or 
about real essences (the underlying structure) given a poste­
riori and constituting the Kripkean way of fixing the reference. 
C Cf. Papineau, 1979, p. 164.1 Both of these alternatives are 
equally viable and justifiable, although they should not be 
used at the same time, or the referential continuity of the 
term will be broken. [As an historical example of these alter­
native processes, see the "True History of 'Copper'* given by 
Harré and Madden, 1975, pt. I.ch.VI., pp. 21-25.1
An advocate of the causal theory might, perhaps, argue 
against this, maintaining that what scientists tak* to be the 
real essence of a stuff does not matter as much as what its 
real essence in fact is. And this latter is unchangeable.
In Kripke's and Putnam's view, the boundaries between 
natural kinds are ontologically given and the statements of
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discoveries regarding their real essences (such as "gold has 
the atomic number 79*) are necessary truths in the strictest 
possible sense [C.f. Kripke, 1972, p. 320[], expressing natural, 
ontological necessities. We might discover that gold - say - 
has not the atomic number 79, but once we have discovered that 
it has that number, nothing counts as gold that has not that 
specific number characteristic of the atomic structure or real 
essence of gold. At this point, you might argue that these as­
sumptions regarding the essences of kinds serve Kripke and 
Putnam as the necessary criteria of existence which I have 
claimed are missing from this theory of reference. But I do not 
think this is the case, since essences here serve only as a 
means of deciding whether a given sample or a particular thing 
does or does not belong to a given kind or species, and not 
whether the kind or species itself exists or not. Thus, in this 
way, we are able to assess if a given sample is not, for in­
stance, water, if it is not HjO, but we cannot establish that 
water is inexistent as a kind , or that water is not B^O. This 
is because, as Putnam says (in the passage quoted above): 
nothing counts as a possible world in which water is not HjO.
4. Stemming from this, I come to my fourth and, I think, 
most fundamental objection against the causal (as well as 
against the resemblance) theory of reference. While Kripke is 
right in stating that
Frege should be criticized for using the term 'sense' in 
two senses. For he takes the sense of a designator to be 
its meaning: and he also takes it the way its reference 
is determined. Identifying the two, he supposes that both 
are given by definite descriptions. [.Kripke, 1972, p.277.J
Kripke himself should also be criticized for not distinguishing 
between two senses of 'refer', that is, between (as I will 
call them) the identifiaatory and the existential component of 
the reference relation. He does not separate 'the way the 
referent of a rigid designator is fixed' from the existential 
commitment (on the part of the referer towards the existence 
of the referent) which, I admit, accompanies it, but which may
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be abandoned without thereby breaking the referential chain, 
that is, without leading to a failure to refer to the same 
thing as former users of the term.
Thus, I propose that we distinguish between reference to 
's' and reference to 'x as existent', following the pattern of 
the usual distinction between 'thinking of x' and 'thinking of 
x as such-and-such'. The idea of equating the two comes with 
Hume. I agree with Williams, according to idiom
Hume's claim that 'the idea of existence is nothing
different from the idea of any object' must be rejected.
[Williams, 1981, p.21.J
Kripke and Putnam construe their theory of reference so 
that, as 1 have argued above, it works for only real and en­
during existents, which are so stable that they retain their 
essences even in other possible worlds. But the ways in which 
references are fixed - by initial baptisms, ostension or orig­
inal samples - and continuated - by historical or causal 
chains - will not work when applied to hypothetical entities, 
that is, to those entitles which, at the moment the terms 
referring to them are introduced, are supposed to be possibly, 
or sometimes surely, non-existent. (To support this point, one 
should recall the case of 'unicorn' as treated by Kripke and 
Putnam.) Thus, in this theory, we cannot refer to things whose 
existence is dubious or which are known to be non-existent. In 
my opinion, this is so because the Kripke-Putnam theory of 
reference is construed on the pattern of the theory of meaning 
for proper name». (Kripke is quite explicit on this point. He 
tells us that "terms for natural kinds are much closer to 
proper names than is ordinarily supposed". [1972, p. 322.3)
5. The Kripke-Putnam theory surpasses that of Frege, 
Russell and Carnap in its sharp distinction between two compo­
nents of the meaning of a term: on the one hand, its sense 
and, on the other the way its reference is determined. However, 
the authors of the causal theory failed to distinguish a third 
component or, rather, failed to distinguish between the two
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parts of the second component, that is, between the pragmatic 
way the reference is fixed, or reidentified, and the existential 
commitment (of the referer) to the existence of the referent. 
Thus, I suggest that the meaning of scientific (mainly the so- 
called theoretical) terms should be composed of three compo­
nents:
(1) the descriptive component (which corresponds to the Krip- 
kean ’meaning* or to the Fregean ’sense’ of the term), 
which is the cognitive part of the meaning;
(2) the identifieatory (reidentificatory) or referential com­
ponent, (which corresponds to Strawson's "identifying re­
ference* or rather to ’the way the referent is determined" 
according to Kripke and Putnam, and which may be given by 
causal or historical chains after its introduction by 
ostension, description or causal assumption). This is the 
pragmatic component of meaning, which is essentially of a 
methodological character; and
(3) the existential component, i.e. the existential commitment 
or assumption regarding the real existence of the referent.
Each of the three components may be changed or modified 
independently of the others, though it is usual to modify only 
one at a time and keep the other two fixed. There are many 
historical examples testifying to the fact that the process of 
the meaning variance of scientific terms consists of stages 
during which one or other of the above components varies rath­
er radically or abruptly, while continuity in meaning is en­
sured by keeping the other two components unaltered for a time. 
It is, however, the third component which plays a crucial role 
regarding the use of the term, for when the existential commit­
ment is abandoned, the term is not generally used to make sci­
entific statements any longer and drops out of the standard 
scientific vocabulary (the term in question does, however, 
retain the descriptive, referential part of its meaning). Ac­
tually,
there are cases of theories which continue to be regarded 
as explanatory, without an apparent continuing imputation
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of truth to the explanans. LDeplin, 1981, p.291, n.25.1
Notice that if the third component is modified - let us 
say, for example, that the referent of the term is regarded 
as non-existent - then I would not say that the term 'does not 
refer’ or 'fails to refer' (not even that it 'refers to noth­
ing'). Since, in my conception, reference does not entail 
existence, non-existence does not entail failure or lack of 
reference. It is only a tacit and usually unwarranted (al­
though warrantable) assumption on our part that, when we use a 
term referrlngly, we usually suppose that its referent exists 
(besides being given in the descriptive part of the term and 
determinable or to be picked out by the identificatory, re­
ferential part of the term). 1 would like to emphasize, how­
ever, that, in my view, a term does not cease to refer when 
we abandon our belief regarding the real existence of its re­
ferent. Furthermore, a term may refer even without any on­
tological commitsient on its user's part towards the existence 
of the referent of the term.
As Leplin writes:
One can refer to something without believing that It 
exists, even believing that it does not exist. CLepUn, 
1979, p. 278.]
My conclusion is thus that for scientific terms it would 
be better not to include the existential component into the 
(linguistic) meaning of the term, as Kripke and Putnam did.
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IMRE HRONSZKY
MEASUREMENT DATA WHICH PLAYED A TRICK ON THEORY*
(The Sole of Vapour Density Measurements in the
Development of Atomié Theory in the 19th Century)
It is well known, after Knight's work on the topic that 
the history of chemical atomic theory of the 19th century 
divides into three phases.* The early impetus of atom theo­
retical thinking was followed by an ever growing mistrust and 
in the eighten-thirties a crisis emerged originating from the 
factual problems of research. This crisis wa3 reinforced by a 
mostly empiristic belief about the essence of scientific work 
and by conflicting beliefs on the structure of matter. The 
anomalies which emerged in Dumas's measurements of vapour 
density played a significant role in the formation of the cri­
sis. This aspect will be closer examined here.
There are measurements where the measurement technique 
brings with itself great difficulties. In other cases, how­
ever, the measurement can easily be executed but the inter­
pretation of measurement results causes problems. In this his­
torical case, the measurement could easily be executed by a 
technical master stroke but the interpretation of measurement 
data became ever more problematic.
The measurement of vapour density became, from 1820 own- 
ward, an important means for the determination of atomic and 
molecular weight. Here it will only be dealt with in connec­
tion with the determination of atomic weight.
We briefly recall here the development of chemical atom­
ic theory at the beginning of the 19th century. In the years 
after the turn of the century, the law of constant weight-
*An early version of this paper was presented at the 
Conference The Sole of Measurement Standards in Human Civi­
lisation (Budapest, 27-30 April, 1976).
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proportions was formulated and accepted. To that time Dal­
ton's atomic hypothesis had become known, in which the law 
of multiple proportions was also formulated. The atomic hy­
pothesis was of heuristic value, yielded a possible explana­
tion for chemical phenomena, but it was not of a strictly 
predicative nature.2 (As to the theoretical foundations given 
by the atomic theory in relation to the laws of weight-prop­
ortions, the teaching was, in a certain sense, also capable 
of prediction; the separate experiences in it concerning 
weight (volume) relations gained an overall validity.)
From the point of view of experimental research, the 
greatest defect of Dalton's teaching was its being based on 
arbitrary atomic-weight values. It must be remembered here 
that the simultaneously arising problems of the determination 
of atomic weights and the determination of the quantitative 
composition of the particles of the compounds together made 
a Dlophantes-problem. In order to solve this, Dalton intro­
duced - at least for temporary use - the arbitrary, so-called 
principle of simplicity. (According to this supposition, he 
took, for example, the composition of water to be HO and, 
consequently, the atomic weight of oxygen to be 5.5 (~8).
In 1808, Gay-Lussac discovered the laws of volume for 
compounding gases. Gay-Lussac supposed that the volume rela­
tions correspond to the particle relations. This supposition 
yielded the possibility of ruling out the principle of sim­
plicity. On the ground of Avogadro's principle (1811 Avogadro, 
1814 Ampere) a mutually unambiguous connection could be estab­
lished between the measured vapour density values and the 
molecular weight, as well as an unambiguous connection between 
the measured density values and the atmoic weight values. 
Avogadro also realised that, with the supposition of the val­
idity of the Avogadro principle, the composition of compounds 
can be rightly deduced from the law of volumes exactly in 
case when the molecules of elements can be supposed to be 
two-atomic or, as it could not be excluded as a purely theo­
retical possibility, sometimes even more-atomic3. The latter
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supposition will be referred to below as the Avogad.ro hy­
pothesis, in contradistinction to the Avogadro principle.
But if this was so, then the results of Gay-Lussac and 
Avogadro yielded, therefore, no mechanically applicable rules 
for the determination of the atomic weight. Nevertheless, in 
principle they made it possible to replace the obviously arbi­
trary principle of simplicity with an experimentally justifi­
able supposition. The problem of Interpretation (and not that 
of measurement) lies in the fact that the supposition con­
cerning the possibility of different numbers of atoms con­
tained in the more complex particles of different elements 
being thought of by Avogadro was yet to be set up and checked 
in eonereto, in the case of each element. But,instead,the 
chemists first continued to work by simplifying the problem 
and used, if any, an inductive generalisation. Some of them, 
as Berzelius, worked with a "volume-atome* hypothesis, that 
is, they thought that at least the last particles of the sim­
ple gases should be one-atomic.
It was Berzelius who, with his experimental work done 
till about 1815, set up a comprehensive atomic weight table. 
With his measurements determining the atomic weights he did 
his best in view of the technical possibilities of his time. 
Beside the results of gas density measurements and the chemi­
cal analogies he also used for determination, from 1819 on­
ward, the observations of Dulong and Petit concerning atomic 
warmth as well as the newly discovered phenomenon of isomorphy. 
But while the technical realization was unproblematic, the 
theoretical position of Berzelius and also his relation to 
Avogadro's hypothesis and to the law of Gay-Lussac was all the 
more problematic.
In 1813, Wollaston first expressed the view that chem­
istry does not need the knowledge of atomic weights at all, 
for the chemist can be satisfied with the purely empirical 
equivalent weights of combining materials. As a matter of fact, 
Wollaston formulated the point of view of an analytical chemist 
and also revealed his Inclination for an empiristic, posl-
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tivlstic ideal of science.
So much for earlier history. In 1826, Dumas began his 
vapour density measurements. The goal of his measurements was 
not to gain empirical information about the vapour condition 
of a given material; he performed them to attain definite 
theoretical goals. La Chateller described the situation in a 
short study in the following way: Dumas measured vapour 
density in order to determine the correct atomic weights.* We 
have yet to show thas this opinion should be formulated in a 
more differentiated way.
The method of vapour density measurement itself did not 
come from Dumas. Already in 1811, Gay-Lussac described an 
apparatus for this purpose and carried out measurements with 
it.5 In these experiments he measured the volume of vapour of 
a given quantity of material taken at a definite temperature. 
Later, Despretz made vapour density measurements in order to 
study the behaviour of vapours, and not in order to determine 
the atomic or molecular weights. Dumas notes somewhere that 
Dulong built an apparatus for the determination of the density 
of sulphur vapours and he was showed this apparatus by Des­
pretz.7
It is interesting to mention that in his chemistry text­
book Berzelius put forward the position that the methods of 
vapour density measurement bring along basic problems of a 
teohnioal natúrt and therefore the realization of measurements 
needs great skill. Berzelius did not take vapour density meas­
urement seriously as a possibility for the determination ofg
molecular weight. Despite this, it seemed quite obvious to 
consider, beside gas density measurements, vapour density 
measurements too in order to determine directly those atomic 
and molecular weights that had been determined up to then only 
indirectly, through analogies.
Dumas broke with the tradition of measuring the volume 
taken of a definite quantity of material and, just to the 
contrary, he took as the subject of his studies the weight of 
a quantity of material found in a given volume. Thereby the
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problems that emerged in the measurement technique after 
Gay-Lussac simply dissolved. Dumas extended his experiments 
over to high temperatures. He only had technical difficulties 
with keeping the temperature identical and with temperature 
measurement. The water, sulphur and fusion baths used by 
Dumas made it possible for him to make measurements in the 
whole interval, between room temperature and red heat. He used 
mercury and air thermometres for his measurements. The proce­
dure applied by Dumas is a good example for the great signif­
icance of technical tricks in the development of experimental 
technique, in the spread of a given method. It has already 
been mentioned that the probably most skilful experimenter of 
the time, Berzelius saw little fantasy in the determination 
of vapour density. Dumas knew that he had succeeded in reach­
ing, through the technical procedures introduced by him, a 
simplification that guaranteed the spread of the procedure in 
the laboratories. The problem to be clarified now was the 
following: what was the Intention and what could this proce­
dure be used for in the first half of the 19th century?
It must be remembered once again that the way from the 
data of vapour density to those of correct atomic weights led 
through the simultaneous acceptance of the Avogadro principle 
and what we called the Avogadro hypothesis. The main factor 
of the confusion arising in connection with the atomic weight 
was that the real significance of Avogadro's hypothesis about 
the existence of more-atomic element molecules was, nearly 
without exception, judged incorrectly by the chemists of that 
time. It was not clear for them that Avogadro's hypothesis is 
a necessary consequence if both the law of volume and Avogad­
ro 's principle are accepted. As has already been mentioned, 
some chemists accepted the view that the element molecules 
known up to that time should be seen two-atomic and handled 
this statement as an inductive working hypothesis. Berzelius, 
who did not accept Avogadro's hypothesis, saw the Avogadro 
principle as something valid only for some simple gases and 
worked with his own "volume-atom" theory.
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Dumas began his vapour density measurements as a part
of an overall program. In 1826 he evaluated the chemical a-
tomic theory as a wonderful conception the significance of
which grew with each day. The goal of his program was "to
substitute positive concepts for the arbitrary data on which9almost the whole of the atomic theory was based" . Dumas 
thought correctly that "the [earlierj efforts to define the 
absolute atomic weights have led to uncertain results“10, and 
"this uncertainty originated from the fact that ... the dif­
ferent methods used led only sometimes to the same result and 
the results of these methods were not comparable in most 
cases". Therefore he decided "to conduct a series of experi­
ments in order to determine the atomic (and molecular) weights 
of a lot of bodies through the measurement of their vapour or 
gas density" ... "Por this purpose it must be supposed that 
in the elastic fluids, under the same condition there is ... 
the same number of molecules" ... "The molecules of the simple 
gases must, be considered susceptible to a final division which 
takes place at the moment of the combination". He thought he 
was forced to declare that "this final division takes place 
at the moment of the combination and it varies with the nature 
of the compund that comes into being".10 He did not hesitate 
to conclude: “Considering the question under this aspect we 
can see that the determination of the real atoms through den­
sity measurements (of gases and vapours) presents insoluble 
difficulties in the present state of science. It is true that 
when the molecules (atoms) of simple materials in gas condi­
tion are associated to some extent yet then these materials 
can be well compared with each other under conditions under 
which they contain the same number of groups (.molecules). But 
obviously it is impossible for us to know how many elementary 
molecules (atoms) are in any of these groups".*'0
The statements quoted from Dumas show that he was quite 
aware of the contradictory character of the situation: without 
correct atomic weights the chemical atomic theory remained 
arbitrary. But he did not see a way to follow on the basis of
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which the number of atoms contained In the element molecules 
could have been deduced. He rightly saw too, although he un­
fortunately expressed his Ideas in a bad terminology, that 
Berzelius' atomic weight system was based on contradictory 
principles; that Is, the formulas of the compounds did not 
refer to the volume-unity of the vapour or of the gas of the 
material.11 consequently, the atomic weights of Berzelius 
were highly questionable. (The theoretical significance of his 
work,seen from the point of view of our day, seems to be that 
he tried to put the determination of atomic weight on a solid 
empirical foundation.)
Let us examine the concrete interpretion problem which 
disturbed Dumas. For the determination of the atomic might 
of sulphur, phosphorus, arsenic and mercury it had to be sup­
posed that in vapour condition sulphur forms six-atomic mole­
cules, mercury forms one-atomic molecules, while phosphorus 
and arsenic remain four-atomic. As we have seen, Dumas accepted 
Avogadro's hypotheaia and these elements showed themselves as 
the first examples of the theoretical possibility predicted by 
Avogadro. But the hypothesis of a six-atomic sulphur molecule, 
and so on, seemed to be a clear contradiction because, ac­
cording to the chemical analogy, the vapours of these elements 
should have contained two-atomic molecules. The molecular 
weights measured by the determination of vapour density and by 
chemical analogy were only consistent with each other when a 
vapour condition was supposed for these elements that was dif­
ferent from that of their chemical analogues.(These contra­
dictions did not appear with Berzelius because he counted the 
atomic weight of the above mentioned elements on the basis of 
chemical analogies only.)
Between 1826 and 1832, Dumas conducted a series of ana­
lyses in order to solve the problem and also examined the ele­
ments showing abnormal vapour density again.12 These measure­
ments already took place in an intellectual setting where the 
word atom was used with an ever more confused meaning and the 
atomic hypothesis meant something already superseded in a
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certain sense. Moreover, It was not thought to be necessary, 
with the exception of some chemists, to exactly distinguish 
from each other the concepts of atom, equivalent, etc.13
In 1833, Mitscherlich performed vapour density measure­
ments with a great number of elements1*. It is worth noting 
how he introduced his measurements: he wanted to gain overall 
knowledge of those relationships that obtain between the Vol­
umina taken up by the compounds and by the elements (siet).
In his study he evaluates the situation as follows: it 
seemed probable that in the same volumina the same number of 
atoms can be found. However, this supposition only proved to 
be correct for the simple gases and not for the compounds 
(sic!
The passage quoted reveals an intermingling of the con­
cept of atom and that of molecule. Dumas interpreted his re­
sults about the vapour density of sulphur by proving that in 
the case of the simple gases the number of the atoms need not 
be the same just like it need not be so in the case of the 
gases of the compounds.
Mitscherlich took oxygen and water to be one-atomic. 
Phosphorus and arsenic are, in his conception, two-atomic, 
sulphur is three-atomic and mercury is half-atomic. Thus one 
can see that he mixed the concept of atom with that of mole­
cule .
In 1831, Gaudin pointed out that a non-contradictory 
atomic weight table can be set up through the consistent ap­
plication of the principle and the hypothesis of Avogadro - 
the latter also demanding a clear distinction between the con­
cept of atom and that of molecule. Therefore the elements 
showing abnormal behaviour, as it was proved by Dumas, must be 
taken as consisting of one-, six-, and four-atomic molecules. 
At the same time, this would mean that vapour density measure­
ment is a satisfactory means for the determination of atomic 
weight. It is well known that Gaudin's ideas elicited no 
response already at that time.16
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The introduction of vapour density determination for 
the determination of atomic weight first seemed to be a task 
of simple collection of empirical information. The first prob­
lem came from the recognition of uncertainty concerning the 
number of atoms in the molecules of a given material. To solve 
this problem, one should have used probabilistic Inferences 
supported by an even fuller system of analogies.^7
For this reason, the ultimately valid confirmation of 
atomic weights was hoped to be the consistency of the results 
obtained by the most different methods. He may disregard the 
problems emerging with the determination of atomic warmth and 
also the problems of the method relying on isomorphy, but it 
must still be remembered that vapour density measurement, ap­
plied first as a simple way of gathering empirical information 
became ever more contradictory when used for atomic weight 
determination. Together with other problems of the atomic 
hypothesis, it seemed quite important that the recognition of 
the existence of anomalous vapours limited the validity of 
well-founded chemical analogies: for example that of oxygen 
and sulphur. Thereby the supposition of the very existence of 
more-atomic element molecules, otherwise also problematic, 
was to be completed by additional, individual suppositions 
always set up as ad hoc working hypotheses in order to save 
the original one. And even that could not be done without 
producing new contradictions.
In furthering the development of the chemical atomic 
theory, the chemists had to choose between two ways. The way 
chosen later (the acceptance of the Avogadro hypothesis and 
the associated vapour state of some of the elements as a phe­
nomenon) seemed to be too much hypothetical. The other way, 
within the limits accepted by Berzelius, relied on a theoret­
ically contradictory basis, which could not be followed by 
people who realized its inconsistency.
It is well known that, for a time, chemistry entered a 
third way emphasizing the Gmelin-equivalents. In other words, 
they neglected theory at all.
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Thus the role of vapour density measurement in the struc­
ture of cognition changed around 1832. The results mentioned 
"proved" for Dumas ever more strongly that the atomic weight 
could only too hypothetically be deduced from the vapour con­
dition of the elements. All this, together with the revision 
of the introduction of atomic theory into chemistry as well 
as the revision of its function have finally led to Dumas's
passionate refusal of the teaching about the existence of the
18atoms of the chemical elements. By 1836, Dumas viewed atomic 
theory as a teaching dogmatically introduced, not only into 
chemistry but into science and philosophy as well, out of 
which certain consequences could be deduced, but this did not 
modify, in the least, the arbitrariness of the whole. This 
arbitrariness became manifest to him through the emergence 
and escalation of contradictions, among which we have only 
mentioned some concerning the vapour density measurement.
That is to say, all the efforts used to solve the problem 
of the determination of atomic weights only deepened the cri­
sis. Let us see briefly some of the statements in "Philosophie 
chimique’ that contains Dumas's lectures from 1836 on in the 
form of a book. (One part of the detail following summarizes 
his knowledge correctly while the other part contains pes­
simistic remarks about the possibilities of vapour density 
measurement.)
"The consequence "f he says in connection with the hypoth­
esis about the two-atomic nature of the molecules of the sim­
ple gases, "stated on the basis of observation of the four 
simple bodies, being, as to their nature, in gas-form, and on 
the basis of observation of the vapour of bromine and iodine,
must obviously be refused on the basis of those observations
19that are connected to sulphur, phosphorus and arsenic."
After this he still had the following, correct, state­
ment to make : "it must be stated that gases, also when they 
are simple, do not contain, at the same volumina, the same 
number of atoms, that is, chemical atoms". This statement made 
with great emphasis for the first time in 1832 was, a year
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later, approvingly repeated by Berzelius. He consented:
Dumas's results have shown that the vapour density measuring 
of the simple gases does not lead unavoidably and in a direct 
way to the determination of atomic weight.20
On the basis of all that has been said here about Dumas's 
litow we clearly see a misunderstanding about him which, except
Cannizaro (1860) many historians share, namely, that he did
21not realize the validity of the Avogadro principle. Canni­
zaro could better judge the situation. It follows from the 
foregoing that by realizing the validity of the Avogadro 
principle Dumas was able to understand the importance of 
introducing the necessary suppositions but he found this way 
of thinking too dangerous. "We can admit that chemistry has a 
means for the determination of atomic weight (vapour density 
measurement); we can say that we find, in the same volume, 
sometimes the same number [.of a toms j , sometimes twice and
22sometimes three times more, but we never find less in it".
For further research, Dumas proposes: "instead of going 
deeper into these hypotheses, it would be much better to find 
a more stable basis for solid theories. Undoubtedly one will 
think that it would be more useful to determine, with already 
existing or with new methods, the vapour densities that are 
unknown to us, while, at the same time, the study of the 
vapour of compound bodies is also not to be neglected. Though 
it is true that the study of the latter is obviously less 
important, it can still lead to significant volume-laws”. He
adds that "today we still cannot find absolute laws but only
22changing, although quite simple, relations".
From the point of view of the theory of science, the case 
is clear: knowledge of the anomalies forcefully led to the 
completion, through hypotheses of association, of the Avogadro 
hypotheses which made the chemical atomic theory applicable 
to vapour density measurements. This step necessarily had am 
ad hoc character. Dumas, who saw the situation clearest, could 
not agree with the method of saving accepted hypotheses 
through amother set of hypotheses because he was worried aüaout
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this method becoming completely arbitrary. Some decades later, 
however, the association in vapour condition was already tak­
en, for certain element molecules, to be an established fact 
supported from different sides, i.e., the association in va­
pour state became a recognized phenomenon. In this way, the 
anomalous vapour density data could no longer be seen as lead­
ing to contradictions with well established chemical analogies 
as facts, but only anomalies as facts, themselves to be ex­
plained on the ground of a more overall conception. So one 
could again pick up the line using vapour density measure­
ments for the determination of atomic weights.
One component of Dumas critique which emerged in the 
thirties on the chemical atomic theory was based on the anal­
ysis of the arbitrary nature of the hypothesis of the chemical 
atoms, of just one permanent particle for each chemical ele­
ment. He was right to see that, in this respect, the chemical 
atomic hypothesis was a translation of the philosophers' the­
ory about the ultimate nature of the world, and thus it was, 
for chemistry, a rather uncertain hypothesis.
The story of the chemical atomic theory in the first half 
of the 19th century appears to be much more complicated than 
the way it can be interpreted in Kuhn's or Lakatos' model.
Both of them can only be partially applied. For example, there 
was not just one paradigm of the chemical atomic theory but 
there were nearly as many variants of the atomic theory in the 
twenties and thirties as leading chemists and among these 
theories there only was a family resemblance. (Note that this 
period cannot be interpreted as a preparadlgmatic phase.) Then 
the theory in the thirties, forties, fifties was not defended 
against emerging anomalies by progressive problem shift; the 
chemists worked otherwise. From the early thirties ownwards, 
the debate concerning the chemical atomic theory did not 
sharpen. Rather, the chemists' community pushed it aside as a 
whole. They used the hypothesis of chemical atoms in many ways 
just as a working hypothesis without great importance. Even 
those people changed their attitude who, like Dumas, were
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well aware of the problems expected to arise If chemistry did 
not make enough efforts to develop a consistent particle the­
ory. Chemistry did not react to the crisis of the theory by 
reinforcing the debate about Its grounds but, at least for a 
time, by giving preference to other functions of aoientifio 
research than achieving a consistently founded theory. This 
Is not an uncommon situation In the development of chemistry, 
a very complicated science, which should receive more atten­
tion from the theory of science as a more general case of 
scientific growth if it is to construct possibly true models 
of complex processes in the history of science.
Technical University, Budapest
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unable to push aside the empiristic counterargument.
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JÓZSEF LUKACS - JANOS KELEMEN
SOME ISSUES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY 
- A HUNGARIAN PERSPECTIVE -
The founders of Marxism-Leninism left us an irreplacea­
ble methodological heritage, but one that has been investi­
gated only in part. A methodological conclusion enunciated 
by Marx and Lenin is particularly important. In order to ob­
tain a picture adequately reflecting social reality, it is 
necessary to consider the object under investigation as a 
whole. The methodological principle of wholeness, as Lenin 
said, protects us from dogmatic one-sidedness.
The principle of concreteness of approach derives from 
the dialectical principle of wholeness, but does not exclude 
the use of "interpretative“ abstractions, those that make 
possible the Intellectual reconstruction of empirically giv­
en, concrete objects-
The pricipal conclusion from the methodological herit­
age of Marxism is the need to apply the principle of his­
toricity in investigating social regularities. Marx devel­
oped that principle and applied it in contrast to unilinear 
evolutionism. He persistently emphasized the dialectics of 
the particular and the universal in history and the uneven­
ness of the development of society.
Marx, Engels, and Lenin believed there are underlying 
laws in the process of history and on the basis of formulat­
ing such laws they outlined the principal criteria for his­
torical progress. Their view about history becoming world­
wide as it overcomes geographic and ethnic boundaries is im­
portant from the standpoint of the materialist understanding 
of history. Such criteria of social progress as the pushing 
back of natural barriers and the replacement of "naturally
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emeroed" forms of community by societal forms have their im­
portant consequences in the field of the methodology of his­
tory. In the analysis of the course of history, the paired 
categories of continuity and discontinuity play an Important 
role. Their employment in dialectical unity makes it pos­
sible for us to derive lessons from the past; but, neverthe­
less, it does not admit of mechanical application of these 
lessons to our day. Marxist methodology regards history as a 
dialectically determined process in which the necessary and 
the contingent, the absolute and the relative, do not exclude 
but presume each other, and in which the discovery of objec­
tive regularities has appropriate revolutionary actions as its 
goal.
The thesis of humanism in Marxist philosophy has a meth­
odological significance too. According to it, the human ln- 
dividuval and the masses of the people must not be regarded 
merely as passive material for the historical process. They 
"make" their history and serve not only as actors but as 
authors in the drama of their own histories.
Consideration of Marx's analysis of what constitutes a 
socio-economic system, of the laws of the capitalist and com­
munist systems, and of the transition from prehistory to gen­
uine history is an absolute necessity from the standpoint of 
contemporary research. Marx's Capital is an outstanding ex­
ample, in the history of science, of the application of the 
dialectics of the concrete and the abstract, and of the struc­
tural and historical approach. Being a model of the applica­
tion of the Marxist paradigm as a method of criticism, it 
points out the direction to be taken in the study of method­
ological problems of the social sciences in our day.
In the social sciences, one has to be particularly cau­
tious in applying abstractions, for only a theory taking the 
most numerous factors into consideration will be free of 
simplifying the object under analysis. It is true, however, 
that the social sciences, like the natural ones, are incon­
ceivable without the use of abstractions of the very highest
70
level. In the work of Harx and Lenin considerable attention 
is paid to the idealizing abstractions. According to them, 
genuine abstraction does not take one away from reality but, 
on the contrary, facilitates the identification and correct 
perception of a system of society and its place in history.
The process of introducing mathematics into scientific 
research and the utilization of symbolic logic have, in the 
social sciences, intensified the role of so-called semantic 
abstractions, formalizations. But formalizations require con­
sideration of the exceptional complexity of the phenomena of 
social reality and, consequently, have definite limits. Bencev 
discovery of the limits within which formalization and seman­
tic abstractions do not become absurdities is an important 
task for methodology. Naturally, the foregoing does not ex­
haust the rich methodological heritage of Marxism and the 
problems that emerged in recent discussions on Marxist metho­
dology .
In Hungary, the last decade has witnessed a recognition 
of the importance of methodological investigations in social 
science. For example, a discussion focused on the specifics 
of social laws produced interesting contributions to methodol­
ogy. An understanding of what is specific to social laws re­
quires, in particular, an answer to the question of whether 
the methodological universalism proceeding from positivism 
and sometimes encountered in the writings of various authors 
in interpreting socialism is applicable to the analysis of 
social reality. One of the conclusions drawn in the discussion 
was that social regularities include an element of univer­
sality, no matter what specific forms they take. This con­
clusion is a starting point both for working out a general 
methodology and for contributing to the development of the 
individual social sciences as well.
In connection with the development of studies in Marxist 
sociology, the question of the relation between sociology and 
Marxist philosophy appeared on the agenda. In the course of 
the discussion of the interconnection between historical mat-
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erialism and sociology, it became even more obvious that em­
pirical methods of gaining knowledge of society and the phil­
osophical interpretation of society are different forms of 
knowledge, though they supplement each other. Sociology cannot 
ignore the theoretical and methodological principles developed 
by philosophy; at the same time, the tasks of philosophy go 
beyond that discipline in the narrow sense and assume the 
presence of concrete sociological Interpretations of societal 
relationships. On the other hand, it has become obvious (on 
the level of the interconnection between the historical sci­
ences and sociology) how unacceptable is the view that history 
"collects“ and "digs up" facts, and sociology arranges them 
in a definite system. The sciences can only fulfil their task 
- that of identifying one or another aspect of empirical real­
ity - if their empirical and theoretical approaches act in 
unity.
The treatment in fuller detail of the category of socio­
economic systems produced lively discussions among philoso­
phers, historians (particularly specialists in ancient his­
tory), and, above all, historians of culture. In those dis­
cussions it was necessary to oppose the point of view that 
cast doubt on the scientific significance not only of problems 
that have not yet found a final solution, such as the "Asiatic 
mode of production," but, even more, of problems concerning 
the very category "socioeconomic system." It proved necessary 
also to oppose those who, having offered a mechanistic, un- 
dialectical treatment of the essence of social development, 
were incapable of providing the required aid to the concrete 
sciences.
The question of the essence of structural analysis and 
critiques of structuralism have also provoked lively discus­
sion in Hungary. Along with the question of historical and 
antihistorlcal approaches, that of the realtionship between 
ideology and methodology emerged in the centre of debate. In 
the course of the discussion it was demonstrated that, in 
themselves, structural descriptions, a striving for a higher
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degree of abstraction and formalization, and the use of mod­
els do not contradict the dialectical application of the 
principle of historicity. There can be no doubt that systems 
analysis has become an important factor in scientific analy­
sis in our day. It is equally obvious that it is impossible 
to draw a sharp line between methodology and ideology. The 
discussion showed that the Marxist social sciences have to 
develop their research techniques on the basis of those sci­
ences themselves.
In light of the present state of the social sciences in 
Hungary and those matters of principle that have been dis­
cussed above, we regard it as pertinent to focus attention 
on the investigation of the following methodological prob­
lems:
1. the dialectical unity of the historical and the log­
ical, of the historical and the systems approach in the meth­
odology of the social sciences;
2. the epistemological foundations of the methodology 
of the social sciences.
In planning the investigation of the first problem, we 
start with the point that society is capable of being theo­
retically cognized only if we are able, having abstracted 
from the level of particular events and direct manifestations 
of historical life, to reconstruct in depth the Interaction 
of the regularities that are concealed, and sometimes dis­
torted, by the contingent character of empirically accessible 
processes. It is only a correctly idealized abstraction that 
permits the replacement of a concrete reality, described with 
the help of empirical data, by an ideal model thereof and, 
on that basis, makes it possible to approach an adequate know­
ledge of the object, to reconstruct its concrete truth, and 
to generalize it at the system level.
One of the most fruitful postulates in the epistemology 
of social sciences is, as we have already stated, the organic 
unity of the historical and the logical. This thesis and the 
principle of totality are mutually interdependent. In view of
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them, the social sphere must be conceived as a developing, 
integral whole, and the empirical phenomena of social life 
can only be understood on the condition that they are de­
scribed as parts of this totality. Naturally, the empirically 
given history of societal forms does not correspond entirely 
to the abstractions in which the essential characteristics of 
these forms are reflected. The historical existence of soci­
eties and the categories reflecting them are not parallel and 
cannot be interpreted from an evolutionist point of view.
Basically, it must be accepted that the fundamental 
categories reflect the forms of existence of historically 
given societies. At the same time, it would be erroneous to 
analyze the individual categories in the sequence in which 
they appeared. As Marx emphasized, the analysis must not 
proceed from a predetermined sequence, but from the totality 
of the relations that will stand opposed to each other in a 
more developed society.
This means that we have to take into account the dia­
lectical and historically logical interconnection between the 
simpler (historically earlier) and more complicated categories. 
Accordingly, the most general abstractions regarding the life 
of society arise only on the basis of analyses of developed 
societies. Although abstract categories are applicable to any 
time, thanks specifically to their universality, for all their 
abstractness they possess historical determinacy and are man­
ifested only within concrete frameworks. Thus, for example, 
in analyzing the notion of labour, Marx showed that only under 
capitalism did its universal character become obvious.
In distinguishing between the abstract and the concrete 
and between simple and historically more advanced abstractions, 
Marx employed such distinctions as a critical tool aimed 
against bourgeois economic and social theories. He shows that 
bourgeois political economy, finding itself stuck at the level 
of analysis of economic relationships, interprets them extra- 
historically, looks upon them as independent abstractions, 
conceals the contradictions existing in reality, and engages
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in an apology for what exists, depicting it as logical neces­
sity.
Marx's methodological principles demanded examination 
of the life of society in its historical development and 
therefore stimulated investigative thought toward drawing 
scientifically founded conclusions regarding the future state 
of society. In describing his method, Marx emphasized the 
significance of those points in the process of cognition in 
which structural analysis brings scholars to the need to ex­
amine a subject from a historical point of view. Marx partic­
ularly singled out those factors in the analysis of capitalist 
society and its mode of production that contained evidence of 
the previous state of society and compelled researchers to 
turn their attention to earlier historical modes of produc­
tion. Naturally, in order to reveal the laws of capitalist 
economy, one does not have to describe the entire history of 
relationships of production and demonstrate in detail how they 
took shape in the course of history. It is not always neces­
sary to reduce a complex system to those equations of the ut­
most simplicity that would point to the past and to the pre­
existing system. Reference is made solely to quite specific 
moments in the analysing work of a scholar in which proceeding 
to historical examination of the emergence of the object of 
investigation is necessary. However, by facilitating a correct 
understanding o,f the present, this kind of disclosure of the 
specifics of what has become the object of research, through 
describing the process by which it came into being, simulta­
neously provides a key to an understanding of the past. In 
this sense, it holds true as well that knowledge of the past 
presupposes an understanding of the present. Marx's method of 
examining what exists presumes, at the saune time, identifica­
tion of those aspects of the reality being analyzed in which 
the overcoming of the contemporary form of production rela­
tionships and the outline of the contours of the future are 
to be seen. In other words, the dialectics of the historical 
and the logical emerges as the basis, in philosophical meth-
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odology, of the study of the past, the present, and the fu­
ture and of the prospects of communist social development.
Consequently, that the concepts employed in particular 
social sciences should be historically determinable is an ex­
ceptionally important aspect of the Interconnection between 
the historical and the logical. This pertains equally to their 
epistemological content and their function in terms of world 
view. In further treatment of this range of problems it is 
necessary to make extensive use of the achievements of con­
temporary logic, systems analysis, and other areas of science. 
In a number of social sciences (linguistics, anthropology, 
and the historical disciplines), the problem of the inter­
connection of the historical and the logical arises in the 
context of the utilization of synchronous and diachronous 
approaches. The analysis of structural and functional connec­
tions also constitutes, for Marxism, a fruitful area of re­
search that it would be wrong to yield to structuralism.
The method of idealizing abstraction (idealization) has 
become widely prevalent in the natural sciences. It provides 
an opportunity for logical reconstruction of the internal con­
nections within the entity under study. Such disciplines in 
natural science as the biological theory of development, pale­
ontology, cosmogony, and others Include in their research ob­
jects the factor of historicity, which is an organic component 
of the notion of development. But it is only in the social 
sciences that the dialectical unity of the historical and the 
logical finds genuine manifestation and emerges as a necessary 
precondition for successful research.
When we speak of these methods, however, we must not 
overestimate them. Neither must we forget, in citing them, 
that an entity reconstructed by logical means must be refera­
ble, as the concrete in thought, to the reality empirically 
given, and that we may accept such methods as scientifically 
valuable only if they give us a more appropriate, profound, 
and integral interpretation of the experimental data than any 
other theoretical explanation. The social sciences also cannot
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do without the principle of the concreteness of truth and its 
verification by practice.
And with this we have already proceeded to a character­
ization of the epistemological problems of the social sci­
ences. We shall list only the most significant ones.
How do social facts correlate with the theoretical foun­
dation of that branch of science? what is the role of quanti­
fication in describing social facts, in identifying the pe­
riodicity of mass-scale phenomena, particularly in sociology, 
political economy, and anthropology? How is one to determine 
the bounds of applicability of quantification and formaliza­
tion? What methods of explanation are inherent in the respec­
tive social sciences, and what is their logical structure?
How are the specifics of the language of the social sciences 
applicable? What are the communicative potentials of the social 
sciences, and the obstacles to them? What are the heuristic 
and axiological functions of the materialist approach to social 
history in studies carried out by the social sciences?
Along with the explication of this list of epistemological 
questions, another task of methodological research in the so­
cial sciences is the identification of principles of classi­
fication and systematization. Thus far, Marxist methodology 
has given relatively little attention to the theoretical foun­
dations, the cognitive aspects, and criteria of classification 
and systematization. Treatment of these problems is possible 
only on the condition that the approach of historical genesis 
be employed. The basic task consists of demonstrating the 
historical manifestation of various spheres of social exist­
ence and, parallel to that, the historical rise of sciences 
and their interconnection. Furthermore, a logical reconstruc­
tion of particular disciplines would further discovery of the 
conceptual limits of systematizaton.
The questions concerning the value of comparative ap­
proaches should be singled out particularly among the epis­
temological problems in the social sciences. Comparativistics 
within the framework of the Marxist methodology can be prod-
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uctive, of course, if the relativist tendency inherent in dif­
ferent schools of hlstoricism (W. Dilthey, 0. Spengler, A. 
Toynbee, M. Weber) is critically overcome, if one rejects a 
typology that denies both historical progress and historical 
regularities, and if one discards formalist schemes and sub­
jective intuitive analogies. At the same time, it must effec­
tively oppose that kind of structural functionalism which 
confines itself to discovering related or similar elements in 
different kinds of systems, without identifying what is spe­
cific to them, what determines the role and function of those 
elements in given historical frameworks. The Marxist typology 
of social forms has to be based on broad, comparative analy­
sis in which historical criteria are deeply manifested. Marx­
ist typology indentifies what is universal and law-governed 
in what is historically distinctive, and this cognitive pro­
cedure is regarded as the methodological base of the histor­
ical typology of various forms of consciousness (religion, 
art, etc.).
The topics considered here demonstrate how numerous the 
methodological problems of the social sciences are. We hope 
that, at the same time, though only in part, they have also 
made clear the principal tasks facing Marxists in this realm 
of research.
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ANTAL HOLLER
DETERMINANT OF PHYSICAL EVENTS
In constructing a concept of determinism, it is essential 
to clarify the exact sense behind the determinacy of events 
and criteria under which we can consider a physical (or, ge­
nerally, an objective material) event as determined. It is 
obvious that the determinacy of events cannot be interpreted 
too widely or it becomes meaningless, losing its heuristic 
value. Nor can it be too narrowly restricted, since it has to 
include the field phenomena known,or presumed, to exist today 
in order to be considered relevant in a philosophical sense 
(or on another level of generality).
Our definition of the principle of determinism is as fol­
lows: Every objective event is determined by its interactions 
with other objective events, and only through them.
He call an objective event determined when having observed 
it we find that an account of its interactions with other ob­
jective events makes it understandable why it happened in the 
way it did and not otherwise. Two essential points about this 
conception of determinism must be made:
a) in this definition of the principle of determinism, 
there is no reference to either the necessary, or the chance, 
character of the relationship of events;
b) by contrast, the definition itself already stresses 
that the relationship of events is characterized as an inter­
action.
On the Concept of State
In classical physics, state was immanently ordered to be­
long to physical objects or systems, and only through change
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of state was it related to other objects or systems. (This 
happened in a more or less abstract manner, through the con­
cept of force: force here represented the intensity and di­
rection of the effect producing a change of state. Yet this 
concept revealed next to nothing about the character of the 
physical system producing this effect.) In this way, the con­
cept of state remained somewhat static and, retrospectively, 
we can see that it only covered a segment of a physical proc­
ess under observation at a given moment in time. In classical 
physics, this "process-state relationship" was considered in 
a reversed order: it was not the state which was considered 
as a segment of the process at a given time, but the process 
itself was a time sequence of states. This explains why the 
concept of dynamism is primarily connected to the concept of 
change of state. In several concrete cases, it was indeed 
realized that the apparent stability on a given level (that 
is, the time constancy of the parameters of the state) was 
the manifestation of changes at other levels. However, it did 
not become clear that the essence of existing physical systems 
is not their constancy of state, but interaction at a lower 
level or with other systems: in other words, change.
Modern physical observations have demonstrated the in­
sufficiency of a static, immanent approach to state. For ex­
ample, the theory of relativity led to the conclusion that we 
cannot speak of a concrete state of physical events or physic­
al systems, except in correlation with other (concrete) 
physical systems - with the so-called "reference systems". 
Microphysics, on the other hand, has proved that an object is 
not characterized, in itself, by its state but only through 
its relation to some sort of measuring arrangement (device). 
Moreover, particle-physics no longer considers its central 
problem to be determining the parameters by which we can 
characterize the state of given micro-particles, but concen­
trates instead on what conditions and in what manner the par­
ticles themselves change into other types of micro-particles.
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That is to say, the physical world, today is no longer con­
sidered to be a system of things with immanent qualities as 
in classical physics, but a system of events in interaction 
with each other.
The Problem of Individuality
Classical physics construed the world as a system of in­
dividual objects which may interact with each other, yet, in. 
this interaction, they behave in keeping with their own im­
manent qualities. It was important that these qualities could 
be rendered more or less independent from the circumstances 
in which they occurred..
One of the basic observations in microphysical research 
is that it is no longer possible to separate the qualities 
of the object from its manifestation conditions (its con­
crete measuring arrangements): that is to say, these objects 
cannot be considered individual to the same extent as macro- 
objects are. Nevertheless, since the micro-objects - under 
well-defined energy conditions - demonstrate a definite (e- 
lectron, proton, neutron, etc.) character, we cannot speak of 
a full evaporation of Individuality. As against the closed 
nature of objects or systems in classical physics (which can 
be realised fairly accurately), micro-objects and micro-sys­
tems are, to a large extent, "open". To designate this situ­
ation, we have previously used the epithet •quasi-individu-
The Concept of Determinism in Classical Physics
In full harmony with the static, immanent approach to 
state was the generally accepted Laplacean concept of deter­
minism, which involved an unambiguous and inevitable relation­
ship between phenomena and states. This means that, at least 
theoretically, random effects were excluded from the deter-
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minant factors. However, in practice, unforeseen effects 
always occurred and, as a result of these, the course of 
concretely observed phenomena always showed a deviation from 
the lawlike. Classical theory attributed random effects to 
Insufficient knowledge, assuming that, upon widening the field 
of information or 'extending’ the boundaries of the physical 
system under observation, the random effects could be brought 
within the framework of necessary and unambiguous laws. That 
is to say, the accidental was considered as an epistemologic­
al category.
Essence of Random Effects and their 
Function in Physical Events
Roughly speaking, the essential difference between clas­
sical and modern physics with regard to the problem of deter­
minism lies in the fact that, in the classical concept of de­
terminism, random effects could be excluded, at least theo­
retically, from the determinants of phenomena, while, accord­
ing to recent determinism, this is not possible for the re­
sults of micro-physical research have shown that the princi­
pally statistical character of events is due to the fact that 
their course is basically affected by chance. Whereas chance 
could in fact, be neglected in classical physics (and, as we 
have seen, it was basically taken to be an epistemological 
factor), in modern particle-physics it plays an essential 
role. Owing to the basic character of the concept of chance, 
in an elaboration of a modern concept of determinism, the 
essential nature of chance and the role random effects play 
in the development of physical events or processes must be 
clarified.
The quality of a phenomenon on a given level is determi­
ned by some constant interactions, as a single interaction 
may produce a radical qualitative change. Other external and 
internal relations only affect the given phenomenon within
82
it» basic determinacy, in a way (differing from the above) 
»her» only the momentary configuration of them all determinee 
the nature of the effects which will be exerted. The elements 
of these non-essential interactions, which lie outside the 
basic determinacy of the given phenomenon, are a series of 
events chiefly Independent from each other, the only con­
nection between them being through their interaction with the 
given phenomenon. Consequently, their appearance in the inter­
action ensemble of the given phenomenon is accidental in con­
trast with the basic interactions which form a necessary, 
permanent connection in its qualitative determinacy. The 
presence or absence of accidental interactions have different 
consequences, according to the combination of other effects 
with which they coincide.
To illustrate the aforesaid, the example of an artillery 
shot will be used. In a cannon shot - taking the gravitat fanal 
field as a necessary external condition - three basic factors determine 
unambiguously that the missile will strike within a certain 
area, within the so-called target ellipse: the angle of the 
gun to the horizontal plane, the mass of the missile and the 
explosive force of the charge. However, with regard to where 
exactly each shot will make a hit, we can only make statis­
tical assertions. Beyond basic determinacy, this may depend 
on a momentary combination of random interactions, such as 
the changing density of air along the trajectory, and the 
diameter of individual missiles (which can only be approxi­
mately identical) etc. Thus, if we say that a given shot hit
a certain point of the ellipse due to a given level of air 
density,2 and if we take this into consideration with the
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next shot, it does not follow that it will strike the same 
point. Such factors as the above, that is, fluctuations in 
the density of air at a given time and place and variations 
in the dimension of the missiles, are modified independently 
from each other, so their total effect depends on their ran­
dom combination.
In reality, of course, not only those two, but innumer­
able such factors exist. Interactions which fall outside the 
basic determinacy of a given phenomenon and whose eventual 
consequenoes depend on the momentary combination of other non- 
essential and transitory factors, can be called random inter­
actions. It is important to stress again that, in the example 
under discussion, the results would always be the same when 
the three basic factors are present,that is to say, the 
missile will always hit within the target ellipse, irrespec­
tive of interference from any other factors. The combination 
of these factors is connected by a necessary relationship to 
the outcome of the events this is why we call them basic fac­
tors. It is evident from the example discussed that we are 
face to face with a necessary relationship, despite the fact 
that unambiguous determinacy in the Laplacean sense is miss­
ing. It is not- only the possible Impact points of the missile 
which are innumerable (Indeed, if we consider the target 
ellipse as a continuum, it is Infinite), but the same target 
ellipse can also be realized through various combinations in 
the joint presence of basic factors. However, joint random 
interactions cannot be given once and for all, as they are 
subject to constant change. So the effect of each element de­
pends on a momentary combination of accidental factors.
The combination of interactions which fall outside basic 
determinacy forms a background to the phenomenon in question, 
and a highly dynamic one, which represents the relationship 
of the given phenomenon with a constantly moving, changing, 
qualitatively infinitely manifold material world. This ac­
counts for the fact that, even if we could establish retro-
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spectively that for the concrete outcome of the shot a con­
crete cause was primarily responsible, the presence of the 
same cause would not necessarily lead to the same result in a 
future occasion. These random causes or interactions are in­
herent parts of the background and their effects are depend­
ent on its variations. In the above mentioned example, we can 
state, for instance, that a given shot "over-reached" its 
target because the missile passing through a less dense layer 
of atmosphere skidded. The presence of the same thin layer of 
air would not necessarily produce the same "long" shot again, 
however, because its effect may be compensated for by a mo­
mentary blast of wind from the opposite direction.
The fact that events otherwise independent from each oth­
er can come into contact through their accidental effect on 
a given event, influencing in this way its concrete outcome, 
renders it possible to define the most important thesis in 
our theory of determinism: in the objective world there exist 
aeries of events governed by independent laws (independent 
causai chains).
In the material world, there are neither specifically 
necessary nor specifically accidental interactions. An inter­
action can only be inevitable or accidental in one concrete, 
objective relation. It is due to the fact that a group of 
interactions objectively determines the quality of a phenomenon 
(that is, these interactions enter into a permanent internal 
connection), that another group of interactions in the given 
relationship becomes accidental. The same interactions con­
nected to other phenomena, or on another level, can become 
elements of necessary connections.
The momentary configuration of accidental interactions 
- which is itself ultimately responsible for the outcome of 
the given concrete event - is subjected to inevitable change, 
so subsequent events cannot be identical. This is because the 
supposition that the combination of accidental interactions 
does not change would require either the complete isolation
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of the given system, or the complete immobility of the world 
outside it (that is, of the background, which is the source of 
accidents). In reality, this never occurs.
Accidental interactions which, at a given moment, react 
in diverse ways, can to a certain extent compensate each oth­
er : for instance, in the given example this accounts for the 
fact that the individual shots are accidental, that is, the 
exact point of the hit is not unambiguously determined.^ In­
stead they are scattered around the theoretical target point 
according to well-defined laws, so that probability asser­
tions on the concrete course of individual shots can be made.
It is evident from the above that accidental interactions 
cannot be contrasted to causal interactions, for accidental 
changes also have their ovn causes; any event is the combi­
nation of random interactions emerging outside its basic de- 
terminacy. It is therefore obvious that the intensity and 
temporal stability of a given event's basic interactions - 
which are the carriers of its Individuality - and of the com­
bination of random effects determine to what extent the ac­
cidental Interactions affect the course of the given event. 
Classical physics was able to offer an adequate description 
of the phenomena in its field of study using the Laplacean 
determinism concept because, in these fields, the effects of 
accidental interactions are objectively negligible. In the 
application of Laplacean determinism, difficulties emerged 
when physics began to transcend the boundaries of the classi­
cal macro-world, that is to say, when it began to recognize 
a deeper interaction level, where accidental interactions 
play a more considerable role.
The Dynamic Character of the Determinaoy of Events
Although causal interactions do not exhaust the determi- 
nacy of events, they undoubtedly constitute its basic com­
ponents. So the character of causal interaction is slgnlfl-
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cant from the point of view of a general determinacy, as well.
It is customary to define the causel connection as fol­
lows: if A exists, then, and only then, B exists. Symbolical­
ly:
A — ► B ,
where the symbols A and B can refer equally to a thing, a 
state, an event or a process. A more general concept of deter­
minism than the Laplacean one demands the explicit statement 
that a thing or a state cannot be the cause, or generally, 
the determinant, of another thing or state: it is only an 
event or prooeee which can exercise an active effect on the 
course of smother event or process. Accordingly the symbolic 
form of the thesis is the following:
(Ax — > A2) — » (Bx — » B2)
By applying the causal thesis to events and not to things 
or states, the dynamic character of the causal determinacy of 
events comes into the fore. (In order to make the time-de- 
pendent, or processual character of events more explicit, the 
following formula can be used:
A(t) - A(t ) — » A(t. ) — ♦ A(t,) — * ... — > A(t ) 0 1 2  n
For simplicity's sake, we continue to use the symbols 
Aj^  ^ A2, and B^ : B2 ,
unless it is very important to make temporal dependence ex­
plicit. )
It is evident that, if the event — ► A2 has an effect 
on the event B^—► B2 , than B^— <► B2 also exercises an in­
fluence on A^— ► Aj . Consequently, the causal connection has 
an interactional character and, accordingly, the final sym­
bolic description is as follows:
(Ax-  A2) ^ ( Bl—  B2> (Kal; K^ ) 4 .
(Let us note for the sake of completeness that the simp­
le arrow in the symbol of an event, or the double one marking 
an interaction, cannot be identified simply with their usual 
meaning of implication or equivalence in logic. The arrow in
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the scheme A1~► A2, if the event is studied *ln itself*, 
only refers to some sort of order in the states, to a tend­
ency towards state change in the events. Only by taking into 
account the causal relation with Bj— ► Bj can it be considered 
as an implication, owing to random factors among the deter­
minants, and then only in terms of "probabllitstic logic". If 
the double arrow symbolizing interaction were Identified with 
equivalence, it would refer to the full symmetry of events 
forming the two sides of the Interaction, but then the inter­
pretation of interaction as a causal relation would become a 
void formality.)
Naturally Ka  ^is only one component in the determinants 
of an event A^ —► A2; an event A^— ► Aj simultaneously takes 
part in numerous other Interactions. At a given moment,
*a2,•••'K»n interactions (determinants) together determine 
the event's concrete course. Similarly, the determinants of 
an event B^—► Bj create the configuration of Interactions
“b i ' ^ ...........’W
As an interaction, is identical to . However, 
interactions Ka2 and *432' or Ka3 ^ 3* etc" • are natural­
ly not identical, since events A^— ► A2 or B^— i► Bj, outside 
the "common" interaction, are interacting with an entirely 
different event complex: the Interaction structure of the two 
events is dissimilar. In other words, the pair of events 
forming the two Sides of an interaction are dis­
similar, so the same given interaction, as cause, leads to a 
different consequence if connected with event A,— ► A2 than 
with event B^— ► 82* from a causal viewpoint, the
interaction ( K ^ jKj^ ) is asymmetrical. The consequence prod­
uced by the causal effect is also dependent on the "immanent" 
qualities of the event subjected to this effect, which, 
owing to the different interaction structure of events A£-»A2 
and Bj-^Bj, is truly dissimilar.
At last, we should mention, in connection with the pos­
sibilities for generalization already referred to, that the
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events for« three groups from the point of view of causality! 
an event c m  be described as a) the coining into being of 
something; b) the change of something; c) the duration, i.e. 
the relatively permanent existence, of something. In a given 
case, the definite objective conditions - or the concrete 
epistemological situation - select one of the three pos­
sibilities.
In accordance with the previously introduced notation, 
the above three types of causal relation can be described as 
follows:
let the two events be
A(t) - Attj)-*- A<t2)-* ...-► A(tn )
B(t) - Bttj)- B(t2)—  B(tn) ;
then a) coming into being as a causal relation:
Aitj)]— ► [B(t0 )-* Bitj)]
b) change as a causal relation:
■ACt^)—  AO^)]—  [B(tk )—  BCtj^J ,
c) duration (relatively permanent existence)as a 
causal relation:
A(t —t.)—* B(t —t. ) .O 1 O 1
In a), t refers to the fact that the event B has just come 
into being; in b), t^, indicates that the event B has taken
another shape in the mutual connection with A than it would 
have otherwise taken; in c), the argument t0~t^ refers to 
the time interval where both A and B exist, and B does not 
exist outside this interval.
Pre-Determination and Poet-Determination
It is obvious that a concept of materialistic determinism 
basically depends on the fact that there should exist m  in­
evitable relationship between a completed event and its de-
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terminants, since only in this way can the role of non-ma­
terial, irrational factors be excluded. However, micro-physical 
experiments demand that random factors influencing the con­
crete course of an event should also be considered as deter­
minants of the event in question.
Moreover, if we accept that the accidental interactions 
of a given event, or their momentary configuration, also beleng 
to the determinants of the event, then it is necessary to 
distinguish between the problem of the determinacy of a future 
event and of one which hae already occurred, in both an on­
tological and an epistemological sense. The first will be re­
ferred to as pre-determination and the second as poet-deter­
mination. The basic ptroblem is then how it is possible to 
reconcile the role of accidentals in the pre-determinative 
formation of events with the inevitable p>ost-determinate re­
lations of the emerging phenomena and its determinants without 
interfering with the objectivity of the accidental.
We must consider the following widespread argumentation: 
simultaneously with the permanent, essential, (necessary) 
interactions Involved in the production of an event, acciden­
tal interactions also affect it. Thus, within a finite time 
interval before the actualization of an event, it is impos­
sible to predict with certainty its concrete outcome, nor is it 
objectively, unambiguously determined, owing to unexpected 
random effects. If we consider the problem an infinitely small 
time interval dt before the emergence of the event, the sit­
uation is entirely different. In such a short time, new random 
interactions cannot be introduced and, at that point, given 
determinants and the developing event can form an unambiguous 
relationship.
Two remarks are to be made about this suggestion. Firstly, 
the expression "an infinitely small time interval dt before 
the emergence of the event" does not make any sense. Because, 
should the short interval dt mean an infinitely short dura­
tion, then new random interactions could not interfere with
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the event, sinoe, within an infinitely short time, no change 
can ooour in the event iteelf. (There are no timeless physi­
cal, or any other material, changes.) "An infinitely small 
time interval dt before the emergence of the event* indeed 
refers to the event itself. Secondly, should dt be optionally 
short, but finite, then not only may the event in aueetion 
change, but new accidental factors may arise as well.
Every concrete event is determined as a process by the 
multiplicity of inevitable and random factors. As a result of 
the accidental factors the concrete occurrence of individual 
events can diverge but, at the same time, the necessary in­
teractions (determinants), which are similar in similar types 
of processes, give a definite character to the particular 
event structure.
Evidently, the solution to the problem is to take the ob­
jective, material random interactions into account as deter­
minants and not to regard events pre-determinatively ae un­
ambiguously determined. We can unequivocally reject metaphi- 
sical Laplacean determinism, if we accept the ‘open* nature 
of phenomena and the objectivity of the accidental. We be­
lieve that insistence on an unambiguous predeterminism only 
reflects a conscious or instinctive nostalgia for Laplacean 
determinism.
As far as post-determinism is concerned, we can say the 
following: with post-determination, we can consider (at least 
theoretically) all factors, both necessary and random, which 
affect the course of an event, that is, we recognize an un­
ambiguous relationship between a particular consummated event 
and its determinants. At this point, however, we should make 
two remarks. Firstly, the mere fact that there is a post­
determinative, unambiguous relationship between an event and 
its determinants does not m e w  that the random determinants 
lose their accidental character. Secondly, if we post-determi - 
nately apply statistical methods to numerous concrete events, 
we can only formulate a probability statement for the, as
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yet, unproduced event. Since the laws of nature are general, 
permanent tendencies in objective processes (or sets of 
events), the relevant basis of characterising such laws is 
the pre-determinative situation. Accordingly, statistical 
(probabilistic) laws are to be considered as the general form 
of the laws of nature. The fact that, despite an unambiguous 
relationship between an event and its determinants, we can 
only make probabilistic statements for future events is the 
subjective reflection of the objectively statistical cha­
racter of the laws of nature.
All these have special significance with regard to micro­
physical events. It is well-known, for example, that, as far 
as particles are concerned, the state of the environment is 
also important in deciding which side of the wave-particle 
dualism, a characteristic of the quantum mechanical state, 
will prevail; that is, whether the object will behave as a 
wave or a particle. (Micro-objects can be regarded as quasi­
individuals. ) In addition, among the interactions affecting 
the state of micro-objects, random interactions play an es­
sential role. Actually, the two sides in a micro-physical 
interaction cannot be regarded as well-defined individual 
changes of state. Events A^—► Aj and B^-* Bj, due to the in­
teraction of micro-objects with their environment (due to the 
“open" character of the micro-objects themselves), represent 
a more or less large segment of the objective physical world, 
and, because of the accidental nature of some interactions, 
they are objectively ambiguously defined. Therefore, the 
concrete manifestation of the given interaction in the events 
constituting one or another side of the interaction is affec­
ted by both the individual qualities of the event and the 
structure of its interaction with its environment. The sta­
tistical nature of micro-physical causality, or, in a more 
general sense, the determinacy of micro-phenomena, is due to 
this fact.
Technical Oniversity, Budapest
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NOTES
1. MULLER, A.: Quantum Mechanics: a Physical World Picture 
Akadémiai Kiadó - Pergamon Press, Budapest-Oxford, 1974
2. This naturally Is ab ovo an Idealized supposition, since 
other factors, not taken into consideration here, may also 
contribute to the shot.
3. Of course, not determined in the Laplacean sense.
4. The interaction in question is referred to from the angle 
of the event Aj—* Aj as K^, from that of Bj— ► Bj as .

karoly reol
ON THE FIRST EUROPEAN THEORY OF MONEY 
(.tieolt Or«*««'* Trtatitt on Monty)*
“Moneta apellata est quia 
monet ne qua fraus in 
métallo vei In pondéré fiat*
(Isidorus, BtynoXogiat, 
lib. XVI., cap. XVIII.)
2. Who uat SiooIt Orttat T
During the 14th century, the spreading nominalistic phi­
losophy, the so-called *via moderna* created favourable con­
ditions for new problems and stimulated the interest in the 
natural sciences as well as in the problems of social philo­
sophy. For the development of natural science, it proved fun­
damentally important that Oclchamism related critically to 
Aristotelian philosophy and physics*, and that it attributed 
decisive significance to ’intuition*, l.e. direct experience.
A great number of scientists, e.g. the fellows of Merton 
College who pursued the traditions of the 13th century Oxford 
school (Thomas Bradwardine, William Heytesbury, Richard Swines- 
head) » or the representatives of the Paris school (Jeu Buri­
dan, Albertus de Saxonia, Marsilius Inghen) reached insights 
in the area of natural sciences - mainly in mechanics and 
astronomy - which formed a transition to renaissance and mod­
ern sciences. The philosophers of the Ockhamist school (e.g.
* Extracts from a longer essay. The author made the first 
Hungarian translation of Nicole Oresme's Traotatus de mutatio- 
nibus monetarum. He gave a synopsis of it in Magyar Filozófiai 
Szemle [the Hungarian Review of Philosophy] 1982/3. Nicole 
Oresme's ’Tractatus” is here quoted from Charles Johnson's 
bilingual critical edition. Charles Johnson: The De moneta of 
Nicholas Oresme and English Mint Documents, (London, 1956.)
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J. Buridan, Heinrich von Langenstein, Gabriel Biel)2 also show a 
lively interest in questions of social philosophy (ethics, 
economics). Among the great figures of "via moderna", we find 
Nicole Oresme who, through his significant mathematical, phy­
sical and astronomic accomplishments, was considered by P. 
Duhem to be the forerunner of Copernicus, Galilei, and Descar­
tes, and Is generally considered to be the most outstanding 
national economist in the 14th century.
Nicole Oresme was born around 1323 near Caen.2 According 
to a note from 1348, he studied theology in Paris at Navarra 
College. He obtained his master's degree in 1356 and was a 
Grand Master at Navarra College from 1356 to 1362, where he 
knew J. Buridan, the well-known scientist. He was the tutor 
of the Dauphin, the future Charles V, and he probably wrote 
his famous financial treatise De mutationibue monetarism around 
this time, in the fifties. His other Latin works in the fields 
of mathematics and physics were presumably born during this 
same period. In 1362, he is canon in Rouen and later holds a 
canonship at La Sainte Chapelle in Paris. He makes a speech 
in front of Pope Urban V in Avignon at Christmas, 1363.4 He 
directs attention to the dangers caused by the unreasonable 
concentration of property and wealth in the hands of the 
Church, as it sharpens the differences between the lower and 
higher clergy and between the ecclesiastical and secular 
spheres. He criticizes corruption and syraony and warns the 
Church against withholding necessary reforms because of the 
illusion of the unchangeability of existing conditions.2 In 
1364, he gained the office of dean at Rouen Cathedral with 
the help of the Regent and after the Regent's crowning as 
Charles V the same year, Oresme became his advisor. By order 
of the king, he translated several of Aristotle's works from 
Latin into French (Politica, Ethica, Oeconomica, De caelo),5 
thereby promoting vernacular culture. He also wrote other 
astronomical and theological works. He became bishop of 
Lisieux in 1377 and died in 1382.
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We cannot here deal with his work In the field of natural 
science.7 We will only mention his astronomic theory belonging 
to the pre-history of the Copernlcan revolution: Oresme, In 
opposition to Aristotle's theory that the Earth Is In a state 
of rest and the Heavens perform daily revolutions, brings ar­
guments in favour of the viewpoint that the Earth moves and 
the Heavens are in a state of rest. In his Interpretation, 
the biblical statements expressing a geocentric viewpoint need 
not be taken as literal scientific truth, as they follow gen-
Oerally accepted usage.
We will prefer to deal with Oresme's famous treatise on 
the theory of money which has Latin versions as well as Middle 
French ones, and is directly connected with the topical prob­
lems of French financial policy.
There are several factors playing important roles in the 
birth of the treatise and the development of its theoretical 
standpoint. These are both theoretical and historical.
As far as the theoretical presuppositions are concerned, 
we must reckon with the ever more determined efforts from the 
beginning of the 14th century opposing the ideology of feu­
dalism. First of all, the philosophical and political theo­
ries of nominalism, the "via moderna", and radical "Averroism" 
played an important role. These trends were effective in the 
separation of theology and philosophy from a methodological 
viewpoint, and, of the ecclesiastic and secular spheres from 
a political one, thus creating a favourable atmosphere for 
empiricism and scientific research on the one hand, and pre­
paring the vindication of the principles of popular sovere­
ignty and representational system, on the other.
From the point of view of social and historical factors, 
especially in the case of France, we must consider the con­
solidation of the third estate, the bourgeoisie, and the 
centralizing efforts of the royal power, noticeable from the 
end of the 13th century on. The financial and taxation policy 
naturally played an important role in the development of the9centralized monarchy. The intertwining of the financial and
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fiscal policies in the royal right for coinage created a 
characteristic dilemma as shown by Hector Estrup.10 If the 
financial policy, or, more precisely, the right for coinage 
is considered to be the source of fiscal income, then the 
government is in a never-ending temptation fo find income 
through the manipulation of money weight, i.e. through cur­
rency debasement, which may lead to the faltering of the mon­
etary system, the damaging and impairment of financial con­
ditions. If the government leaves the financial system un­
touched, that may easily lead to a deficit in the State Treas­
ury, considering the special political difficulties in the 
assessment of new taxes, and in tax Increase.
2. On the Topic and Sources of the Treatise
From the very first sentence of his Introduction, Oresme 
presents the problem under consideration as a debated ques­
tion, namelyt is the alteration of money a royal privilege or 
not?
Some men hold that any king or prince may, of his own 
authority, by right or prerogative, freely alter the 
money current in his realm, regulate it as he will, and 
take whatever gain or profit may result: but other men 
are of the contrary opinion.
This way of raising a question by Itself represented a prov­
ocation against the feudal concept of financial affairs. And 
it grew into a definite opposition in Oresme's central thesis: 
•Money belongs to the community" (Moneta est communitatis).
The contents of the work's 26 chapters may be summarized 
as follows:
The first chapters (I-VII) discuss the general problems, 
regarding money, its origin, role, properties, manufacturing 
and ownership. The next 7 chapters (VIII-XIV) describe the 
different forms of money alterations. The next chapters 
(XV—XXII) discuss the inadmissibility of these alterations. 
Then 2 chapters (XXIII-XXIV) present the arguments offered for
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the monarch's right to alter the currency - and give the 
refutation of these arguments. The last 2 chapters (XXV-XXVI) 
discuss the political aspects of the question: besides crit­
icism of the tyrannic exercise of power (XXV), he shows the 
harmful effects of the alteration of coinage on the future of 
the realm (XXVI).
As far as the sources of Oresme's Tractatus are con­
cerned, he quotes some books from the Bible (The Laws of 
Moses, Prophets, Gospels), he repeatedly refers to Aristotle's 
Ethics and Politics, he refers once to Huguccio, the famous 
canonist, and quotes Cicero, Ovidius and Seneca from among 
Roman writers. One of his important sources is Cassiodorus 
who, standing on the boundary line between late Antiquity and 
Middle Ages, mediated the transfer of ancient cultural mate­
rial to posterity. Cassiodorus, as it appears from Oresme's 
quotations, was concerned with the problems of the financial 
situation in Late Antiquity*'1 and this is the reason for 
Oresme's interest who also had to face practical tasks in the 
area of financial affairs.
The above comprise practically all the source areas for 
medieval economic thinking. The Middle Ages developed their 
own standpoint, the ideology suited to the specific needs and 
trends of the period, by reprocessing, reinterpreting and 
developing these ideas again and. again.
The Bible remains of course an unavoidable and indis­
pensable source. The provisions of Mosaic law, the social 
criticism of the prophets and the ethos of the Gospels, con­
tained many things which could be related to the economic 
problems of the Middle Ages.
The works of the ancient philosophers, especially 
Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, already known to 13th-cen­
tury schoolmen, contain a manifold political and economic 
theoretical material, treated at a high level. It was studied 
by the schoolmen with great interest, as they discovered 
analogies between the city-life unfolding in front of their 
eyes with the organization and constitution of city-repub-
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lies, and the ancient polls (civitas) analysed by the Phi­
losopher .
The revival of the study of Roman Law and the system­
atization of canon law also helped them in the legal formu­
lation of the problems occurring in the developing trade-and 
financial relations.
They naturally utilized the materials of the Christian 
intellectual tradition preserved by the Church Fathers and 
the Christian authors of Late Antiquity (e.g. Boetius, Isidore 
of Seville, Cassiodorus).
In all these areas, the Middle Ages found a specific 
circle of problems which had mainly developed on an ancient 
ground, but served nevertheless as a suitable starting point 
for medieval scholars in the formulation of their own prob­
lems. Oresme could, to a certain degree, adhere to this circle 
of problems.12
3. The Signifiaanoe of the Treatiee
In attempting to summarize the significance of Oresme's 
treatise in one statement, we should perhaps emphasize the 
fact that a definite step is made here from “oeconomica", 
expressing the ancient and medieval concept of the economy 
towards "oeconomia", the science of modern national economics. 
"Oeconomica* was essentially the science dealing with the 
direction and government of the family-type "small enterprise", 
the fundamental unit of production in subsistence farming, 
whereas now more comprehensive phenomena of the economic life 
emerge on the theoretical horizon, the problems of national 
economy as a whole are outlined for the first time, heralding 
the birth of "oeconomia", the new science christened "polit­
ical economy" by Montchrétien.
He have referred earlier to the remarkable phenomenon 
consisting in the parallel Interest of the thinkers of the 
"via moderna" in problems of both natural science and social
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life.13 In both respects, we can see a process of thematic 
and methodological emancipation and of separation from the 
traditional framework of the theological-philosophical sys­
tem. This process was realized through several stages: first 
of all, still within the framework of the great speculative 
systematizations, the "summae", certain problems were expound­
ed in greater detail and more thoroughly than earlier, so 
that a given topic grew into an almost independent treatise.14 
Another stage is when, leaving the area of theological sys­
tems, the study proceeds on the level of philosophy in the
narrower sense, usually in the form of commentaries written 
15to Aristotle's works. Finally, there appear treatises in­
dependent in genre, devoted to special topics. These are the 
first "swallows* of the increase of interest in scientific 
specialization.16 It is advisable to consider these stages in 
a "logical", rather them a strictly historical sense, as 
earlier, e.g. in the 13th century, we can already find in­
dependent treatises on different natural, social or economic
questions.17 Such questions are discussed in a wider spécula­
istive theoretical context at a later date as well. The 
formal- "logical" differences do however express a "historical" 
tendency: generally speaking, the separation process of 
specialized sciences from the unifying framework of tradi­
tional theological-philosophical systems.
Last but not least, the significance of Oresme's Treatise 
- even from a mere formal point of view - lies in the fact 
that he makes the first decisive step - at least in one re­
spect, in the problem of currency -, by writing an independent 
economic work and opening the line of works devoted to eco­
nomic problems.
The significance of Oresme's Treatise as regards its 
contents lies in the fact that it fits into the developing 
stream of 14th century criticism against the traditional forms 
of feudal ideology. In this way, a conception is emerging in 
his work which foreshadows and prepares, respectively, the 
economic outlook of the age of the original accumulation of
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capital, the viewpoint of mercantilism and Its early stage,
monetarism. It cannot be considered accidental that Oresme's
Treatise saw numerous editions precisely during the 17th 
19century.
As in monetarism, and later in mercantilism,in Oresme's 
Treatise the interest is focused on the question of money.
This means that the sphere of economy is approached from the 
side of trade, i.e. the circulation of goods. Ancient and 
medieval theories opposed "natural riches" to "artificial 
riches" and placed the stress on the activity producing use- 
value, consumption goods, corresponding to the leading role 
of "subsistence farming". It gave evidence of distrust for 
money as "artificial riches’, owing to its destructive effect 
on the community and "morals" and only justified its use as 
the mediator in the exchange of goods. On the other hand, the 
advance of commodity and money economy, under feudal condi­
tions, brought a new emphasis on the money problem which, on 
one hand, brought a more positive acknowledgement of money, 
while, on the other hand, kept alive the arguments and count­
er-arguments of traditional criticism against the increasingly 
independent movement of the currency.
Oresme's Treatise deals primarily and directly with the 
problems of the alterations of coinage in feudal practice.
His theoretical starting point is the Aristotelian dlscrimi- 
tion between natural riches and artificial riches and, accord­
ingly, he tries to limit the role of money to its mediatory 
function in the exchange of goods, i.e. he attributes a 
normative importance to the G-M-G /goods - money - goods/ 
movement. However, we can clearly distinguish the importance 
of circulation and trade relations as well as, in harmony with 
this, the separation from the feudal legalistic conception of 
money and the advance toward monetarist metallism.
As is well-known, ancient and medieval theories consider­
ed money a measure and symbol of value determined by law and 
thought real riches consists in the abundance of goods /abun— 
dantia rerum/. On the contrary, the monetarist-metallist theo-
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ry explained the special role of money through the natural 
characteristics of precious metals (gold, silver) and declared 
that "riches is money" ("Das Relchtumb, das ist Gelt")20.
There is a close correlation and correspondance between 
the concept of the nature and right of money. The interpreta­
tion of money as a simple symbol corresponds to the legalistic 
theory and practice which thinks the determination of the 
value of the currency is the right of the legislative or a 
supreme authority. This conception served as a basis for the 
justification of the royal right for altering currency in the 
Middle Ages which, in practice, often meant the justification 
of forgery. Marx states in connection with the 14th century 
money policy of the Bouse of Valois:
Lawyers started long before economists the Idea that money is a 
mere synbol, and that the value of the precious metals is purely 
Imaginary. c they did in the sycophantic service of the owned 
heads, supporting the riefrt of the latter to debase the coinage, 
during the whole of the middle ages, by the traditions of the 
Rosen Bqpire and the conceptions of money to be found in the 
Pandects. "Qu'aucun puisse ni doive faire doute", says an apt 
scholar of theirs, Biilip of Valois, in a decree of 1346, "que a 
nous et à notre majesté royale n ' appartiennent seulement ... le 
nestler, le fait, l'état, la provision et toute l'ordonnance 
des normales, de donner tel cours, et pour tel prix comme il nous 
plait et ban nous semble. " It was a maxim of the Roman lew that the 
value of money was fiwex by decree of the emperor. It was expressly 
forbidden to treat money as a commodity. "Becunias vero null! emere 
fas erit, nam in isu publico constitutes oportet non esse mércém. "21
The schoolmen who, In the wake of Roman lawyers, followed 
this legalistic interpretation and distinguished money from 
commodities, considering it essentially a state-determined 
measure of value whose role in the economic life, in the ex­
change of goods, was not so much due to its natural internal 
properties as to the fact that it was the "creature" of law, 
were in this "non-metallist" conception also backed by Aristot­
le's authority.22
In Oresme's Treatise, we can see significamt differences 
from the traditional ideas in both respects: in the interpre­
tation of the nature amd the right of the currency. He witness 
a transition to a monetarist or mercantile conception asOresme
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emphatically declares that money is not a thing arbitrarily 
alterable by the monarch but its value and functioning as 
currency are closely related to the natural properties of 
precious metals used as currency, (cf. Ch. X.)
This leads to the other significant change which sepa­
rates Oresme's views from the former ones. This concerns the 
right of money which was considered a domanial right or regale 
in the feudal conception. Oresme, however, most definitely 
represents the standpoint that financial affairs are the 
business of the community or of its better, wealthier part 
(communltas sive pars valentior eius); the ownership of money 
is their legal due on the basis of natural lau.23H. Estrup, one of the reviewers of the Treatise shows 
that Oresme emphasises the institutional nature of money,
i.e. that financial affairs should be assigned to the author­
ity of the community as a unit. Another new idea is that the 
right to coinage differs fundamentally from domanial rights 
and privileges and that the financial system should be handled 
as a public affair and national interest by the supreme 
authority, rather than as the legal and official source of 
income to the royal power. Oresme's support for the claims 
of the estates and his democratic attitude are concisely and 
briefly expressed in his central statement: "moneta est 
communitatis", money belongs to the community.
Oresme's Treatise, its practical nature and close con­
nection to politics remind us again of the approach of mer­
cantile economists as he examines economic problems in their 
wide connections - on the level of the national economy. He 
attempts to scrutinize the nation's economic life as a whole 
and this whole is opposed to the conditions in other countries 
as economic units. His primary attention is drawn to foreign 
trade turnover and, consequently, to the questions of money 
circulation. This new viewpoint explains why economic ques­
tions emerge in their concrete political, legal or moral 
aspects and not as isolated problems, as pure theories.
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Oresme's observation and analysis of trade conditions
leads to statements which may rightly attract the attention
of economic historians. It is known that the formulation of
the first economic law is generally attributed to Thomas
Gresham (1519-1579), the founder of the London Exchange (1566)
who served both Edward VI and Queen Elizabeth. Gresham's law
declares that if money of lower value is circulated in a
country together with money of higher value, the former will
crowd out high-value money.
We meet a formulation in Oresme's Treatise, some two
hundred years earlier, which may be qualified as the anti-
24cipation of Gresham's law. In Chapter XX, Oresme, analysing 
the consequences of the debasement of currency, writes its 
follows: ’Again, such alterations and debasements diminish 
the amount of gold and silver in the realm, since these 
metals, despite any embargo, are carried abroad, where they 
command a higher value. For men try to take their money to 
the places where they believe it to be worth most. And this 
reduces the material for money in the realm".
Oresme points out the negative effects of these debase­
ments from the point of view of the exchange of goods and 
foreign trade as well as the problems of the flight of capi­
tal: "Again, because of these alterations, good merchandise 
or natural riches cease to be brought into a kingdom in 
which money is so changed, since merchants, other things being 
equal, prefer to pass over to those places in which they 
receive sound and good money." (Ch. XX)
Economic discussions in the treatise are organically em­
bedded in the political conditions. The demand for financial 
reforms is raised as a question in the struggle between the 
estates and the royal power. In this struggle Oresme appears 
as a representative of the estates whose affections lean 
toward the bourgeoisie. His bourgeois estate democratism is 
especially evidenced by the discrimination between tyranny
and Kingdom. This democratism even employs the reference to
25national consciousness In the defence of estate Interests.
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Oresme's central thesis, as we have seen. Is the fol­
lowing: "Money belongs to the community*. (Moneta est commu- 
nltatis.) However, the question arises: who actually consti­
tute this community? The problem of the social content of the
26expression "community" (communitas) is raised by E. Schorer, 
editor of Oresme's Traotatue. He comes to the conclusion that 
this “community" does not mean all the people, but the com­
munity of private owners, of those who possess money if this 
possession is legal. We have Indeed reasonable grounds for 
supposing that it does not simply mean the whole population 
of the country but rather the more or less wealthy social 
strata which really possess money, wealth and property. This 
is what Oresme refers to in the restriction of the expression 
"community”: the community or the better part of it (com­
mun! tas sive pars valentior eius).
The notions of “community" (communitas) and better part 
(pars valentior) are not accidental, ocasslonal formulations 
but the cardinal concepts of a wide-ranging, important the­
oretical conception, the so-called corporative theory.
The corporative theory, this characteristically medieval 
offset of legal theory in the 13th century brought the fun­
damental transformation in the outlook and theories about 
society, and the actual beginnings of a theory of the state
as shown by JenS Szűcs, a Hungarian researcher of this theo- 
27ry. The significance of the corporative theory primarily 
lies in the fact that it is the first serious attempt to sur­
pass the hierarchic view of political theory and to grasp 
theoretically the real, horizontal, autonomous structures of
society. Corporation, universitas, communitas, are the basic
28model of an "autonomous" society.
In reference to the principle of representation in the 
corporative theory, the "better part" (pars valentior) 
charged with the representation of the estate did not simply
4. Final Remark to th» Central Thesit
106
mean the quantitative 'majority* but the qualitatively 'more 
powerful* part. What does this "qualitative* content of the 
expression cover? The discussions of J. Quillet help us under­
stand this through the analysis of ’Defensor Pads* by Mar-
29sillus. Hia analyses show that "pars valentior* with Mar- 
silius means the part representing the universality of the 
citizens (universitas civiura) in a qualitative and quantita­
tive sense at the same time, and is not merely a majority 
system. Hence the statement, often appearing in literature, 
according to which Marsilius is the mouthpiece of the prin­
ciple of popular sovereignty must be handled with some re­
serve. The real mewing of the expression covers not only a 
numerical majority but also the part with greater riches. So 
we can translate this expression as the richer, wealthier 
part. This is witnessed by Aristotle's Polities, the main 
source of Marsilius, which he does not interpret in a ’Pla­
tonic way" but "sociologically", i.e. he vanta to draw the 
model of an easily realizable, purposeful constitution which 
assures state-existence, and its most important condition: 
peace, instead of an ideal but practically unrealizable state. 
Aristotle says in his Polities (Booh VI, Ch. 3/1318a)r
"Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided bv 
the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law.
Granted: - but not without some reserve: since there are 
two classes out of which a state is composed, - the 
poor and the rich, - that is to be deemed law, on which 
both or the greater part of both agree; and if they 
disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, 
and by those who have the higher [property] qualifica­
tion. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and 
twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the 
rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the 
remaining four of the rich join with the party of the 
poor, and the remaining five of the poor with that of 
the rich; in such a case the will of those whose [prop­
erty] qualifications, when both sides are added up, are 
the greatest, should prevail." (Translated by Benjamin 
Jowett)
The political practice in the Italian city-republics, 
which Marsilius refers to, also shows that at the time of his
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writing the former democratic government of the communes had 
become oligarchic. The statutes of Padua, Siena and Florence 
in this period prove that the composition of the city councils 
is based on wealth, the definition of "pars valentior” being 
based on the movable and especially the immovable property 
of the bourgeoisie.
Presumably, the expressions in Oresme's Treatise like 
"communitas aut valentior pars eius", "optimae partes com- 
munitatis", or “meliores subditi’ occur in the same or similar 
meaning and concern the wealthier, richer, more influential 
strata of the community. At any rate, for Oresme, the com- 
munitas-theory is obviously a means by which he validates the 
claims of the estates against the possible abuses of the 
central royal power, and not just the common claims of the 
three estates - clergy, nobility and bourgeoisie - but, as 
we may infer from certain of his allusions, he shows partic­
ular sympathy for the bourgeois estate.
Institute of Philosophy, Budapest
NOTES
1. The leading line of the attack against Aristotle's system 
and the development line of mechanics coincided in the 
Middle Ages - writes Károly Simonyi in his ’A fisika kul­
túrtörténet«’ £"The Cultural History of Physics"j (Gondo­
lat Publishing Bouse, Budapest 1978, p. 128)
2. E.G. Jean Buridan (1300-1358) in his Comments on Aristotle's 
works (Quaestiones super decern libros ethicorum Aristotelis 
ad Nicomachum: Quaestiones in VIII libros politlcorum 
Aristotelis); Heinrich von Langenstein (1325-1397) in his 
works about the contracts of sale (Tractatus bipartitus de 
contractibus emptionis et venditionis; Epistola de contrac-
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tibus emptionis et venditionis ad Consules Viennenses); 
Gabriel Biel (1430-1495) In his treatise on money (Tracta- 
tus de potestate et utllitate monetarum).
3. About Oresme's life, activity and works, see H. Clagett,
The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages. The Univer­
sity of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1959. pp. 337-340. The 
catalogue of Oresme's manuscript and edited works is 
found in M. Clagett, 1fioole Oresne and the Medieval 
Geometry of Qualities and Motions. The University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, etc., 1968, pp. 645-648.
A basic work from earlier literature about Oresme's eco­
nomical and political views and about his age: Émile 
Bridrey, La Théorie de la monnaie au XIVe sildé: Sicole 
Ore eme, étude d*histoire des doctrines et des faits 
économiques, Paris, 1906.
4. "Sermo coram papa Urbano V et cardinalibus habitus anno 
1364 (1363?).* Editions: Flacius Illyrlcus: Catalogua 
testium veritatis (Basel 1556; Lyon 1597); J. Wolf: 
Lectionum memorabilium et reconditarum centenarii XVI.
Vol.2. (Lauingen 1660); independently: S. Gesner (Witten­
berg 1604); O. Gratius: Fasciculus rerum expetendarum. Vol. 
2. (London 1690) Cf: A. Dempf: Sacrum Imperium, München 
und Berlin 1923, p. 538.
5. Well fore the speech in Avignon, in his Treatise, Oresme 
compares the illnesses of the state to those of man based 
of the ancient Aristotelian parallel. (Politics, V.3., 
1302b-1303a) He shows the danger the illness which the 
concentration of wealth into one part of the state body 
means for the working of the whole organism: "As, there­
fore the body is disordered when the humours flow too 
freely into one member of it, so that that member is often 
thus inflamed and overgrown while the others are withered 
and shrunken and the body's due proportions are destroyed 
and its life shortened; so also is a commonwealth or a 
kingdom when riches are unduly attracted by one part of
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it. For a commonwealth or kingdom whose princes, as 
compared with their subjects, increase beyond measure in 
wealth, power and position, is as it were a monster, like 
a man whose head is so large and heavy that the rest of 
his body is too weak to support it. And just as such a 
man has no pleasure in life and cannot live long; neither 
can a kingdom survive whose prince draws to himself riches 
in excess as is done by altering the coinage." (Ch. XXV)
Oresme uses the favoured ancient and medieval analogy 
of musical harmony in order to support the demand for the 
state's functional harmony. Extreme financial equality is 
as undesirable as extreme inequality is; proportional and 
measured inequality is necessary (Ch. XXVI).
Concerning Oresme's ideas on the aesthetics of music, 
expounded in his "Tractatus de configurationibus qualita- 
tum et motuum", see: V.P. Zoubov, "Nicole Oresme et la 
musique". Mediaeval and Renaieeanoe Studies, Vol.5,
(1961) pp. 98-107.
6. Modern editions: Maistre Nicole Oresme: le livre de 
Politiques d‘Aristote. Ed. A.D. Menüt. Philadelphia, 1970. 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New 
Series, Vol.60, Part 6. - Maistre Nicole Oresme: Le livre 
de Ethiques d‘ Aristote.Ed. A.D. Menüt. New York, 1940. - 
Maistre Nicole Oresme: Le livre de Iconomique d’Aristote. 
Ed. A. Menüt. Phildelphia, 1957. Transactions of the 
American Philosophical Society, New Series Vol.47, Part 5 
(1957), pp. 785-853. - Le livre du ciel et du monde, Ed. 
A.D. Menüt and A.J. Denomy, C.S.B. Mediaeval Studies, Vols. 
3-5 (1941-43). New ed. Madison, University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1968.
7. In a review of the medieval debate on "intensio et remissio 
formarum", focussing on "quantification" of qualities, Már­
ta Fehér deals with Oresme's relevant views in: "A mérhető 
világ felé" [Towards a Measurable World]. In: Vildgossdg
15 (1974), 12, pp. 730-738, especially pp. 736-737.
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8. Károly Simonyi, Op. eit., p. 128, deals with Oresme's 
astronomical views and publishes an excerpt from Oresme's 
Comments to Aristotle's De ooelo et mundo, where Oresme 
discusses the arguments for the daily revolution of the 
Earth (pp. 129-131).
9. N. Ellas, Ober den Prozess der Zivilisation. II. Bd. 
Handlungen der Gesellschaft. Entwurf zu einer Theorie der 
Zivilisation. Suhrkamp 19796» see especially Chapter VIII 
(Zur Soziogenese des Steuermonopols) pp. 279-311.
10. H. Estrup, "Oresme and Monetary Theory". The Scandinavian 
Economie History Review. Vol. XIV. (1966), No. 2, pp. 97- 
116, especially pp. 97-98.
11. An aspect of the characteristic crisis of the last period 
of the Roman Empire was the debasement of the currency and 
a shortage of money. Cf.: Jenő Darkó, Csdszdrimddó Róma - 
képromboló Bixdna ^Emperor-adoring Rome - Iconoclastic 
Byzantiunfj. Magvető Publishing House, Budapest 1977, pp. 
17-18.
12. A good survey on the development of economic views from 
ancient times to the establishment of classical political 
economics: B. Gordon, Economic Analysis before Adam Smith. 
Besiod to Leeeius. Barnes and Noble, 1975. B. Gordon 
gives a detailed account of the developments of economic 
analysis between 1300 and 1600, including the formation of 
monetary theory and he deals with Oresme's Treatise briefly 
pp. 188-192.
13. In this relation, it is noteworthy that a pioneer in modern 
astronomy like Nikolaus Copernicus, in addition to his work 
in natural science, also devoted time to the study of eco­
nomic, more precisely, financial problems, as proved by 
his "Monetae cudendae ratio". Cf: Edward Lipinski, "Nico­
laus Copernicus, a közgazdász" [^Nicolaus Copernicus the 
economist]. In: Copernicus és kora [Copernicus and his 
AgeJ . Selected and edited by Dr. Barbara Bienkowska. Gondo­
lat Publishing House, Budapest 1973, pp. 159-174.
Ill
It cannot be acciendtal that Hegel, In a profound 
comparison which is a complete research programme in a 
nutshell, chooses to compare political economy and astro­
logy, of all things. Cf. Hegel, The Outlines of Legal 
Philosophy § 198. and Appendix.
14. For example, the French theologian Petrus Cantor (d. 1197) 
already deals with financial problems in the 12th century 
in his Summa de eaeramentis et animas oonsiliis. Cf.:
John W. Baldwin, Masters, Princes and Merchants. Vol 1, 
Princeton, 1970, pp. 241-244. - In the 13th century,
Thomas Aquinas devotes two independent "quaestio"-s in his 
Summa Theologica (Pars Secunda Secundae) to the discus­
sion of economic-ethical questions raised in voluntary 
exchange affairs [commutationas voluntariaej: Quaestio 
LXXVII analyses agreements about sale (De fraudulentia in 
emptionibus et venditionibus contingente), Quaestio 
LXXVIII discusses usuries in loan transactions (De vitio 
usurae in mutuis).
15. E.g. in Buridan’s Comments to Aristotle'8 Polities (In 
VIII libros Politicorum Aristotelis, lib. I, quaest, XI: 
Utrum mutatio et commutatio monetarum in policia bene 
recta sint licite).
16. Besides the above mentioned works by Heinrich von Lan- 
genstein and Gabriel Biel, e.g. Petrus Olivi (1248-1298), 
Quaestiones de permutations rerum, de emptionibus et ven­
ditionibus; Alexander Bonini (the beginning of the 14th 
century), Traetatue de usuris; Lorenzo di Antonio Ridolfi 
(1360-1442), De usuris; Johannes Nider (c. 1380-1438), De 
eontraetibus mereatorum; Konrad Summenhart von Tübingen 
(1465-1511), Traotatu8 de eontraetibus; Thomas de Vio 
(Cajetanus) (1468-1534), De usura, De aambiis; Martin 
Azplicueta Navarrus (1493—1586), Commentarius resolutivus 
de eambiis.
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17. E.g. Thomas Aquinas, De mixtions elementorum, De ooaultis 
operationibus naturae, De motu eordia, De emptione et 
oenditione ad ternpus.
18. E.g. Antoninus Florentlnus (1389-1459), Summa Morális 
Theologiae, Luis Molina (1536-1600), De Justitia et Jures 
Leonard Lessius (1554-1623), De Justitia et Jure. These 
works as well as the above mentioned ones reflect, in 
several respects, the economic relations emerging in 
Europe and particularly in its most developed areas in the 
15th and 16th century. The phenomena of economic life in 
Northern Italy, the Spanish Peninsula, France and the 
Netherlands, the problems arising from the increasing role 
of monetary policy, financial capital, banking, and from 
the incipient process of capitalization, exert an ever 
strengthening impact on the gradual transformation of the 
ever so traditional conceptual framework.
19. See C. Johnson: The De mone ta of Bieolas Oresme and 
English Mint Documents. London, 1956. Introduction, p.
XVII; Cf. M. Clagett, 'Nicole Oresme and the Medieval 
Geometry of Qualities and Motions', p. 647
20. Cf. Antal Mátyás, A polgári közgazdaságtan története. [The 
History of Bourgeois Economics]. Közgazdasági és Jogi 
Publishing House, Budapest, 1963, p. 14
21. K. Marx, Capital, Vol.I. Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1954, 
p. 94, Note 1.
22. Paulus, the famous Roman lawyer writes about money in 
Digesta: 'Origó emendi vendendique a permutationibus 
coepit. 011m enim non ita erat nummus neque aliud merx, 
aliud pretium vocabatur, sed unusquisque secundum neces­
sitates! temporum ac rerum utilibus inutilia permutabat, 
quando plerumque evenit, ut quod alteri superest, alteri 
desit. Sed quia non semper, nec facile concurrebat, ut, 
cum tu hadieres, quod ego desiderarem, invicem haberem, 
quod tu accipere velles, electa materia est, cuius publica
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ac perpétua aestimatio dlfficultatibus perrautatlonum 
aequalitate quantitatis subvenlret. Eaque materia forma 
publica percussa usum dominiumque non tam ex substantia 
praebet, quam ex quantitate, nec ultra merx utrumque, sed 
alterum pretium vocatur". (D. lS.l.l.pr. Paulus) Quoted 
ins Robert Brósz-Elemér Pólay, A rámái jog ÍThe Roman 
LawJ . Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest 1976 ^ , p. 420. - Thomas 
Aquinas calls money a measure determined by law in his 
comments to Aristotle's Ethics (lib. V. lect. IX.): "Et 
Inde est quod denarius vocatur numisma: nomoa enim lex 
est, quia scilicet denarius non est mensura per naturam, 
sed nomo, id est a lege: est enim potestate nostra 
transmutare denarios et reddere eos inutiles".
23. H. Estrup, Op. oit. pp. 98-99; 100-101; 116.
24. About these problems and the debates around them, see 
H. Estrup: op. oit., pp. 104-105. Cf.: J.A. Schumpeter, 
Biatory of Economie Analyaia. New York, 1954, p. 343.
25. In Oresme's opinion, the difference between the tyrant 
and the monarch is that the tyrant wants to be more 
powerful than the community which he rules by force; 
while royal moderation is characterized by the fact that 
it is more powerful and bigger than any of its subjects, 
but in terms of strength and riches, it is yet smaller 
than the community as a whole, and thus it takes the 
middle place between the individual and the whole.
Oresrae clearly sees the danger of the arbitrary 
growing tendency of royal power, therefore he emphasizes 
the need for close control of this power: "But because the 
king's power commonly and easily tends to increase, the 
greatest care and constant watchfulness must be used, 
indeed extreme and supreme prudence is needed to keep it 
from degenerating into tyranny, especially because of 
deceitful flatterers who have always, as Aristotle says, 
urged princes to be tyrants." (Ch. XXV.)
In order to keep the kingdom lasting and not to let it
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degenerate into tyranny, this rule must be followed: ’That 
is that the prince should not enlarge his dominion over 
his subjects, should not overtax them or seize their 
goods, should allow or grant them liberties and should not 
Interfere with them or use his plenary powers but only a 
power regulated and limited by law and custom. For few 
things, as Aristotle says, should be left to the decision 
of a judge or a prince." (Ch. XXV.)
Finally, Oresme refers to the harmful consequences of 
a tyrannic rule which endanger the future of the royal 
house and the whole kingdom (Ch. XXVI.), and in an elevat­
ed style, he invoices Gallic national consciousness against 
tyranny: "God forbid that the free hearts of Frenchmen 
should have so degenerated that they should willingly 
become slaves; and therefore a slavery thrust upon them 
cannot last. For, though the power of tyrants is great, 
it does violence to the free hearts of subjects and is 
of no avail against foreigners. Whoever, therefore, should 
in any way induce the lords of France to such tyrannical 
government, would expose the realm to great danger and 
pave the way to its end. For neither has the noble off­
spring of the French king learned to be tyrannous, nor 
the people of Gaul to be servile; therefore if the royal 
house decline from its ancient virtue, it will certainly 
lose the kingdom". (Ch. XXVI.)
26. Edgar Schorer, Nicolaus Oresme "Traktat über Geldabaer- 
tungen". Verlag Gustav Fischer, Jena 1937, p. 26
27. Jenő Szűcs, Nemzet ás történelem [Nation and History]]. 
Gondolat Publishing House, Budapest 1974, p. 453
28. Ibid, pp. 456-509
29. Jeannine Quillet, L‘Aristotélisme de Marsile de Padoue. 
Miscellanea Mediaevalia 2. Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. 
Berlin 1963, pp. 696-706, especially pp. 702-703.
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JANOS SIPOS
ON THE MATERIALISTIC APPROACH TO THE PSYCHE AND 
PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
In modern psychology, materialism generally occupies a 
dominant position. Traditional spiritualistic views and the 
idealistic "phsychology of consciousness", which attribute 
conscious functions to a supposed immaterial "spirit", have 
mostly been excluded from the science of psychology. Today, 
the main question is what type of materialism it is that works 
on the different trends of psychology and what aspects rule 
it.
At present, a materialistic monist approach is the most 
characteristic trend in psychology, that is to say, the view 
that psychic functions - Including their higher fDrms - are 
functions of the brain, special physical processes, or, in a 
wider sense, part of the only real worlá, the material world. 
This much is expressed by the behaviourist Donald Bebb, for 
example, when outlining his "monistic" approach, according to 
which startinq point the psyche is a "physical process", "the 
functioning of the brain or part of it". This is also Rubin­
stein and Leontiev's standpoint, who both share the philosoph­
ical background of dialectical materialism. This view opposes 
all dualistic approaches, and is consistently monist, con­
sidering the psyche to be something which fits organically 
into the universal coherence of the material world's phenomena, 
something which is not only determined by its environment but 
is also determinative in itself, directly defining and ruling 
the responding activity of the organism. Rubinstein stresses 
the fact that, in the general ontological sense, psychic ac­
tivity appears to be the material activity of a material orgarv 
realizing the interaction between the organism and the outside
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world. According to Leontiev, the psyche is a definite form 
of vital processes, a form of material interaction between 
the material individual and the material environment; psychic 
reflection is a result of the actual mutual connection be­
tween the living material individual and the surrounding ma­
terial reality; psychic processes are parts, dérivâtes and 
mediators of the material individual’s outward practical ac­
tivity, and material processes realize the interaction be­
tween the material individual and material reality.
However, within the overall monistic view of modern ma­
terialist psychology, there are fundamentally important dif­
ferences . The crisis in psychology at the turn of the century 
had strong vulgar-materialistic tendencies. Behaviourism, in 
opposition to spiritualistic, introspective "psychology of 
consciousness", gave up the study of the inextricable "mind". 
Watson emphasised the need to turn attention to observable 
behaviour. The above-mentioned D. Hebb, a representative of 
this particular theory himself, calls it ’physiological or 
mechanistic". Its basis is the supposition that "soul" does 
not exist and everything can be explained in physiological 
terms. Behaviourists used Pavlov's results in the study of 
reflex activity. They believed human behaviour to be con­
ditioned reflex activity but, unlike the Sechenov-Pavlov 
school of thought, they excluded the "middle phase" of the 
reflex process, i.e. they discarded psychic fact as idealistic 
nonsense. The study of these reflex mechanisms, entwined with 
current psychological tendencies, has formed the neurological 
trend in psychology which interprets the leading processes in 
objectively studiable behaviour as mere neuro-physiological 
processes. The reduction of psychic to neuro-physiologic is 
widespread in contemporary psychological literature. However, 
though this standpoint is really materialistic, the complete 
identification of psychic processes with those of neuro-phys­
iology - although necessary to some degree - results in the 
disappearance of psychic processes themselves.
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This neuro-physiologlcal reduction, its ackwardness and 
insolvable contradictions are also felt by its adherents. It 
theoretically eliminates the psyche from its study, but, in 
practice(if approaching from the angle of outward behaviour), 
it still tries to find an explanation for psychic phenomena. 
Hebb, while stressing the revolutionary significance of be­
haviourism, reflexology and neurology, still comes to the 
conclusion that this theory is inadequate, as it neglects the 
psychic processes mediating between stimulus and response. He 
himself stresses that mediatory psychic processes and the 
psychic functions realized by them (thinking, comprehension, 
etc.) are differents the physiological approach or "neurolo- 
gization", as Hebb calls it, has a "more molecular" tendency, 
is "more refined", and "is concerned with the units rather 
than the whole". So, a psychological approach with units on 
a larger scale is necessary.
Materialistic psychology based on Marxism has the avantage 
that, from the beginning, it pays great attention to the in­
dividual's social determination, social nature and changes of 
form. In other words, due to its historical approach, basic 
social orientation and its program of understanding man's 
social nature, Marxist psychology cannot be restricted a priori 
to studying psychic phenomena solely in connection with neural 
processes. It has had to take into consideration the fact that 
psychic processes, as brain processes, are different from the 
neurological, physiological mechanisms from which, neverthe­
less, they cannot be separated. They obviously reflect the 
surrounding world and this "picturing" changes along with the 
changes in the level and social position of man’s social prac­
tice. After the development of the Vigotsky-Leontiev histori­
cal genetic approach, it has gradually become clear in dialec­
tical materialistic psychology that the psyche is a relatively 
independent phenomenon with its own typical structural quali­
ties, efficient mechanisms and laws of motion.
In Marxist psychology, too, it is basically important to 
explore the way in which psychic processes are tied to mental
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processes and to study the neuro-physlologlcal-mechanlsms 
carrying them. But, in contrast to other "physiologlring" 
efforts, Marxist psychology draws significant attention to 
other interactions in psychic phenomena. The psyche's "ref­
lecting* nature is studied with special attention: that is, 
the fact that pfcychlc processes are a part of the brain's 
operation which is basically determined by outside reality, 
as the psyche has a reflex nature. Following Rubinstein's a- 
nalysis, it is the brain's response activity, through which 
the outside world is reflected. This determination is not only 
manifested in actual, everyday reflexes but also phylogenet- 
ically and ontogenetically (morphological and functional 
changes in the evolutionary organs responsible for adaptation 
and the transformation of reflex-like life functions, as well 
as the development of the Individual's psychic abilities, all 
evolve in interaction with the environment, under its decisive 
influence). Marxist psychology at the same time discloses the 
active character of psychic processes, highlighting the fact 
that these are a way by which the living organism actively 
adapts to its essential conditions. In addition, Marxist 
psychology considers the Influences in a changing environment 
which are asserted through the mediation of the organism's 
programmed activity, itself operating via an innate evolu­
tionary programme (N.A. Bernstein). The living organism's 
psychic functioning mediates outside stimuli, then actively 
analyses, transforms and prepares these stimuli, and, on the 
basis of former experience, forms a response. With man, this 
active process takes the form of social practice and this 
practice mediates the effect of the outside world: as Engels 
stresses, this is why practice has become the primary element 
in cognition. Consequently, psychic functioning, as the ele­
ment of active interaction between the organism and the en­
vironment, is determined by both environmental conditions and 
Itself: it forms and rules the organism's responses. This 
ruling, or directing function, is the psyche's fundamental 
function, inseparably intertwined with its function of re-
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fleeting the environment. The psyche's reflecting and direct­
ing fonction in man has a characteristic, consciously voli­
tional form which includes the development of the activity's 
theoretical plan.
Marxist based psychology pays scrupulous attention to 
studying and understanding the aoeial natura of the human 
psyche through highlighting the fact that the peculiarities 
of human psychic functions, abilities, actions, and their 
products have their origin in the human psyche's links with 
the individual's social way of life. The human psyche, like 
the typical life functions of which it is the reflecting, di­
recting part, is a process which is instrumental, mediated by 
tools and socially interpreted. Man is able to rule his en­
vironment and direct his own psychic processes with the help 
of those inodes and instruments, including linguistic tools. 
These tools and forms of psychic activity are called into 
existence by man's social way of life and they are socially 
stored and inherited. Man's higher psychic functioning is 
founded beyond his biological organism, in his essential so­
cial life conditions (Luria).
The modem materialistic approach, breaking away from 
simplified naturalistic and "physiological" explanations, 
necessarily focuses on the peculiarities and complexity of the 
human psyche, as well as on its organic connection to, and 
relative independence from, neuro-physiological processes. 
However, special difficulties of interpretation arise in the 
dialectical materialistic approach which also disturb the 
development of scientific psychology.
In my opinion, the dualistic solutions found in Marxist 
philosophical and psychological literature may act as a kind 
of defence against "vulgar materialistic" mistakes and espe­
cially "physlologlzation". It was not only Mario Bunge who 
criticized these dualistic tendencies, but S.L. Rubinstein, 
and others, working is Socialist countries also voiced such 
opinions. Rubinstein highlighted the error implicit in the idea 
that mind, through the nature and essence of the psyche op-
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poses the material in all aspects and is, thus, excluded 
from the phenomena of the material world. This error was 
rooted in the misinterpretation of a contrast between the 
mind's reflecting nature and objective reality, a contrast 
which is limited to the field of the theory of knowledge. As 
a result of theoretical developments from the late 1950's on, 
first in the Soviet Onion, and then in the other Socialist 
countries (Hungary among them), the complex analysis of con­
sciousness and being became accepted, emphasizing both their 
gnosiologlcal and ontological aspects, as well as the unity 
of consciousness and matter, at least in that consciousness 
has its origin in matter and is materially defined.
International Marxist philosophical literature, however, 
has not yet come to apply materialistic monism consistently.
I have just mentioned the significant role "vulgar material­
istic" physiological reductionism has played. But, in the 
recent break-down of the process of clarification, a similarly 
large part is played by strengthened "ontologizing" efforts 
and ideas which are strongly connected with "praxis philosophy" 
and "social ontology". These tendencies move stress to the 
mind's ontological position and its objective social role 
through weakening or eliminating its reflecting, secondary 
nature and its dependence on vital social conditions. In the 
last analysis,they renew subjectivist social philosophies, 
stressing that the conscious, psychic factor is the basic and 
independent determiner of social movement and denying that 
objective necessities and laws control social processes.
The characteristic standpoint may be traced back to this 
view, which rejects the full exposition of the ontological as­
pect beside the epistemological. In this framework, contrary 
to materialist monism, the consideration of the psyche, at a 
general ontological level, as a materialistic phenomenon, as 
a real, existing part-process of the only material world, with 
a particular structure and parameters, is shown to be false. 
The following theoretical viewpoint takes shape at this theo­
retical level: the consciousness, from an ontological angle(
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Is only material In its origin and determination, but, with 
regard to its nature it is “immaterial*. As it is generally 
argued, this is because its crucial characteristic is its 
reflecting nature, and thus it necessarily and essentially 
opposes objective reality in all respects, being only its 
subjective reflection.
It seems, then, that this standpoint makes the same 
mistake Rubinstein warned us about expreeaia verbia 25 years 
ago, and to which Lenin drew the materialists' attention more 
than 70 years ago: it “absolutizes" and overstrains the op­
position between the material and the mind, which only exists 
in a narrow sphere within the theory of knowledge. The oppo­
sition is transmitted to the level of ontological problems, 
to the general ontological relationship where the psyche, as 
a real existing phenomenon, appears as a “particle of nature* 
(Lenin), as a part-process in a material world which was 
thought "unique* by materialists, “besides which there is 
nothing else". To make matters worse, they contrast psychic 
phenomena to “material" phenomena, using “vulgar materialist­
ic*, and “physicist* arguments in a way which identifies the 
"material* with “physical" or “bodily* things. They state 
that a thought, in contrast to the above is Imperceptible, in­
tangible, it has no dimension, no weight, no colour, etc.
The fear of “vulgar materialism" and "ontologization* 
results in a blurring of the real problem in the greater part 
of contemporary Marxist philosophical literature. As a matter 
of fact, the fault of these trends at a theoretical level is 
not that they consider the psyche as something material in the 
general ontological sense (that is, as no part of a special 
supernatural mental world and not merely a subjective phenom­
enon). In my opinion, the fault lies in the fact that the 
“ontologlzing* standpoint rejects the mind's secondariness, 
its reflecting nature, because it emphasises its objective 
existence, and makes consciousness the final determiner of 
social processes. Contemporary vulgar materialism, on the 
other hand, interprets the material and objective reality of
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psychic phenomena by identifying these phenomena with neuro­
physiological processes. In this way, it eliminates "the 
psychic" from the processes of reality.
I only wish to discuss this latter problem here. I have 
to reject the rather widespread argument that the psyche, 
although something which really exista, is not material (in a 
general ontological sense) because it is "imperceptible", "in­
visible" and has "no extensity", etc, thus differing from the 
cerebral cortex and neuro-physiologlcal processes. This rakes 
up an extremely vulgar idea of materiality and involuntarily 
leads back to a kind of dualism. It also leads to a situation 
where such hidden relations, inaccessible to the organs of 
sense, are automatically eliminated from material reality. In 
addition, this method makes a further coarse methodological 
mistake in that it confuses the carried, process with the 
carrying process, misunderstanding that psychic processes 
represent a different level of mental activity from neuro­
physiological, biochemical or bio-electronic neuro-mechanisms. 
The reason for this misunderstanding lies in that this argu­
ment wants to see the characteristics of neuro-physiological 
processes in psychic processes, and their absence leads the 
elimination of psychic phenomena from the material sphere. 
Within the sphere of carrying processes, carried phenomena 
always remain "invisible": life, for example is Imperceptible 
at the level of chemical processes; and social structures and 
dynamics cannot be perceived at the level of individual motion 
either. The more complicated organizational spheres of reality 
have their own structural peculiarities, specific interactions 
and kinetic laws, which cannot be explored from lower, more 
involved spheres.
Neurophysiological processes are carrying processes 
which do not determine either the contents or the structure 
of psychic processes. Receptors as stimulus collecting and 
transforming mechanisms, the transmission of electro-chemical 
impulses by neurons, the complex mental physiological mecha­
nisms formed from these simple processes, the spread of the
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stimuli and the different forms of Inhibitions - including 
differentiating inhibitions, - do not give us any information 
about the psychic processes they carry. The human brain prod­
uces rich, special psychic processes, for example, the speak­
ing and thinking process, the abstract, notional reflection 
of reality's significant connections, the conscious control 
of activity, and new forms of perception and memory. These 
typical psychic forms are realized and carried by similar 
neuro-physiological mechanisms, which are the basic impulse 
generating and transmitting mechanisms of, for example, the 
neurons. The same mechanisms produce the simpler psychic 
processes of animals. Human speaking Itself is an activity 
combining exceedingly different sign systems, but different 
languages - for example, English or Hungarian -, with their 
different vocabularies and grammars, are realized by the same 
neural and cerebral, etc., processes. Similarly, historically 
developing forms of logic are obviously independent of the 
neuro-physiological mechanims carrying logical processes. 
The same is true of the various ways of thinking among people 
living in different historical ages or belonging to different 
social layers: this typical, independent structure, and the 
characteristics of the ways of thinking, do not depend on the 
neuro-physiological mechanisms, as these remain identical and 
unchanging from one person to another. The roots of the an­
tagonism between the collectivistic and the individualistic 
ways of thinking are social and not neuro-physiological, and 
changes in the idea of existence arise via unchanged brain 
mechanisms, obeying the impulses of the typical, relatively 
independent, laws of psychic processes existing under social 
conditions.
The development of cybernetics greatly helps us under­
stand the mistake of the psyche's neuro-physiological reduc­
tion. Results in the information theory are especially impor­
tant, as the higher forms of psychic operation belong to in­
formation phenomena. The information processes - studied in 
cybernetics - are processes of reflection and control, and it
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is in this that their speciality lies. These differ funda­
mentally from the processes studied by physics, chemistry and 
biology. Experts mostly agree that Information phenomena rep­
resent a special type of material process. In these phenomena, 
the “materials’ transmitted or transformed, are not physical, 
chemical or biochemical, since they are not primarily energy 
processes. The brain's function, for example, differs from 
that of the liver or the muscles: its typical function is not 
to produce some secretion, or to perform the body’s movement, 
but to direct and regulate the movement and behaviour of the 
whole organism. The nervous system is an Information process­
ing machine or, more accurately, a governing apparatus.
All information processes are alike in that they con­
nect deflned,physical, chemical and bio-chemical "currents of 
material* or energy processes. The input, storage, trans­
mission and processing of information cannot occur without 
energy, or defined physical or chemical processes. Transmis­
sion is impossible without a carrier which mediates the in­
formation and functions as its sign. Electric processes
or defined groups of neuro-impulses carry the information, 
whose transmission and processing consume energy. But the in­
formation process iteelf belongs to a different type. Its 
characteristic feature is, as stressed in cybernetics, that 
it directs, and is able to direct, high energy processes with 
a small amount of energy. In consequence, the carried nature 
of informational processes is far more striking. It can be 
said that all processes in the material world are built upon 
other processes which carry and mediate them, and, without 
which, they would not exist. Special emphasis must be laid 
here on the relationship itself of being carried, as a crucial 
problem in examining the reduction of the psychic level to 
the neuro-physlological process carrying it. Cybernetic lit­
erature is unanimous in declaring that the nature of infor­
mation processes differs completely from those processes 
carrying them. It also stresses that the same transmitting 
process may be realized by more carrying mechanisms and that
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the structure and contents of the carried Information cannot 
be found In either the computer's hardware or the brain's 
neuro-dynamic structure.
Psychological sciences themselves can be relatively in­
dependent, due to the independent structure of psychic proces­
ses and their difference from the neuro-physiological proces­
ses bearing them (and from which they are inseparable). Per­
ception, sensory experience, memory, imagination, thinking, 
speaking, attention, emotions and volition all represent a 
different level in a process. Their laws can be studied in­
dependently, without knowledge of their carrying neuro-physi­
ological, or, even deeper, their bio-chemical, physical pro­
cesses. Today, it is also known that new forms of psychic ac­
tivity Influence the carrying neuro-physiological mechanisms, 
re-organize them and lead to the the development of dynamic, 
new brain formations. The other side of this relationship is 
that after certain brain injuries, the re-establishment of 
psychic functions occurs along with the development of new 
brain organizations. The discovery of dynamic, functional or­
gans in the brain strengthens the conviction that psychic 
functions themselves are the workings of defined brain or­
gans and that these psychic functions of reflection and con­
trol transform and react upon the brain structures carrying 
them. They do so through transforming the organism's life ac­
tivity and social practice, and generate new carrying forma­
tions, this being a function of the transformation.
This objectively existing, relative independence of 
psychic processes was the epistemological basis for the first 
naive materialistic theories. These theories could not func­
tionally Interpret the psyche and considered ’spirit” a sep­
arate *thing* in some physical sense. The concept of ancient 
atomism was also extended to fit it. This independent struc- 
turalization and motion forms the basis of a spreading clas­
sical animistic spiritualistic theory which sets ‘spirit* 
against all other phenomena in an absolute way, tearing it 
away from unique material reality, from the human body and
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the brain itself, which becomes merely the tool of Immaterial 
"spirit". The modernized spiritualistic theory, forced to 
adapt itself to the results of contemporary science, does not 
believe the psyche to be one of the organism's life-activi­
ties, the function regulating the interaction between the or­
ganism and the environment. Neither does this theory believe 
the brain to be the mechanism realizing psychic reflection and 
control. In this theory, "spirit" is a separated, substantial­
ly Interpreted, "immaterial" thing, independent from the 
brain. It is able to leave the body and only usaa the brain 
in its autonomous activity as a telegraphist uses the tele­
graph set to enforce his autonomous will.
Because of the continuing, harmful influence of overtly 
or covertly spiritualistic and dualistic theories, in addition 
to vulgar materialistic and "ontologlzing" distortions, it is 
important to reiterate the general methodological principles 
of the scientific study of psychic processes. A complex, many- 
sided approach is thought to be most needed in order to under­
stand the "particularity" of these processes. Besides the 
study of the neuro-physiological mechanisms carrying them, we 
must analyse these processes from the viewpoint of their en­
vironmental, social determiners. From this, we must also ex­
plore their structural, dynamic characteristics, reflecting, 
controlling functions, active nature and their new, higher 
forms in man. We must be able to correctly employ the materi­
alistic approach in the study of the psyche. We must under­
stand that the relative independence and difference of psychic 
processes from the neuro-physiologic carrying processes, their 
reflecting nature and their sharing the characteristics of 
"ideas", can never account for their opposition to "material" 
processes at a general ontological level. Psychic processes, 
as typically complex, relatively independent processes with 
their own parameters and structure, particular laws and ob­
jective regularities, not forgetting their reflecting con­
trolling function, are real processes in the only material
128
/reality in the sane way as the neuro-physiologlc processes 
carrying them, the environmental processes producing and def­
ining them, or the social processes defining the changing 
forms and contents of human psychic functions.
Lor&nd EOtvSs University, Budapest
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TIBOR J . SZÉCSÉNYI
THE STRUCTURALIST VIEW ON EQUILIBRIUM 
THERMODYNAMICS
This paper has three purposes: (X) to analyse Kirchhoff's 
paradox in equilibrium thermodynamics, (2) to compare the var­
ious foundations of thermodynamics, and (3) using the method 
developed by J. D. Sneed, to give a reconstruction of Carathé- 
odory-Landsberg's thermodynamics.1
1. Introductory remarks
1.1 Two foundations of thermodynamics
As is well known, Clausius, Kelvin, Rankine etc. recon­
ciling Carnot's principle with the work of Joule and Mayer 
founded a new theory of heat in the early 1850's by means of 
the concepts of energy, entropy, and absolute (or Kelvin) tem­
perature. The investigations in the kinetic theory of gases 
actually accomplished by Clausius and Kelvin to establish 
these concepts were not involved in the standard formulations 
of the postulates of the theory. It was not inaptly called 
"thermodynamics of cycles* by Tisza, because the applications 
of the method of Carnot cycles, the only technique that was as 
yet available, yielded abundant results without making un­
warranted assumptions about the structure of matter. But in 
this artifice, all statements were in terms of reservoirs and 
other idealised macroscopic devices. This procedure, in which 
the system was hardly more than a "black box", became more a 
hindrance than a help to a direct study of physical systems. 
The first adequate method for this structural problem was de-
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veloped by Gibbs (1902).
In Gibbs' theory, attention is focused on the system. 
Laying the theoretical foundations of his method, Gibbs built 
in the process an impressive theoretical structure. It is 
universally recognised that the publication of his papers on 
thermodynamics was an event of first importance in the history 
of chemistry, that in fact they founded a new branch of chem­
ical science which, in the words of M. Le Chatelier, was be­
coming comparable in importance with that created by Lavoisi­
er.
In contrast to Gibbs' theory, we speak of Carathéodory's 
theory of thermodynamics which is a mathematical formulation 
of the theoretical structure built by Clausius and Kelvin.2 It 
sought to replace thermodynamic arguments based on Carnot 
cycles by a differential geometry dealing with Pfaffian dif­
ferential forms. Both Gibbs and Carathéodory had a common pur­
pose to eliminate the concepts that arose from the practice of 
heat engines but the idea of reversibility was adopted in 
their theories.
At first sight, the difference between the two theories 
is that Charathéodory's theory is an axiomatic approach and 
Gibbs' theory is a phenomenological one. But if we adopt Pri- 
goglne's classification of thermodynamical systems, then we 
can also say that Carathéodory’s theory deals with isolated 
systems and Gibbs' theory deals with closed systems. Both the­
ories are principally interested in reversible (or quasistatic) 
processes and they indirectly deal with irreversible proces­
ses. The reason for this is that a systematic investigation of 
irreversible processes was only begun by the pbulication of 
Onsager's paper (1931). Since that time, it has been the usual 
practice to divide thermodynamics into two disciplines: equi­
librium and non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Although it has 
been suggested that Carathéodory's theory may eventually pro­
vide a better mathematical basis for a theory of non-equilib­
rium thermodynamics, for example by Eckart (1940), most of the 
recent theories are based on Gibbs' theory.
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As for equilibrium thermodynamics, its central problems 
are: (1) the definition and proof of the existence of entropy 
and absolute temperature, and (2) the parametrization of equi­
librium, that is, the development of a mathematical formalism 
by which equilibrium properties of thermodynamic systems can 
be characterised. Although both Carathéodory's and Gibbs' 
theories have some ideas and concepts in common, the first 
theory is concerned primarily with the axiomatization of (1) 
along the lines initiated by Clausius and Kelvin "without re­
course to any hypothesis that cannot be verified experimental­
ly", while the second one is directed to (2) using the con­
cepts of energy, entropy, and absolute temperature as primi­
tive ones.
In order to point out a characteristic feature in which 
Carathéodory's theory differs from that of Gibbs, it is con­
venient to compare the geometrical methods utilised by each. 
These methods are based on a "thermodynamic phase space". In 
Carathéodory's theory, the phase space is spanned by all the 
"independent state variables*. The only criterion is that the 
variables must be directly measurable quantities. Beyond this 
requirement, however, no specific choice of the phase space is 
made; in particular, no mathematical distinction is made be­
tween extensive and intensive thermodynamic variables. This 
was first pointed out by Ehrenfest (1911), who recognised that 
the precise distinction between them requires additional axioms 
to those contained in Carathéodory's theory.
In this paper, we will consider a new modification of 
Carathéodory's approach to equilibrium thermodynamics devel­
oped by Landsberg (1956), (1961) and Buchdahl (1966). In this 
theory, the existence of an entropy function and an absolute 
temperature is Inferred from the consideration of quasistatic 
adiabatic processes. Entropy is obtained through the integra­
tion of a Pfaffian differential equation and it is represented 
by a one parameter family of surfaces in the phase space. The 
monotonity or "one-way" property of entropy is deduced from
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the consideration of non-static adiabatic processes. Since 
Carathéodory's theory is quite insensitive to the specific 
choice of phase space, there is no way to obtain the charac­
teristic potentials that are associated with particular ther­
modynamic spaces.
In contrast, in Gibbs' theory, a particular phase space - 
the Gibbs space - is spanned by all the independent extensive 
variables. The exact mathematical foundations of Gibbs' géo­
métrisation of his thermodynamics was accomplished by Blasch- 
ke (1923), who showed that the geometry of the Gibbs space is 
an affine defferential geometry. In this theory all the ther­
modynamic properties of the system are supposed to be con­
tained in a fundamental equation representing entropy (or en­
ergy) as a function of the additive invariants. Geometrically, 
this equation is represented as a surface in the Gibbs space; 
it is called the primitive or phase surface. The phases of 
thermodynamic systems are each represented by a primitive sur­
face. A system of given chemical composition exists potential­
ly in a number of phases, each of which is specified by a 
primitive fundamental equation. The actual distribution of the 
additive Invariants of a system over phases is determined by 
the entropy maximum principle. Gibbs' criteria of stability 
may be obtained from an analysis of the curvature of the prim­
itive surfaces.
1.2 The problem of equilibrium; Kirehoff’e paradox
Among the most important concepts of thermodynamics is 
that of equilibrium, an elusive concept - in the words of Ti-3sza -, since there is no purely empirical method to establish 
whether or not a given system has actually reached equilibrium. 
For it might well be the case that an experimental investiga­
tion of a given system does not reveal any measurable changes 
during the time required to carry out the experiments; but this 
is not to say that a change might not have been observed if the 
investigation had extended over a greater interval of time. It
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is, however, experimentally observed that isolated systems 
generally tend to evolve spontaneously toward simple terminal 
states. Moreover, it is natural that a physical theory should 
first attempt to treat the properties associated with the 
simplest states of a system rather than to attack all possi­
ble complicated.states in a completely general way. But, of 
course, a fundamental question is still with us: "What are 
the simplest states of a system?" Since the observation of 
"whether the state of Interest is static and quiescent" cannot 
be considered as the absolute empirical criterion, we have to 
look for another one for greater simplicity. A very general 
formal criterion of simplicity is the possibility of describ­
ing the system in these states - the so-called equilibrium 
states - in terms of a finite number of variables. In order to 
rephrase the description of equilibrium in a manner that will 
provide a basis for further theoretical development, it is 
necessary to postulate the existence of equilibrium states and 
to assume that it is always possible to give a finite number 
of independent parameters which define the equilibrium states 
of a given system uniquely. These parameters or variables, 
which enter into the specification of an equilibrium state, 
are called state or thermodynamic variables. Of course, unless 
equilibrium obtains, these variables are not defined, in the 
sense that experiment does not yield unique values which might be 
assigned to them. Accordingly, it is meaningless to speak of a 
"non-equilibrium state": a system not in equilibrium is simply 
in no state at all.
By regarding the state variables of a system as coordi­
nate axes of a finite dimensional space, one can picture an 
(equilibrium) state of a system as represented by a point in 
the appropriate phase space. Further specification of thermo­
dynamic variables leads to the different foundations of thermo­
dynamics .
We now call attention to a methodological problem which 
was first objected by Kirchhoff to Planck'® early writings on 
thermodynamics. We will call this problem Kirchoff's paradox.
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In any theory of equilibrium thermodynamics, the determina­
tion of the conditions of equilibrium is made in the cases 
of isolated systems. But there are two possibilities: (1) the 
system is in equilibrium, or (2) it is not in equilibrium. In 
case (1) it is no longer possible to determine the conditions 
of equilibrium. In case (2) there is the problem of defining 
a thermodynamic potential for non-equilibrium states, but it 
is not a matter for equilibrium thermodynamics. That is, how 
are we to make a statement like "the entropy of an isolated 
system tends toward a maximum", whereas the entropy concept 
can be applied only for systems in equilibrium? To resolve 
this difficulty Carathéodory Introduced the Ingenious idea of 
“composite systems", which was later carried over into Gibbsi­
an thermodynamics. However, the systematic Incorporation of 
this concept into the foundations of equilibrium thermodynam­
ics necessitated a considerable revision of the classical con­
ceptual framework. In order to achieve this in a logically 
satisfactory manner, it was necessary to introduce some de­
vices endowed with extraordinary properties. These devices are 
called partitions or walls. They are essential for what might 
be called the "basic trick* in thermodynamic arguments. It is 
only by virtue of this basic trick that we can convert the 
nón-equilibrium situation to an equilibrium situation and, in 
particular, we can talk about the entropy of non-equilibrium 
states of a system.
The assumption of the existence of walls or partitions is 
fundamental for equilibrium thermodynamics. They separate a 
given system from its surroundings and provide its boundary 
conditions, or divide the Isolated system Into a number of 
subsystems. It is by means of manipulations of the walls that 
the thermodynamic parameters of the system are altered and cer­
tain processes are initiated. Thus, in this approach, the no­
tion of specific thermodynamical processes is deduced from the 
notion of specific walls. Of course, the converse reasoning is 
equally good. If the notion of a certain type of process is 
given, one can easily define the appropriate type of wall.
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As it was pointed out by Landsberg (1956), if a system 
in equilibrium is thermodynamically fully defined in terms 
of a finite number of independent variables, then a wall can 
be considered as one which forces one new relation on all the 
variables involved. Thus, from the mathematical point of 
view, a wall and a condition of equilibrium which establishes 
itself across it - i.e. the relation of “thermodynamic inter­
action" - can be characterised so that there shall exist a 
unique function of the variables of the systems separated by 
it such that the value of this function for the final equi­
librium states of subsystems is zero. If the sequents of 
state variables of two subsystems are denoted by x^, x^ and 
the number of independent variables for these systems are n^, 
n2 respectively, then the required function, say f i2(*i ,*2), 
is a function of n^ ♦ n2 independent variables. He can re­
gard this function as having physical meaning only for certain 
values of the n^ + n2 parameters - those values in fact 
which occur in the equilibrium conditions *j > " 0.
For any two systems, this relation is defined experimentally. 
According to Carathéodory, "In every particular case it is 
necessary to define what is meant by the various expressions 
used. This is done experimentally by establishing the form of 
an equation of type IFi x^) - 0/ that describes the ther­
modynamic properties of the wall under consideration. ... The 
discovery fo all relations of this type constitutes one of the 
principal problems of experimental thermodynamics."1*
1.3 The notion of oompoeite eyeteme
Let attention be then turned to the problem of the defi­
nition of walls and of composite systems in axiomatic ap­
proaches to thermodynamics.
As we want to carry along with the idea of a physical 
system the assumption that it can be modified within certain 
defined limits, i.e. a system has to be regarded together with 
its domain of permissible changes or, in other words, of per-
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misslble processes which can take place in this system, we 
need the notion of processes as primitive. Thus, the next 
methodological problem is the classification of the possible 
processes. The simplest solution is to introduce some basic 
types of processes as primitives. Another solution is to de­
fine the different types of processes in terms of given types 
of walls. In this case, of course, the notion of walls is 
considered primitive.
The processes arising by manipulations of the walls are 
generally associated with a redistribution of some quantity 
among various systems or among various portions of a single 
system. Thus, a formal classification of different types of 
walls would be based accordingly on the property of the walls 
in allowing or disallowing such redistributions. It is clear 
that this classification depends on which quantities are 
chosen. The general definition of the walls would be based on 
the concept of energy. Energy can be transferred to several 
modes of a system. For example, it can be transferred to a 
mechanical mode, an electrical mode, or a chemical mode of a 
system etc., such fluxes of energy being called mechanical 
work, electrical work, and chemical work etc. The different 
types of energy transfer can be typified by the terms treated 
fully in the standard theories of physics references. Thermo­
dynamics, from this point of view, is concerned with the 
energy transfer to the hidden atomic modes of motion which is 
called heat. At this point, however, there is the problem of 
founding thermodynamics without knowing a heat term.
First, we will consider the formulation of Carathéodory’s 
axiomatic approach given by Lansberg and Buchdahl. Let us 
refer to this theory as C.L.T. Carathéodory's theory specifies 
only two types of walls more closely: adiabatic and diatermic 
walls. That is, in this theory, the interactions between two 
systems are dichotomized into two types that are known, re­
spectively, as pure ttork interaction and pure heat interac­
tion». The essential characteristic of the presentation given 
by Carathéodory is “that the concepts 'adiabatic' and 'adi-
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abatically indulated' are defined with the aid of physical 
properties and are not, as is usual, reduced to the concept 
of energy'5. However, the definition of adiabatic walls in 
terms of "impermeability of heat' implies that the concept of 
heat has been defined. Hence the definition of the 'amount of 
heat" in terms of adiabatic changes (or processes) involves 
apparently logical circularity. To avoid this circularity 
Landsberg introduces the notion of the adiabatic process in 
the restrected sense. The essence in this artifice is intro­
ducing the notion of restricted adiabatic process as a primi­
tive one. The definition of this concept is not an explicit 
definition, it is rather used to demonstrate that this con­
cept may operationally be defined. His main object of intro­
ducing restricted adiabatic changes is to prove the existence 
of an "internal energy" function in terms of mechanical quan­
tities only. Then, having this knowledge, it may generally be 
supposed that there exist forms of energy other than mecha­
nical, and we have full knowledge of the properties of all 
forms of energy, except just one, namely the form called heat. 
Thus, when Landsberg introduces the general notion of energy 
and states the First Law in full, he has to use the concept 
of adiabatic processes as another primitive one. Consequently, 
the underlying theory of C.L.T. consists of the "theory of 
adiabatically interacting systems' referred to as T.A.I.S. For 
simplicity, we will use the concept of adiabatic processes for 
the structuralist reconstruction of T.A.I.S. and, by the above 
remarks, we will refer to it as non-theoretical.
The starting point of T.A.I.S. is assuming the existence 
of empirical methods to determine if a given system is in 
equilibrium. That is, we assume that a given system in equi­
librium is macroscopically fully defined by means of a finite 
number, say n, of independent physical quantities known from 
other parts of physics. As a matter of convenience, bearing 
the aim of simplicity constantly in mind, a further restriction 
will be placed for the time being on the kind of systems to be
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contemplated, which relates to the character of its coordi­
nates. Explicitly, all independent state variables of this 
sort of systems, called standard-systems, except for one, 
must depend on the external shape of the given system. The 
quantity that determines the external shape will be called 
deformation variable. As a consequence of this restriction, a 
standard system cannot have any internal partitions which 
adiabatically isolate parts of it from each other. From the 
mathematical point of view, this amounts to saying that there 
exists a function from the set of all states of the system to 
the n-dlmensional Euclidean space, where n ^ 2. The con­
dition n > 2 for the dimension of Euclidean space is neces­
sary, because in the case n » 1 the equilibrium would be 
reduced to a special kind of equilibrium which is discussed in 
another branch of physics.
In T.A.I.S., in addition to the notion of (equilibrium) 
states and of independent variables, we will use the general 
notion of processes as a non-theoretical primitive one. More­
over, it is possible to single out a special class of proces­
ses, namely quasietatic processes, which satisfy the addition­
al requirement that the work done in a quasistatic process is 
done precisely by the forces which hold the system in equilib­
rium. Since a quasistatic process has, as a sequence of (equi­
librium) states, a reasonably clear intuitive definition, the 
concept of quasistatic processes may be regarded as a primi­
tive non-theoretical one. Hence in T.A.I.S. the concepts of 
(equilibrium) states, state variables, permissible processes, 
adiabatic processes, quasistatic processes, and work are re­
garded as primitive non-theoretical ones. That is to say, 
T.A.I.S. is a special theory in the sense that it is exposed 
without the use of theoretical terms. As the underlying theory 
of C.L.T., this theory has the other feature that there is no 
need to Introduce constraints, i.e. the notion of composite 
systems.
The Carathéodory-Landsberg theory is considered as a the- 
oretization of T.A.I.S., where the new component is the inter-
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nal energy function. For the formulations of the constraints 
we will use the concept of diatermic walls as a non-theoreti­
cal primitive. In C.L.T., the primary object of using compos­
ite systems is to proceed to the concepts of absolute tem­
perature and entropy. The mathematical basis of this proce­
dure is the Frobenius Integration Theorem.
Let us now consider the use of composite systems in 
Gibbsian thermodynamics. The motivation for the use of compos­
ite systems in this theory is the same as in Carathéodory's 
theory. Composite systems, together with the thermodynamic 
processes of the redistribution of additive invariants, are 
used to determine the condition of equilibrium. That is, in 
order to obtain the conditions of equilibrium, it is neces­
sary to introduce partitions. In this theory, however, the 
classes of walls are increased so that other criteria of equi­
librium can be obtained in addition to those of thermal equi­
librium.
We will refer to the formulation of *neo-Gibbsian thermo­
dynamics" given by Moulines (1975) as known. In contrast to 
C.L.T., in his formulation of Gibbsian thermodynamics, denoted 
by S.E.T., Moulines introduces two primitive state concepts: 
states in the general sense and equilibrium states. Beside 
them, in S.E.T., there are the following primitive functions: 
energy, entropy, volume, mole numbers, and pressure. In addi­
tion, for the formulation of the most important thermodynamic 
contraints. Moulines introduces the notion of a combination 
operation as a primitive dyadic operation on states. From this 
primitive operation on states, he derives a defined operation 
on the corresponding systems. Recall, a system is identified 
with all its states. The combination operation is the formal 
counterpart to the physical coupling operation. Thus, ln S.E.T. 
the concept of composite systems is defined in terms of a com­
bination operation and intensive functions. Instead of assum­
ing the existence of different types of walls, in this theory, 
the notion of "Y-equilibrium" is defined, where Y is an ab­
stract intensive function.
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One of the most remarkable differences between S.E.T. 
and C.L.T. Is that S.E.T. concerns only one process. Hence 
all the primitive functions are defined on the set of states.
In order to proceed to the formulation of the Second Law, 
Moulines introduces the precised form of the so-called ’fun­
damental equation", i.e. he assumes the existence of an un­
specified "functional correlation" between entropy and the 
other primitive functions. The functional correlation means 
that the values of the entropy In the equilibrium states de­
pend on the values of energy, volume, etc. This dependence is 
expressed by means of a given function f® whose particular 
form can be different for different kinds of systems, but it 
is always the same for a given system. Moulines calls the 
function fs which is defined on tuples of real numbers an 
"entropy determination".
Finally, in S.E.T., amongst the primitive concepts those 
of state, volume, mole numbers, and pressure are non-theoret- 
ical and those of equilibrium state, combination operation, 
energy, and entropy are theoretical. It should be noted, how­
ever, that Moulines has not raised the question of whether or 
not the function fs is a theoretical one. The axiom D3-(4)ewhich is expressed by means of the function f is considered 
as am empirical law; but the axiom D3-(5) which is also ex­
pressed by means of it is considered "as an intertheoretical 
relation (Tisza's 'corresponding principle'), a bridge between 
thermodynamics amd mechanics. Had we an appropriate conceptual 
apparatus for reconstructing this sort of inter-theoretical 
principles, D3-(4))and D3-(5) would certainly not fall under 
the same logical category". Then he says: "... D3-(4), as 
stated in the core, does not specify anything. It is a general 
frame law. In a way analogous to Newton's second law in clas­
sical particle mechanics, this thermodynamic frame law is not
'falsifiable'. For a given simple system, we try to apply the§theory with a specific f ; if we do not get the desired re­
sults, we just try another form of entropy determination."6 But
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this seems to mean that the function fs is considered to be 
a theoretical one.
2. formaliaation of T.A.I.S.
After the foregoing discussion of T.A.I.S., it should 
be clear that all primitive terms are non-theoretical ones.
The reconstruction of T.A.I.S. given here is based on the for­
malization of ’First Law Thermodynamics" given by Day (1977). 
We will assume that the basic concepts of the theory of dif­
ferentiable manifolds, particularly the Frobenius theorem, 
are known to the reader. For discussion of these topics one 
can consult Von Westenholtz (1978) or Boothby (1975).
2.1 Dafinition
TAIS (*) iff there exists an B, P, Pad, pqs, L and W 
such that**
(1) x - <E, P, Pad, Pqa, L, W>;
(2) E is a connected C^-manifold of dimension n+l>2, 
with a single chart where the coordinate functions 
are denoted by Xq , x , ... , xR;
(3) P is a non-empty set;
(4) Pad and Pqs are non-empty subsets of the set P;
(5) L is a function from P into E x E;
(6) W is a function from P into the set Re of real num­
bers.
The intended interpretations of the primitives are as 
follows: E is the set of all (equilibrium) states. The coor­
dinate functions are to be interpreted as representing the 
n+l>2 independent state variables which are appropriate to the 
system of interest. Note that there is only one non-deforma­
tion coordinate which will be denoted by Xq . The image of E is 
usually called the phase space of the system. P is the set of 
all possible processes which the system can undergo.pad and Pqa 
are the subsets of all adiabatic and quasistatic processes, 
respectively. The function L is to be interpreted as an as-
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signaient f initial and final states to the processes. We will 
use the notations L(p) = (pi, pfX  or L(p) = (e^, e2> for 
all p € P .  (°f course, the values oiay be expressed in the 
local coordinates as well.) For notational convenience, we 
will use the expression L(p) to denote the ordered pair which 
is obtained by reversing the members of the ordered pair L(p). 
Finally, any process p e P, for which L(p) « L(p) will be 
called eyolio prose at. For any p e P, WCp) is the real num­
ber which represents the net work done by the system in the 
process p with respect to some fixed units of measurement.
The set of all partial possible models (and of all pos­
sible niodels) of T.A.I.S. is the set TAISpp /-TAISp/ »
- (x : TAIS (x)}.PP
2.2 Definition
TAIS(x ) iff there exists an E, P, pad, Pqs, L, W, and DW 
such that
(1) x - <E, P, Pad, Pqs, L, W>;
(2) TAIS„(x) ;- PP
(3) DW » I a.dx is a non-singular Pfaffian differential
l<i<n 1
form ~ on E where aj^  ” ai(x0, x , ... , x^ );
(4) For any e^, e E, there exists an p e Pad such that
either L(p) » ^e^ e2> or L(p) - <e2# e^;
(5) For any p, P' e Pad, if L(p) - L(p') then 
W(P> - W(p'),
(6) For any e ^  e2, e3 e E and for any p', p "  e Pad,
if L(p') ■ e2^ and kip” ) “ (e2» then there
exists a p e Pad such that L(p) ■ , e3) and
w(p) - w(p') + w(p") ;
(7) There exists a bijection C between the set Pqs and the 
set V </0' E * of the Piecewise differentiable
curves in E such that p1 » c (0) and pf » c (1), for 
os P PP e Pqs ;
(8) For any p e Pqs, W(p) - / d w .
‘t*
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According to the intended interpretation, the particular 
fora of Dtf given in the coordinate system xq , x^, , xq 
contains all physical properties of the system of Interest.
The differentiable functions a^, 1 < i < n, which in fact con­
tain the empirical information necessary for the application 
of theory, are sometimes as the generalized forces correspond­
ing to the derformation variables. "The functions a^ can be 
determined experimentally by measuring at every state of the 
system those forces that must be applied from the outside to7maintain equilibrium.1' Axiom (4) stipulates that for «my two 
states of a given system there must exist an adiabatic process 
which connects these two states, but the direction of the 
process is unspecified. Axiom (5) stipulates that for any two 
adi«d>atic processes which have the same initial and final 
states the net work done by the system in one of these proces­
ses is equal to the net work done by the system in the other 
process. Axiom (6) stipulates that, if there exist adiabatic 
processes such that the final state of one process is the 
initial state of «mother process, then there exists «m adiabat­
ic process which connects the initial state of the former 
process with the final state of the latter process and the net 
work done by the system in this process is equal to the sum 
of the net works done by the system in the first two proc­
esses. Axiom (7) stipulates that every quasistatic process is 
represented by a piecewise differentiitble curve, and converse­
ly. Axiom (8) together with the intended interpretation of the 
Pfaffian DW may be considered as an exact mathematical formu­
lation of the expression "the net work done by the system in a 
quasistatic process p1*.
The set of all models of T.A.I.S. is TAIS - {x : TAIS(x)}.
Let us now consider the theorems and definitions which 
will be derived from 2.2 Definition.
The proofs of the following theorems may be found in Day 
(1977).
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2.3 Theorem
For any p ^  p2< P3 e p8d# if Pi “ P2 and L(P3> “
= <P*, Pj) then W(p3) - W(px> + W(p2).
2.4 Theorem
For each oyolio process p e Pad, W(p)« 0 .
2.8 Theorem
For any p^, P2 e Pad if L(p^> “ L(p2> then 
W(P3) “ -W(P2) .
The first theorem is the usual statement of the FirstgLaw of Thermodynamics. In this theory, however, it is derived 
from two weaker requirements (explicitly, from axioms (5) and 
(6)) which contain all the essential conditions necessary to 
the foundations of thermodynamics. The latter two theorems 
are simple consequences of the first one.
Now, in order to formulate the well-known fundamental 
properties of T.A.I.S., we will give a definition of internal 
energy function for the system (E,P).
2.6 Definition
Ief(E, P) is the set of all functions 0 whose domain is 
E taking on real numbers as values such that for any p e pad,
OCp1) - 0(pf) - W(p).
2.7 Theorem
The set Ief(E, P) is not empty.
2.8 Theorem
For any U^» U2 e Re^ if 6 Ief(E, P) then 
V2  € Ief(E, P) if and only if there exists a c € Re such 
that for all e e E, U^e) “ 02(e) + c •
According to 2.8 Theorem, an internal energy function of 
the system (E, P) is unique up to an additive constant. The 
proofs of these theorems are also in Day (1977).
Next, we will give a definition of heat function for the 
system (E, P) which associates with each process p e P the
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net heat absorbed by the system In that process.
2.9 Definition
Heat (E, P) is the set of all functions Q whose domain 
is P taking on real numbers as values such that for all 
pep, Q(p) - U(pf) - (Up1) + w(p) .
2.10 Theorem
Heat (E, P) - (Q>.
2.11 Theorem
« adFor any p ß P  •
2.12 Theorem
For any oyolio process p e P, Q(p) = W(p).
The proofs of these theorems may also be found in Day 
(1977).
According to the first of these theorems there exists 
one and only one heat function for a given system. The second 
theorem upon interpretation says that the net heat absorbed 
by the system (E, P) in any adisbatic process is zero. Final­
ly, the third theorem may be considered as expressing the 
impossibility of a perpetual motion machine of first kind.
In order to formulate the basic set-theoretic predicate 
of C.L.T. we need an important auxiliary concept.
2.13 Definition
AIP(E, P) is the set of all points e S E for which 
there exist points e' e E arbitrarily close to e that 
are inaccessible by adiabatic processes with initial 
state e e E.
The points in the set AIP(E, P) are called Adiabatically 
Inaccessible Points of the system (E, P).9
3. Formalization of C.L.T.
As in the case of T.A.I.S., we will assume that it is 
clear from the considerations made in the introduction that
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all of the primitive terms of C.L.T. are nontheoretical ones. 
Thus the frame of C.L.T. is also a special one because the 
set of possible models for the fundamental predicate of the 
theory is identical with the set of its partial possible mod­
els. In this case, of course, the constraints are imposed 
upon non-theoretlcal components.
3.1 Da finition
CLT (x) iff there exists an E, P, Pad, Pqs, L, W and 0 PP
such that
(1) x - <E, P, Pad, Pqs, L, W, 0>; n
(2) TAIS( E, P, Pad, PqS, L, W where DW - I a ^ ^
(3; x0 - 0 e Ief(E, P) is of class C1; iml
(4) DQ = DO + dW is a non-singular Pfafflan.
The set of all partial possible models (and of all pos­
sible models) of C.L.T. is the set
CLT (- CLT) - {x : CLT (x)>.pp p pp
3.2 Definition
CLT(x) iff
(1) CLT (x);PP(2) For any p e Pqs, Q(p) « / DQ where Q e Heat(E, P>.
(3) AIP(E) « E. Cp
The set of Jill models of C.L.T. is the set CLT « {x : CLT(x)}.
The axiom(3) in 3.1 Def. requires that the n + 1 in­
dependent state variables consist of the internal energy and 
n deformation coordinates. Axiom (2) in 3.2 Def. may be con­
sidered as a precised form of the expression "the amount of 
heat gained by the system (E, P) in a quasistatic process P". 
Axiom (3) in 3.2 Def. is Carathéodory1 e principle. It àimply 
says that all points ln E are adiabatically inaccessible 
points. According to this axiom, which may be considered as 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics, axiom(7) in 2.2 Def., and 
2.11 Theorem tor each point e e E, there exist points
14S
e' e E arbitrarily close to e that are inaccessible from e 
along curves for which DW « 0.
The following theorem, which may be called Carathiodoryfa 
theorem, is an application of Frobenius's integrability theorem. 
It says that the integrability condition for the Pfaffian 
equation DO * 0 and Carathéodory's principle are equiva­
lent.
3.3 Theorem
For an y x, E and P if cur(x), pr^(x) - E and 
pr2(x) • P then the following statements are equivalents
(i) There exist two functions h, s e C^ (E, Re) such 
that DQ - h ds.
(ii) AIP(E, P) « E.
The proof of this theorem may be found in Von Westen- 
holtz (1978) p. 237.
According to this theorem, Carathéodory'8 principle is 
a necessary and sufficient condition for a function 
s e C*(E, Re) to exist such that ds + O on E and the 
hypersurfaces of the type
N {e e E : s(e) « const, and ds(e) f o) 
are integral surfaces for DQ. By the Intended interpretation, 
any continuous sequence of states, no two members of which 
are quasistatlcally accessible from each other, therefore 
generates a family of non-intersecting hypersurfaces in E, 
called the adiabatic hypersurfaces, or simply the adiabatics 
of the system (E, P).
The new function s e C^(E, Re), determined by the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics and the particular form of DQ, 
is called empirical entropy function of the system.
3.4 Definition
Ent(E, P) is the set of all functions s e C*(E, P) for 
which there exists a function h e C*(E, Re) such that 
DQ - h ds.
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It is well known from the proof of the Carathéodory 
theorem that an empirical entropy function is uniquely deter­
mined up to arbitrary monotonically increasing or decreasing 
transformations of class C^; i.e. if g e C*(Re) and 
s e Ent(E, P) then g o s e Ent(E, P).
A basic property of the empirical entropy function is 
that it has the same value for all states which are accessible 
from each other by quasistatic adiabatic processes.
The following theorem says that an entropy function can 
be used instead of the internal energy function as one of the 
independent state variables.
3.S Theorem
For any x, E, P, U, and s if CLT(x) and pr^(x) E,
pr2(x) “ P» 0 O' and s e Ent(E, P) then 
1
fs ° f01 and f0 ° fs
are C -diffeomorphisms between fp(E) and fg(E), where the 
coordlane functions of the chart f„ are x,
pr. o f„ (1 < i < n)
0 0 
and of the chart f
s, Pri o f_ (1 < 1 < n).
Proof: It is enough to prove that as/2U # 0 for any e e E. 
Assume that s e Ent(E, P), i.e. DQ « h ds. Then by point 
4. of 3.1 Def.
n
DQ =■= d0 + t a.dx. * h 
i=l 1 1
ds.
Since ds s
n
+ I 22-dxätrD i«l 5 x ^ xi
f
we have DQ * h ^ JO + h ; j j d
i«i?xi xi •
Hence h 9sh 3ÏÏ - l. that 3s/au * 0
To formulate the general constraints of C.L.T. precisely 
we will need the following definitions.
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3.6 Dafinition
k
where E. , P. , P*d etc. 
lk Xk K
«... o. , • • **y D * UU 
rk '
are the components associated
• • • 9
with application i^th of C.L.T.
First, we will formulate the identity constraints for 
functions L, W, Q, and 0. These constraints reflect the in­
tuitive idea that these functions measure an *intrinsic prop­
erty* of the system, i.e. they require that the different
concrete functions L. , L. , ... etc. proceeding out of the 
*1 l2abstract functions L, W, etc. yield the same value for a 
process, respectively.
3.7 Constraint
When there is no risk of confusion, we will omit the un­
derlining and use the same letter for the concrete and ab­
stract functions.
To formulate the "diatermic Interaction* between two 
standard systems we will need the notion of a diatermic cou­
pling relation between them. Let us denote this relation by 
RdtsP x P.It is, of course, a primitive relation likewise 
the combination operation • used in Moulines (1975). The phy-
L is a function from P into E x E;
W is a function from P into Re; 
Q is a function from P into Re; 
0 is a function from E into Re
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sical interpretation of the relation Rdt, which may be con- 
sidred as the formal counterpart to the idea of the "diatermic 
interaction", is the following: For any two processes Pj^  and 
p2, which belong to distinct systems, if ^Pj, P2) e R<3t then 
then at the initial states pj, p2 there must be a diatermic 
Interaction between the two systems (E^, P2) and (E2, Pj) 
for which the states pf and pi pertain, and there is a func-1 ‘ f f
tion F12 : Ej x Ej -» Re such that Fi2*pl' p2 ° *  The Partic“
ular form of F^2 is determined by a set of primary empirical
conventions. Furthermore, this relationship shall be unique
in the following sense. If the local coordinates of p^ and p2
are xQ , and yQ , respectively, and if
all but one of the x's and y's in the equation Fi2*x0'** ’ ,3V
y ,...,y ) “ 0 are known, the unknown coordinate shall be o n
determined uniquely by this equation.
As is well known, the main aim of claiming the Zeroth 
Law of Thermodynamics is to proceed to the idea of empirical 
temperature. However, the usual statement of this law does 
not imply the continuity property of the entropy function. It 
was pointed out by Lenker (1979) that we have to place addi­
tional restrictions on the set of relations F ^  and the state 
spaces so that continuous empirical temperature functions do 
exist.
First, we will define the following notions:
S.8 Definition
For any x^, x2, E^, Ej, P^, and P2 if CLTÍXj^), 
pr^(x^) « Ej, prjiXj^) = Plf CLTCXj),- pr^iXj) - Ej_, and 
pr2(x2) « P2 then
Ed2 is the set of all points ^e^, e2^ e Ej x Ej for 
which there exist p^ e P^ and p2 6 P2 such that 
<pl« P2> e Rdt» ei * Pi and e2 ' p2 ;
Pd2 is the set of all pairs ^p1# P2)> 6 P^ x Pj, for
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which <(Pjí e R<^t .
3.9 Constraint
For any x^, E^, and ej lf CLT(Xj), pr^tXj^) » Ej, and 
ej e Ej then there exists an x2, Ej, and e2 such that
That is, in the case of standard systems, equilibrium 
can exist only on condition that one or more relations of the
The following theorems are simple consequences of 3.8 
Dsf. and 3.9 Constraint.
3.10 Theorem
If e is a state of the system composed by Ej and E2 with 
independent state variables nj and n2, respectively, then the 
composed system in state e has ni + n2 + * Independent state 
variables with nj + n2 deformation coordinates.
3.11 Theorem
For any e, e' e E, there exists a process p e Pdt such 
that L(p) « (e, e'^ or L(p) « <^ e', e^; where Pdt is the 
set of those processes of the system (E, P) for which there 
exists a system (E', P') and a process p' e P' with
The next two constraints posed upon the relations F..
10 13are usually called the Zeroth Law of Thermodynamics.
3.12 Constraint
For any xif Ej, and ej (i ■> 1, 2) if CLT(Xj),
form F,ij « 0 are satisfied.
<p, p '> e Rdt-
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3.12 Constraint
For any x^ , E^ , and ^  (i « 1, 2, 3) if CLT(x^), 
e£ e E1, <elf e2) e i *  and ^  ej) e thei <er  e^ 6 .
First, we will concentrate the identical copies of a 
given standard system. The set of relations is thus re­
duced to a single relation F. It follows from the last two 
constraints that F induces an equivalence relation Edt on 
E x E if we define <ex, e2) e Edt exactly when F(e1,e2) - 0.
3.14 Theorem
&  is an equivalence relation on E.
Denote the equivalence class of e e E by /e/, and the 
quotient space by E/Edt.
3.15 Constraint
For any e e E, /e/ is closed and connected.
Let E+ be the subset of E which satisfies the condition 
that, for any e ^  e2 e E+, <elf e2^ $ Edt.
3.16 Constraint
E+ is not connected.
We are now in a position to apply a result due to Eilen­
berg (1941).
3.17 Theorem
Biere exist exactly two inverse near orders on E.
The intuitive idea behind this procedure is the follow­
ing: the concept of thermal equilibrium induces a near order 
relation on E, and an empirical temperature function is sim­
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ply e real-valued near order-preserving function defined on E.
Extension to more than one systems. Let us assume that 
the state spaces E. (1 « 1, 2, 3) of three arbitrary systems1 Jl
are endowed with equivalence relations E^ and near orders, 
denoted by H^, respectively.
Now, we can define a subset E^23 — E1 x E2 x E3 by the 
condition that
< el' s2' 3> e E123 Iff ïijCej/ej)
e E,,vi>ere i,j « 1, 2, 3, i ^ j  for any e^ e E^,
e2 6 E3.
Moreover, we can define a near order H123 on E123 component­
wise if the equivalence relation on E123 generated by
E^fc is also defined componentwise.
Finally, we can define two functions.
3.18 Dofinition
For any 6 t ©2 ® and e
Y1 : E1/E^t -#•
be defined by the assignment YlU e in
and the function
*2 : Ej/Ej1 E3/Ef
be defined by the assignment Y2(/e2/) « /e3/ if 
F23(e2'e3) “ 0>
The next two constraints complete the sufficient condi­
tions for the Zeroth Law of Thermodynamics to imply the exist­
ence of a continuous empirical temperature function.
3.19 Constraint
The functions Y3 and Yj are near order-preserving func­
tions .
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3.20 Constraint
E /EdtE123,fc123 possesses a countable dense subset.
3.21 Theorem
There exists a real-valued continuous near order-pre­
serving map t with domain Ei23^E123 "
Thus t * t o G is a real-valued continuous near order­
preserving map defined on E323, where G(x) • /x/, for any 
x e e123.
Where are finally ready to define the empirical tempe­
rature functions. Since they are all defined similarly, we 
exhibit t3 by t^e^) « t((e3, e2, e3>), i.e. an empirical tem­
perature function of the system ( ,  Pj^ ) is a restriction of 
the function t to E^.
3.22 Definition
For any x, E, P if CLT(x), pr^(x) « E and pr2(x) = P 
then Temp(E , P) is the set of all empirical temperature func­
tions of the system (E, P).
It is important to note that temperature functions exist 
only for systems which are free from adiabatic partitions and 
vacuous spaces. The particular form of an empirical tempera­
ture function depends on the particular form of the empirical 
functions used to determine the condition of thermal equi­
librium. The existence of a unique empirical tempereture func­
tion for a given system has not been proved, and in fact no 
such function exists. It is obvious that any monotonically 
increasing or decreasing transformation of a given tempera­
ture function may equally be considered as a new temperature 
function of the system of interest. Of course, requirements of 
continuity of differentiability on the transformation function 
and on the empirical functions F ^  are understood.
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The following theorem says that for any t 6 TempiE,P) 
if t is given by the local coordinates 0, x^,...,xR then it 
must in fact depend on at least one of the x's.
3.23 Theorem
Por any x, E, P, if CLT(x), pr^(x) » E, and pr2(x) “ P
then for any t B TempiE, P) there exists a coordinate func­
tion xj (1 < 1 < n) such that St/JXj + 0.
Proofs Let eQ , e e E and p e Pad such that e ^ eQ ,
L(p) » <eQ , e} and the local coordinates of eQ>e are the fol­
lowing
xq ■ <0, xx, • «. f xlI ••« , xR^ and 
x - <^ 0, Xj^ ... , x^ + dxA, ..., x^y , respectively!
i.e. dO « 0, and dx^ « 0 if j f i. By 2.11 Theorem, Q(p) “ 0
and since Q(p) ■ / DQ » a. dx. by 3.2. Def., we haveS .,<0, xx, ... , xn ) - O .
That is U, x ^  ..., xR would not be independent, but this is 
a contradiction.
The consequence of this theorem is that any empirical 
temperature function can be introduced in expressions in­
volving x^ by virtue of the given dependency relation.
As is well known, the proof of the existence of absolute 
temperature and entropy function is one of the main results of 
C.L.T. Next, we will proceed to this task.
Let us consider the thermal equilibrium of the systems 
(Eir Pj^ ) and (Ej, P2). Let xQ , ... , xm and yQ , ... , yR be 
the independent state variables corresponding to these sys­
tems, respectively, where x0 “ si e Ent(Ej, P^),
Xj « tj e TermiE^, P^), yQ * s2 e EntiEj, Pj), end
y1 * t2 e Temp(E2, P2 ). The thermal equilibrium imposes the
relation t^(e^) » t2(e2), for all e^ e E^, e2 e Ej. That is,
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if we use t for the common empirical temperature, then the 
independent variables are
t, s^, s2, Xj, ... , x^, y2 , ... , yn
where t denotes the common empirical temperature. Since there 
exists an integrating factor to each system separately, and 
the combined system is also a standard system, using 
DQ * DQj^  + DQ2 for the Pfaffian of the combined system, one 
finds
(1 ) h ds h^ ds1 + h2 ds2
omitting suffices for the combined system. On the other hand, 
from the functional relation s « s(t, s,
y2' 
the
, y n ), the derlvate ds can be expressed in terms of
(2)
(3)
and
(4)
m + n + 1 independent coordinates :
ds = £!Ljt + ^_ds + £s^js + t ^ - d x  + r+ 35^*sl + ^  2 i-2 ?xi 1 j-2
(1) and (2)
9s m
at
as
axi
« 25_ . o 
*xi
(2 < i < m. 2 < j < n)
as
ask m k
(k - 1, 2)
;s
PY.,
By (1) and (3), s 
tion (4) follows that
s(s^, s2), consequently, from the equa-
(5) a2sas^t ■ 0, that is
a/hk\,5EVE7 (k - 1, 2)
Performing the differentiation explicitely, we find that
-1 1^n2 _ 1 3h
Ti 2*. '(6)
lah
F ^ t F2-t
Since 
y2' *
S^, Xj, X )m and h2 *= h2(t, s2.
i , y ) it follows that each expression (6) is a func­
tion of t only, g(t) say. Thus, g(t) is a universal function 
of the chosen empirical temperature function. It is easily 
seen that the sign of the integrating factor h does not affect 
the specific properties of the function g(t). So far, there
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is no need to make special assumption«concerning the sign of 
h. By integration, we obtain
t
(7) hk(t' sk' *kJ “ Bk(sk' *k* exp* ^ g(t)dt} (k » 1, 2)
fco
where Zj^ ■ , ... , x^ y and *22“(y2' *'' ' yn) *
The value of this integration depends on the value of 
t . Consequently, to fix the value of the integrating factor 
we need a new constraint:
3.24 Constraint
The standard empirical temperature t is the same for all 
physical systems.
Thus, the value of the integrating factor h^ at this 
temperature occours as a constant of integration, and has been 
denoted by
(8) hk (to' sk ' “ Bk(sk' *k*' “ 1* 2) •
The possibility of using a single empirical entropy func­
tion for the combined system can be justified by an argument 
based on (1) and (7) but we will not repeat here.
To gain the existence of an absolute temperature function 
we have to require not only t but also a constant C is given 
for all standard systems.
3.25 Constraint
The value of the constant of integration derived in (7) 
is the same, C say, for all physical systems.
Now, we can write for all systems 
DQ - h ds - T dS 
where, by definition
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3.26 Definition
t
T(t) » C exp{ / g(t)dt} and
- 1 S —S(s ) - C A / B(s, z)ds
8o
and sQ refers to a standard value of s for the particular 
system under discussion. The function T is called the ab­
solute temperature, and depends only on tQ and the empirical 
temperature t, while S is called the entropy which depends on 
the variables z, the empirical entropy s and the value sQ . To 
fix the value of S we will require the following
3.27 Constraint
For all physical systems, the value so has the property
S(so ) - 0.
The name absolute temperature comes from the fact that 
one and the same function T, depending only on t and the 
empirical temperature function t, serves as an integrating 
denominator for the Pfaffian DQ of all standard systems whose 
temperatures are measured on a common scale t. The function T 
can be also considered as a transformation from one tempe­
rature function to another.
As it can be justified that the function g(t) can not 
change sign under the given assumptions, we will assume the 
following
3.28 Constraint
By adjustment of the sign 
function if necessary, g(t) has 
for all systems.
The following theorem is a 
requirement.
of the empirical temperature 
been arranged to be positive
simple consequence of this
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3.29 Theorem
The absolute temperature is a strictly Increasing or a 
strictly decreasing function of the empirical temperature, 
when the remaining variables are kept fixed.
Proofs Since g(t) is real, T and dT/dt both have the sign of 
the constant C.
The next theorems say that T and S have certain essential 
invariance properties.
3.30 Theorem
For any x, E, P, t^, and t2 if CLT(x), pr^(x) m E, 
pr2(x) - P, and t^, t2 e Temp(E, P) then T(t^) ■ T(tj).
Proofs See Landsberg (1961), p. 64
3.31 Theorem
T and S are independent of the choice of the integrating 
denominator for DQ.
Proof: See Landsberg (1961), pp. 64-65
3.32 Theorem
T and S are independent of the choice of the empirical 
temperature functions.
Proofs See Landsberg (1961), pp. 65-66
Against the properties of invariance just discussed must 
be set other properties of entropy and absolute temperature, 
which depend on certain arbitrary choices. One of these have 
been already done in 3.28 Conetr., l.e. the sign of the empir­
ical temperature. As it was already noted, the choice of sign 
for the integrating factors h has no effect on the absolute 
temperature T, but it does effect the sign of the entropy S: 
The absolute temperature function is defined only to within a
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constant factor since we can always write (c_1T)d(cS) In 
place of TdS, where c e Re. We will require that the sign 
of c be chosen so that d(cS)/ds > 0, whilst factors c * and 
c may simply be left understood in T and S, respectively. That 
is, the sign of S depends on the sign of the integrating de­
nominator for DQ.
3.33 Constraint
The sign of the integrating denominator for DQ must be 
chosen that dS/ds > 0.
Finally, the sign of the constant C determines the sign 
of T and of dT/dt.
3.34 Constraint
The sign of C must be positive.
Now, let us turn to the "one-way" property of entropy in 
adiabatic processes. According to 2.2 Def. (.4), i.lt Def. and 
3.2 Dsf. (3), two points in E which correspond to different 
entropy values can be linked by a non-static adiabatic proc­
ess. Consider now the entropy values attainable by arbitrary 
adiabatic processes which commence at a given state eQ S E.
Let the function S be defined for all processes p e Pad, 
i 0 ffor which p « eQ , by SQ(p) - S(p ). The range of SQ is an
interval of Re by 2.1 Def. (2). It follows from 3.2 Def. (3)
that SQ(eo ) is an endpoint of this interval, i.e. the value
of the function S_ ean either not inerease or not decrease in o
adiabatie prooesses with initial state e . Of course, this 
property is independent of the particular choice of the ini­
tial point eQ. It remains to be decided if the sense in which 
the entropy can change from a given Initial state is the same 
for all initial states of a given system. However, this cannot 
be derived from the assumptions made so far.
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3.3£ Constraint
The monotonity property of the function S0 in adiabatic 
processes is the same for all points ln E.
The following theorem says that this sense is the same 
for all standard systems.
3.36 Thsorsm
e p
For any 
ad
P2
(Ej, P), i®2' ^2^' Pl' P2' sl' and
e p 2 , s^ G Ent(Elt Pj), and s2 e
if
then
sign Spi(pj) - sign Spl(p2) .
Proofs See Landsberg (1961), p. 82
To determine the sense in which the entropy of a system 
changes in adiabatic processes, we have to define the entropy 
of composed systems. The functions T and S have been defined 
only for standard systems. If the systems (E^, P^) and (E2,P2) 
are in thermal equilibrium, then from the expressions
h ds ■ h^ ds^ + h2 dSj
we have
That is
DQ
DQ
dS
TdS
T dS^ + T dS2
dS^ + dSj ;
T d(Sx + S2)
and this implies
s _ * r
S » / B ( s ,  z ) d s « / l
s *  s Lo o
(S^, z1 )ds1 + BjiSj, z2 )ds2
» Sj + S2 + A
where the constant A, which depends only on the standard 
entropy value sQ , is zero by 3.27 Constraint. Thus, the 
entropy of the composed system in the given equilibrium state 
is the sum of the entropies of the individual systems. If the
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part systems are each in equilibrium, but their temperatures 
are different, then the composed system is not a standard one. 
That is, this system has no unique temperature function, nor 
has it an entropy function. However, an appropriate entropy 
function can be defined to be the sum of the entropies of the 
part-systems. Hence, the Increment of the entropy of a com­
posed system consisting of two adiabatic part-systems is 
dS » dSx + dS2
bearing in mind that the equation DQ “ TdS does not hold in 
this case, since the composed system is not a standard one.
If an absolute temperature T is introduced as a weighted 
average of and T2 then we can assign an appropriate 
standard system to the given composed one. The Pfaffian of 
the new system is defined by
dS. dS.00 - Ti ar1 * t2 as^  “
Now, if the Initial temperature difference T2 - T^ > O 
is very small, then the change of entropy of the composed sys­
tem in a quasistatic non-adiabatic process which establishes 
a temperature equality is
(*) dS « DQ(1/TX - l/Tj) > 0
i.e. it is positive by 2.9 Def., 3.2 Def. (.2), and 3.34 
Conetr.
Then, under the same initial states, instead of using a 
quasistatic non-adiabatic process, we use a non-static adia­
batic process in which the variables entering into the ex­
pression for DW are again kept fixed to attain temperature 
equality between the two systems. Of course, the final states 
in these two experiments will in general not be Identical.
But it would be reasonable to expect them to be very similar, 
with a very small distance between them. For the non-adia­
batic element in the first process, and the non-static element 
in the second process, are then both very slight. It follows 
that the sign of the entropy changes involved is the same in 
both processes. Thus, by 3.3S Conetr. and (*), the entropy of
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a system (which may contain adiabatic partitions and vacuous 
spaces) in a given state cannot be adiabatically decreased. 
This statement is usually called the prinoipl« of tho inr 
area»» of entropy.
4. Concluding remark»
First of all, the formalization of C.L.T. given here is 
not concerned with the ’complete" equilibrium thermodynamics, 
because it does not account for the so-called Third Law of 
Thermodynamics.
Instead, the main points are
1. to reconstruct the relationship between the First Law 
and the Second Law, and it has been achieved through the defi­
nition of TAIS and of CLT;
2. to formulate the sufficient conditions for the exist­
ence of empirical temperature functions; it has been achieved 
through Constraints 3.9, 3.12, 3.13, 3.15, 3.16, 3.19, and
3.20;
3. to formulate the sufficient conditions for the exist­
ence of absolute temperature function and entropy function, 
which has been achieved through Constraints 3.24, 3.25, 3.27, 
and 3.28;
4. to derive the principle of increase of entropy for a 
given type of systems characterised by Constraints 3.33, and
3.34 from Charathéodory's principle and Constraint 3.35.
The relationship between SET and CLT is not a reduction 
relation or a specialization relation. These are different 
theory-element cores. The diatermic coupling relation in CLT 
seems to be similar to the combination operation • used in 
SET. However, the physical interpretation of R<*t and that of 
• are very different. Moulines requires that • be a dyadic 
operation on states, i.e. z^ • Zj is also a state for any
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States z1 and Zj. In addition, a combined state of two sys­
tems is considered in which there is a possibility of a truly 
physical interaction of a certain, unspecified kind between 
the two systems. By (D.8) ln Moulines (1975), the composite 
system Z^ * Z2, whose members are the combined states of 
the systems Z^ and Zj, cannot be considered as a subset of 
Z1 x Zj. We have to note, moreover, that Moulines fails to 
require that Z^ • Zj be a possible model of S.E.T., or even 
a "continuous process", while this is Involved in the require­
ments (C.3), (C.4), (C.7) and (C.8).
Loránd Eötvßs University, Budapest
NOTES
1. We will assume that the reader is familiar with the 
structuralist approach as expounded in Sneed (1971) and 
in Balzar and Sneed (1977-78).
2. Carathéodory (1909)
3. Tisza (1966), p.36
4. Carathéodory (1909), p.232
5. ibid., p. 230
6. Moulines (1975), p. 114
7. Carathéodory (1909), p. 238
8. Carathéodory (1909), p. 239; Landsberg (1961), pp. 25, 31; 
Buchdahl (1966), p. 40
9. Landsberg (1961), pp. 50-55, 77-79
lO. Carathéodory (1909), pp. 243-4; Landsberg (1961), p. 13; 
Buchdahl (1966), pp. 27-30.
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